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ABSTRACT
TRANSFORMATIONS: MATERIAL TERMS FOR WRITING ON RELIGION IN
COMPOSITION CLASSROOMS
Mark Alan Williams
April 10, 2013
This dissertation argues for closer attention to the material conditions of student
writing on religion. Writing scholars in recent years have called for the inclusion of
students’ religiously inflected perspectives, values, experiences, genres, and texts in the
classroom, but I argue insufficient attention has been paid to the broader social contexts
in which composition students must write about religion.
In the first chapter, I outline the basic principles of my theoretical approach and
attempt to articulate the generalized exigency of this work in terms of our current
political and religious climate. I contend that a clearer understanding of how changing
conditions create and transform religions can better prepare educators to intervene in and
alter potentially counterproductive understandings and assumptions held by students and
instructors alike. In the second chapter, I illustrate this, demonstrating how approaches to
religious students previously forwarded by rhetoric and composition scholars fail to
adequately address the material conditions of the writing classroom and larger American
religious culture in which students and teachers interact.
The third and fourth chapters draw on scholars outside rhetoric and composition
to offer a materialist case-study of American evangelicalism, exploring how its
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representations are distributed through various channels including institutional policies,
celebrity representatives, research definitions, classroom interactions, and political
platforms; and how these representations come to shape a society’s religious ideas,
commitments and identities. I also examine the discourse of alternative forms of
evangelicalism to demonstrate how religious formations are contested and change in
response to changing social contexts, such as recent shifts in American attitudes towards
homosexuality and women’s rights.
In chapter five, I draw on translingual pedagogies emphasizing the critical use of
students’ personal resources in the classroom to point out several ways students could
employ their diverse religious resources in writing so as to interrogate and intervene in
these changing religious contexts. Vital to these pedagogical recommendations is a focus
on the role of disciplinary relationships, bodily practices, and material objects in religion,
areas of study that have increasing value as rhetoric and composition looks to
acknowledge these critical dimensions of learning and writing.
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CHAPTER I
THE WEAK MIDDLE

Charles Taylor characterizes the current “Secular Age” as one in which most
individuals can no longer naively adhere to traditions but must always choose, forced to
recognize that their tradition is one among a range of options. Anthony Giddens similarly
suggests that globalization has placed new demands on people: “in a cosmopolitan world,
more people than ever before are regularly in contact with others who think differently
from them. They are required to justify their beliefs, at least implicitly, both to
themselves and to others.” Giddens’ description, like Taylor’s, suggests what we already
likely know: globalization brings contact, and contact often denaturalizes habituated
beliefs—as well as habituated assumptions, feelings and behaviors. College writing
courses are sites where these challenges to students and their ways of being occur; not
only because the university classroom is a site for the sort of contact that Giddens
gestures at, but also because the rationale behind many contemporary writing courses
emphasizes diversity, complexity, cultural critique, reflection, and choice. Our
classrooms are inherently and intentionally sites where such encounters across difference
will take place. Recognizing this pressure, scholars in rhetoric and composition have
spent more than a quarter century asking how we can better facilitate (both initiate and
address) these processes of critique, self-reflection, representation, and choice with all
students.

1

Religious discourses are increasingly recognized by writing instructors as one of
these sources of difference (Daniell; Goodburn; Perkins; Gere; Rand; Carter; Thomson;
DePalma). But religious discourses—a term by which writers often designate religious
ways of being that include religiously-inflected perspectives, values, feelings, behaviors,
texts, genres, as well as the communities in which they circulate (Thomson 7)—are not
always comparable to other differences that instructors work to incorporate in the
classroom. Religious students and their religious discourses—statistics suggest
somewhere between 70 and 80 percent of American students claim a religious
affiliation—present a different challenge for instructors because religions have been and
continue to be implicated in many forms of oppression and intolerance. Lizabeth Rand’s
statement ten years ago still holds true, although it now might apply to more religious
groups than she references: “We may feel suspicious toward religion—particularly
Christianity—as a cultural and social force that has been used too often to oppress and
dominate people” (351). In the United States, for example, we can cite the religious
institutions, coalitions, and discourses currently fueling legislative and cultural efforts
against gay marriage and contraceptive rights. Given this suspicion, it can seem that
incorporating religious discourse as a legitimate difference in the classroom will mean
“either working toward effecting [political] change in students, some of whom appear to
oppose it, or reinforcing through [our] teaching practices what [we] perceive to be
ethically noxious social relations” (Lu and Horner, “Problematic” 265).
In this fairly common construction of the situation, we are faced with an
ostensible choice between promoting tolerance by challenging a dominant religious
discourse, or practicing tolerance by abstaining from forcing our critical discourse onto
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religious students. The first to thoroughly articulate this concern was Amy Goodburn.
Fifteen years ago, she reversed the common-sense framing of religious students as
possessors of the dominant discourse, and instead worried that some religious students
were actually struggling against a dominant critical discourse. As she noted, “some
fundamentalist students’ experiences often are that of constantly defending their beliefs
from dominant discourse, even those that invoke liberatory goals” (350). In this struggle
she saw between critical academic discourses and Christian fundamentalist discourses,
students were forced to “engage in counter-hegemonic practices daily in classrooms
where the discourses through which they read the world are delegitimized or challenged”
(350). To remedy this, Goodburn hoped to re-present fundamentalist discourse to writing
instructors in a way that might alter what she called “oppressive classroom relations”
(351). Following subsequent, similar critiques from Priscilla Perkins and then Rand,
critical strategies that challenged religious discourses largely ceded the ground to
inclusive strategies that construed religious and academic discourses as complementary
and worked to avoid hegemonic relations between students and academic discourse.1 I
understand this as a major shift away from trying to “fix” or “change” religious students
and their religious discourse (promoting tolerance) and towards what Bruce Horner and
Min Zhan Lu describe as “a commitment to honor the experiences, needs, and desires of
students or informants” (“Problematic” 258)—what I call practicing tolerance.
In these inclusive strategies, students’ religious commitments have come to be
viewed increasingly as discourses or identities to be respected and incorporated as
classroom resources that help students acquire academic discourse, while the critical idea
1

Elizabeth Vander Lei and Lauren Fitzgerald, Shannon Carter, Heather E. Thomson, and
Michael John DePalma have each noted this inclusive trend as well.
3

of working to change religious discourses or helping students work to change religious
discourses has become less and less visible. This inclusive trend seems to be on the rise
despite our persisting, if largely unvoiced, concerns that religious discourses can still
prove hegemonic, ethically and politically suspect. I find this a less-than-satisfactory
result. I applaud the sentiment behind this shift, but I’m concerned that in the process
we’ve left behind the important critical aim of promoting tolerance, specifically the aim
of helping our religious students use their writing to participate in improving their lived
conditions. Improving those lived conditions, of course, should include helping them to
change their religious discourse and religious discourse community. Unless we do, we
cannot successfully answer Shari Stenberg’s call that writing be used to help religious
students obtain new ways of examining their religion that might be “politically
transformative” (284).
In this dissertation, I work to locate a strategy for accomplishing inclusive goals
while still pursuing a politically transformative agenda. I believe this begins by
acknowledging that religious students and writing instructors are always “trying to talk to
each other under the weight of global political, cultural, and economic forces we [can]
only understand incompletely,” as Bronwyn Williams has written (116). Our strategies
have not yet achieved a balance between promoting and practicing tolerance because we
haven’t given sufficient attention to these structuring forces, what Williams also calls the
“constraints of the structures of power” (116). My dissertation responds to this gap by
drawing on scholarship in anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and rhetoric and
composition to posit a new contextual framework for writing on religion in light of those
forces. Specifically, my project investigates and explicates materialist approaches to
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religious culture, and to religious students’ writing, that can help us achieve Stenberg and
Perkins’ politically transformative goals.

The Trans-formational Approach
In this first chapter, I outline the basic principles of my theoretical approach to
religion, and attempt to articulate the generalized exigency of this work in terms of our
current political and religious climate. In order to do so, we must begin from the work of
sociologist Talal Asad, whose writings on religious studies initiated my particular line of
approach almost thirty years ago. The crucial founding assumption in Asad’s
“formational” approach is that religions are always in process; like genders, identities,
and languages, religions do not have an essence or a stable core. They instead depend for
their existence upon the forms of life that maintain and transmit them—languages,
material objects, relationships, practices—and the social apparatuses that organize and
authorize those forms so that particular religious practices, relations, and loyalties are
enabled, while others are disabled. So what a religion is can only be determined
provisionally by the practices and institutions shaping it into a temporary historical
formation at a given moment (on this, see also Keane; Engelke; Mahmood; Robbins; and
Chidester). Religions are always becoming.
Asad originally asserted this perspective in a critique of anthropologist Clifford
Geertz, who had forwarded an essential, universalizable definition of “religion” that he
could apply to various groups and behaviors. But such universalizing definitions, Asad
argues, “aim at identifying essences when we should be trying to explore concrete sets of
historical relations and processes” (“Reflections” 252). Failing to explore religion in
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terms of these concrete sets, Asad suggests, obscures the “processes of formation and
effects of power, hovering above social reality” (251). Put another way, Asad argues that
religious meanings and symbols simply “cannot be understood independently of . . . their
articulation of social life in which work and power are always crucial” (250; 251). So
Asad argues we must “begin by asking what are the historical conditions (movements,
classes, institutions, ideologies) necessary for the existence of particular religious
practices and discourses. In other words, let us ask: how does power create religion?”
(252). This sets out the two related lines of religious investigation that inform Asad’s
work as well as this dissertation—the ongoing creation of religion through processes of
formation and through relations of power.

Processes of Formation
As indicated by the phrase “processes of formation,” Asad’s term formation here
is not only a noun referring to a religion, but always also a verb referring to the active,
historic process that constantly inscribes particular religious sensibilities, attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors into individual and corporate bodies, producing religion. I prefer
Asad’s term formation over terms like “discourse” because the crucial emphasis upon the
contingency of particular instantiations of religion is constantly highlighted in the dual
reference to processes of formation and products of formation. Other terms with a similar
utility include “collective” (Latour) and “assembly” (DeLanda). Though there are
differences, all three terms encourage users to present social groups as instable and
constantly in process—as Bruno Latour writes, when looking at a network, we must
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focus more on the “work” than the “net.” To put it differently, we must focus on the how
and the why, not the what, when examining religion from a formational perspective.
From the formational perspective, religions’ relative stability paradoxically results
from the nearly imperceptible process of change that theorists including Pierre Bourdieu,
Judith Butler and Alastair Pennycook have called “sedimentation.” Sedimentation occurs
as particular practices, words, objects, and sensibilities are practiced—repeated—over
time and in various contexts, coming to be both socially recognized and described as
markers of particular religious formations, and so create apparently natural boundaries
around religions through their relatively stable reproduction. Together, these apparent
coherences and boundaries result in the sets of practices that we identify as “religions.”
But sedimentation is an ongoing process, because material conditions continually change,
and because all new iterations of religious actions and practices must break (however
slightly) with the previous context in which they were performed in order to be recontextualized in their new context. Thus the next “stable” iteration of a religion will
necessarily be different from the previous “stable” iteration, so that repetition
simultaneously produces religious stability—as in duration—and assures its essential
instability—as in change (Pennycook 34-51).
In addition to simultaneously offering an account of the durability and instability
of religion, the practical sedimentation process assigns religious participants an active
role in forming and re-forming religion—after all, practitioners are the ones who bring
religious words, forms, and behaviors into new contexts, maintaining and transforming
religion through iterating its forms across space and time. Practitioners, then, create
religion. Throughout the dissertation I will draw out different facets and consequences of
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this assumption, contrasting it with the implicit assumptions in our own work. Asad’s
formational perspective begins from the assumption that religious users do not simply
experience or believe in a static religion—they actively perpetuate, and change, the forms
of religion that they receive and the inflected forms of religion that they subsequently
transmit. I will offer multiple examples of this below.

Relations of Power
But focusing on sedimentation in formational processes also introduces the
question of power into religion, because sedimentation indicates that uses of religious
forms are not free, but instead are constrained by the social conditions and previous
histories of use that make them socially meaningful. As Judith Butler writes, “[T]he
subject is neither a sovereign agent with a purely instrumental relation to language, nor a
mere effect whose agency is pure complicity with prior operations of power. The
vulnerability to the Other . . . is never overcome in the assumption of agency (one reason
that ‘agency’ is not the same as ‘mastery’)” (Butler 26, qtd. in Lu and Horner,
“Translingual Literacy” 11). This sort of tension is perhaps most visible when religious
practitioners re-deploy religious conventions for their own purposes—like the Egyptian
Muslim women in Sherif’s “Gender Contradictions in Families,” who don the hijab in
order to take well-paying jobs outside the home (see discussion in chapter four). Those
women are neither sovereign nor passive, to borrow Butler’s descriptors, but
negotiating—deploying one religious tradition in order to transform another to their
advantage (the Egyptian social and religious systems that encourage middle- and upperclass married women to remain in the home).
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As it regards religious formations, Asad addresses this “vulnerability to the
Other” that Butler describes at least partially in terms of processes of authorization.
Rather than asserting that there are quintessentially religious dispositions or meanings
that we can locate in various cultural behaviors, Asad argues that for something to be
“religious,” there must be an authorizing process, and implicitly agents, that declare it so:
The connection between religious theory and practice is fundamentally a
matter of power—of disciplines creating religion, interpreting true
meanings, forbidding certain utterances and practices and authorizing
others. Hence the questions that Geertz does not ask: how does religious
discourse actually define religion? What are the historical conditions in
which it can act effectively as a demand for the imitation, or the
prohibition, or the authentication of truthful utterances and practices? How
does power create religion? (246)
That last phrase is the provocative refrain throughout Asad’s article, and the question he
ultimately condemns Geertz for failing to address. So Asad’s formational perspective
encourages us to focus on the creative work of power relations on several different
levels—on one level, there are the intraformational power asymmetries between religious
practitioners within a tradition that shape the way a religion will be practiced and talked
about; second, there are the interformational relations and power asymmetries among
religious (and irreligious) groups in society that shape religions by introducing new
possibilities or restrictions into religious practices; and on a third level, there are
interformational asymmetrical power relations between researchers and religious
subjects, which often seem to enact the former asymmetries.

Work and Power: Transformations
In a complex move, Asad locates all of these creative and asymmetrical relations
within Geertz’s definitional work. For Geertz, Asad argues, the heart of religion rests in
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“religious symbols [that] formulate conceptions of a general order of existence” (qtd. in
Asad 247); those religious conceptions are affirmed and expressed in (not shaped by)
religious practices. On this conception of religion, Asad argues, “to achieve what is truly
religion, ‘received practices and conventional sentiments’ must be joined to discourses
which affirm something, which give these practices some cosmological meaning” (245).
The essence of religion for Geertz, then, lies in a meaning behind the practices, which the
anthropological researcher attempts to discern: “always, there must be something that
exists beyond the observed practices, the heard utterances, the written words” (246). But
Asad argues that this definition of religion, which still seems to hold sway in many
rhetoric and composition texts2, gives inordinate primacy to religious thought and
religious meanings “without regard to the processes by which meanings are constructed”
(245). Geertz’s focus on religious meaning, Asad writes, misses “the occurrence of
events (utterances, practices, dispositions), and the authorizing processes which give
those events religious meaning” (245).
For Asad, religious symbols and actions are not merely expressive of religious
conceptual truth, but rather are constitutive of religious truth and both constrain and
enable its experience. Asad points out that even for St. Augustine,
[I]t is not mere religious symbols that implant true dispositions, but
power—ranging all the way from laws (imperial and ecclesiastical) and
other sanctions (hellfire, death, salvation, good repute, peace, etc.), to the
disciplinary activities of social institutions (family, school, city, church,
etc.) and of human bodies (fasting, prayer, obedience, penance, etc.).
Augustine was quite clear that power, the effect of an entire network of
motivated practices . . . imposed the conditions for experiencing
[religious] truth. (242-43)

2

See discussion in chapters two, three, and five
10

Rather than existing out there somewhere apart from its practical realizations, for Asad
here religious truth is immanent: implanted in bodies in the form of a “true disposition,”
and conditionally experienced as a result of the social disciplines that produce that
disposition.
Asad argues that Geertz’s definition, by removing the essence of religion from
this processual immanence, is heavily biased towards modernist, idealist, Western, and
specifically Protestant constructions of religion. When Geertz universalizes his definition
of religion as cosmological meaning and applies that largely Christian definition to the
behaviors of non-Western and non-Christian religious groups, he obscures and
perpetuates the intra- and inter-formational power relations mentioned above. First, in
accepting the more modernist Christian construction of religion—rather than, say,
Augustine’s—Geertz ignores the historical processes and power struggles within
religions that shape and re-shape their practices and beliefs. He mistakes the religion he
sees in one point in time for something transcendent. But he also mistakes the religion he
sees in one location for something universal. In doing so, he ignores the power
asymmetries at work between the Western researcher and his non-Western subjects,
wherein the researcher’s discourse itself does the work of deciding what events and
practices have true religious meaning. This research process echoes broader
interformational power relations between Western religions like Christianity and the
religions of the non-Western populations Geertz studies.
To draw out these various relations, Asad has most recently focused on the
practices and institutions of modern “secularism” that form contemporary religions. He
sets out the following guiding questions for his study, Formations of the Secular:
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How do attitudes to the human body (to pain, physical damage, decay, and
death, to physical integrity, bodily growth, and sexual enjoyment) differ in
various forms of life? What structures of the senses—hearing, seeing,
touching—do these attitudes depend on? In what ways does the law define
and regulate practices and doctrines on the ground that they are ‘truly
human’? What discursive spaces does this work of definition and
regulation open up for grammars of ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’? How
do all these sensibilities, attitudes, assumptions and behaviors come
together to support or undermine the doctrine of secularism? (17)
He examines, as one example of these interformational relations of work and power, a
situation in Greece where individuals were not allowed to keep their religious affiliation
on “identity” cards despite their protests—thus enforcing a definition of religion and of
identity. Asad explains that the Greek government refused by citing the need to protect
their human rights; but clearly, what it means to be “human” is different for the protesters
and the government. As Asad argues, what the protesters “regard as vital to their religious
being,” the government judges not to “affect their freedom of religious belief”—so here
we see different views of 1) what human rights include and 2) the nature of religion and
religious belonging (Formations 139-140).
In order to declare that keeping the religious affiliation would amount to the
violation of those desirous individuals’ civil rights and removing it would not, the
government declared religion (and identity) an individual, private matter that therefore
cannot be violated by lack of access to particular forms of identification, including
communal identity. Only on the assumption that human rights are “individual” and even
that they relate to anonymity can a government refuse a minority group the right to
identify as a group on the basis of human rights. And only on the assumption that religion
is about internal “religious belief” can such a ruling be upheld. But these are not
universally-agreed upon definitions of the human and of religion, but rather Western
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ones: Asad argues that in contrast, being Muslim “is being able to live as autonomous
individuals in a collective life that extends beyond national borders” (180). Those
Muslims’ religious being, in other words, was violated for the sake of ostensibly
protecting their rights as a human being. So we might fairly say that a significant social
conflict plays out here in the production of a small material object: practical definitions of
religion and of humanity are contested and made significant through practical
enforcement, motivated by a question of legal practice, and decided through a structure of
legal channels, ultimately shaping how it is possible to practice religion and to be human
and/or religious in Greece.
Asad’s work is often focused in this way on the complex and mutually
constitutive relations between formations (like Western academics and non-Western
informants). He imagines contemporary life as “complex space” in which a variety of
forms of life operate and relate simultaneously. In defining this complex space, he cites
John Milbank’s argument that “there is no such thing as absolute non-interference; no
action can be perfectly self-contained, but always impinges upon other people, so that
spaces will always in some degree ‘complexly’ overlap, jurisdictions always in some
measure be competing, loyalties remain (perhaps benignly) divided” (Formations 178).
Complex space speaks to the complexity of individual’s “internal” space as well: we
should imagine society as “a multiplicity of overlapping bonds and identities. [In
medieval Christendom and Islam] People were not always expected to subject themselves
to one sovereign authority, nor were they themselves sovereign moral subjects” (179). In
complex space, everyone participates in multiple formations—“the sovereign state cannot
(never could) contain all the practices, relations, and loyalties of its citizens” (179).
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Simply put, from a formational perspective religions do not operate in a vacuum, but
interfere, are interfered with, and really depend upon external discourses—public
discourses on sexuality, gender, race, politics, education, even religion—and the shared
forms of social life—media, political systems, educational systems, economies, and the
like—wherein those discourses can circulate. So rather than looking for a single
hegemonic discourse or single religious powerful institution in society, Asad encourages
the recognition of various mutually-interfering formations that operate at a variety of
practical levels to support, change, or undermine one another.
In order to even more firmly indicate the mobility and instability of religious
formation in complex space, in my dissertation I will term Asad’s construction of religion
transformational. There’s obviously some redundancy in the term, but transformation
highlights for me the cross-formational action that accounts for much of the change and
relations of power we want to represent. Trans-formational action takes several forms:
First, there are the internal trans-formational relations between groups within a religious
formation (not all Muslims would agree with Asad’s characterization of “being Muslim,”
for instance); second, there are also external trans-formational relations wherein outside
formations participate in and reciprocally shape a religious formation, as in the Greek
government’s restriction on religious practice; third, and just as importantly, there are
trans-formational relations that translate between levels, in and across formations: from
bodily practice to religious belief, from manufacturer’s invention to religious disposition,
from legal doctrine to religious identity. In various chapters of the dissertation I will
focus on all three of these trans-formational relations.
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It is my working assumption in this dissertation that education is one of the forms
of life in which religions circulate, and that liberal academe specifically is one of the
“competing” formations engaged in mutually interfering relations with religion—
especially, in American classrooms, with forms of Christianity like evangelicalism in
which many of our students participate. In addition to Asad’s work on religion and
Western thought, writers like Charles Taylor and Mark C. Taylor have traced a few
intricate engagements between Christianity and Western academic thought far beyond
what needs to be established to initiate this investigation (Sources of the Self; After God).
The academy, however, is an incredibly varied institution with largely undeterminable
relations to both religion and traditions in Western thought. It seems necessary for me, at
least, to narrow my scope.3 I believe writing scholars’ texts on religious students offer us
descriptions of local instances where religion and the writing classroom interfere with
one another, and in somewhat regularized ways. That being the case, this dissertation
attempts to answer Asad’s provocative question—How does power make religion?—with
regards to my discipline, rhetoric and composition. In what ways, I ask throughout, do
writing scholars, instructors, and students participate in the making of religion through
these overlaps and interferences? What sorts of religions are we making? How might we
participate differently in shaping the various practices of religion in America?

3

The same logic, in part, drives my decision to focus on evangelicalism. I certainly want
to recognize that students affiliated to other forms of religion—not only other forms of
Christianity but other forms of religion and irreligion—are also present in the
composition classroom. I assume here that they too may participate in and experience
interfering relations between academic and religious formations. But given the incredibly
diverse nature of religion it often proves necessary here to narrow my scope to just one
set of interfering relations, drawing in other forms of life and religion wherever possible.
I elaborate on my selection of evangelicalism, specifically, in chapter three (see pp. 867).
15

Material Consequences
So why are the answers to those questions important to rhetoric and composition,
specifically? I will argue throughout this dissertation that the consequences of current
constructions of religion in America, perpetuated in part by interactions in the writing
classroom, are politically and socially damaging—not only to the civic agenda of a liberal
arts education, but also to our students whose ways of being religious or irreligious are
constrained by these constructions. In a recent online interview, sociologist Philip Gorski
puts the contemporary religio-political situation well:
Our current politics is in many ways defined by the people on the edges,
by radical secularists on the Left and religious nationalists on the Right.
Not to say that this is all that’s going on in American politics, but if you
take this religious slice of it, I think that’s a lot of it, with the culture wars
and so on. The two feed off one another to a certain degree. The radical
secularists become a stand-in for anybody who’s on the Left and anybody
who’s not the religious nationalists, and the radical religious nationalists
become a stand-in for everybody who’s religious. When people look at
religious people from the Left, you get this kind of undifferentiated and
polarizing picture, so there is this rather unfortunate synergy between the
two positions.
I argue in this dissertation that even our most generous approaches to religious students in
the writing classroom unintentionally perpetuate this hegemonic and polarizing situation.
This polarizing binary choice (conservative religion or liberal secularism) that
Gorski describes has concerned many of our writers, including Michael John DePalma,
Shannon Carter, and Elizabeth Vander Lei. We often explicitly worry that students will
be forced to choose between the two poles (see chapter two for more on this disciplinary
discussion). But contemporary research shows convincingly that the binary generally
produces three categories. Sociologists Robert Putnam and David Campbell describe
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their finding on this: “people (especially young people) have increasingly sorted
themselves out religiously according to their moral and political views, leaving both the
liberal, secular pole and the conservative, evangelical pole strengthened and the moderate
religious middle seriously weakened” (American Grace 132). Some students are
channeled towards religious conservatism, some towards secular liberalism, but the vast
majority move towards what Putnam and Campbell have rightly described as the weak
moderate religious middle. It’s this third option I find most significant and troubling,
because it represents a missed opportunity for writing instructors to participate in religion
in the politically transformative ways Stenberg imagines. I hope to show throughout this
dissertation how our current practices risk contributing not only to religious and political
polarization, but worse, to the expansion and weakening of the religio-political middle.
Here, I briefly articulate those three positions.

Religious Conservatism
Students’ first potential response to current constructions of religion could be
termed “incorporation,” in which they come to embody and identify with the
representational norms. The primary reasons for incorporation will be discussed in depth
below; but troublingly, research indicates that secular education can actually contribute
to, or accelerate, this response. As Perkins notes, “conservative Christian students who
attend public institutions tend to become more fundamentalist . . . by the time they
graduate, whereas those who attend religious colleges emerge considerably less so”
(594). Perkins’ brief explanation is that “students at church-related colleges are enabled
by some combination of peer support and culturally sensitive teaching to become more
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questioning than their relatively embattled and isolated counterparts at secular schools
do” (595). But rhetorical theory affords us a more satisfying, if still partial, explanation of
such responses. Within individual interactions, Elizabeth Ervin calls the reactionary
phenomenon Perkins describes “discursive entrenchment,” the rhetorical digging-in-ofthe-heels that results from perceived risk, disrespect, or hostility in a rhetorical encounter.
This reaction—described so well by Carolyn Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Carl Hovland’s
Social Judgment Theory—is the motive force often attributed to larger religious
movements as well.
Philosopher of religion Mark C. Taylor, for example, argues that all
fundamentalisms emerge as situated responses to perceived threats (to tradition, identity,
values, beliefs, and so on) (13). In his Reith Lectures, Giddens similarly argues that
fundamentalism is simply “beleaguered tradition,” and in American Grace Putnam and
Campbell suggest that the emergence of contemporary evangelicalism in the 1970s—a
broader cultural movement than fundamentalism, per se—could be read as a reaction
against the liberal challenges of the sixties that continues to resonate for many. Their
research of 2006 bears this out: “more than two thirds of evangelical Protestants in our
Faith Matters survey said that they felt their values were ‘seriously’ or ‘moderately
threatened in America today’” (114). All of these writers seem to suggest that the
academic environment Heather E. Thomson describes in her dissertation on religious
students and writing instructors, where both perceived and real antipathy seem the norm,
may actually be triggering fundamentalism in conservative religious students while
simultaneously silencing the majority of moderate and progressive religious students
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whose fears of being mischaracterized—and mischaracterizing themselves—keep them
from speaking up (Thomson 72, 96, 206).

Liberal Secularism
Christian students’ second response to the dominant religious representation is
related. I call this the oppositional stance, visible in the exodus of American religious
students and American young people more generally from religion. Researcher David
Kinnaman concisely describes the shift:
1. Teenagers are some of the most religiously active Americans.
2. American twentysomethings are the least religiously active. (You Lost
Me 22)
Putnam and Campbell also point out that the incidence of two sets of “nones”—those
who claim to identify with no religious group and those who did not attend church in the
last year—has risen from about 7% of college freshmen in 1965 to about 24% in 2009. In
fact, despite common perceptions to the contrary, there are significantly more Americans
aged 18-29 claiming “no religious preference” than “Evangelical Protestant” (the most
populous religious category). Putnam and Campbell explicitly attribute this desertion of
religion to popular shifts in both popular disposition and the representation of religion:
This group of young people came of age when ‘religion’ was
identified publicly with the Religious Right, and exactly at the time when
the leaders of that movement put homosexuality and gay marriage at the
top of their agenda. And yet this is the generation in which the new
tolerance of homosexuality has grown most rapidly. In short, just as the
youngest cohort of Americans was zigging in one direction, many highly
visible religious leaders zagged in the other.
. . . Many devout religious people would have preferred to (and did)
sit out the culture wars, and some liberal Protestant groups have tried hard
to keep up with the evolving views of young people on issues of sexual
(and homosexual) morality. It is very hard, however, for a religious
“brand” forged in the fires of the Reformation four centuries ago to
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“rebrand” itself overnight. Moreover, this youthful generation seems
unwilling or unable to distinguish the stance of the most visible, most
political, and most conservative religious leaders from organized religion
in general. (130-1)
Putnam and Campbell are very clear about this: it is the articulation of Christianity with
conservative politico-social agendas that drives many young people away from religion.
Kinnaman also observes that most of those who leave organized Christianity “are more
defined by and committed to their distance from Christianity than they are to their current
spiritual perspectives” (You Lost Me 66). While “Many still have positive things to say
about specific people (such as their parents), . . . the overall tenor of their perceptions is
negative” (68). The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, too, notes the motivating
force of these negative perceptions. They observe that nones tend to “think of religious
people as hypocritical, judgmental or insincere” (qtd. in Putnam and Campbell 131). And
so the polarizing cycle continues—negative representations of religion lead to more
secular liberals, more religious conservatives, and a lot of religious moderates who lack
the cohesion or representation necessary for political or even institutional mobilization.
While we may all agree that increased alienation and fundamentalism are
troublesome outcomes for the writing class, some of us may be tempted to feel that
growing dissatisfaction with religion is a fine development, an even better one as it may
be leading to the generalized decline of religion in America (I’m thinking here of
prominent writers such as Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins). Writing scholars
have generally argued, however, that such a shift constitutes a loss of identity (see
discussion of Carter; Rand; Vander Lei; and DePalma in chapter two). But I would offer
a different, perhaps more pragmatic reason for concern: Research finds that religious
participation actually makes participants significantly better citizens and better neighbors
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(one of the chief and oft-cited goals of our liberal educational environment) than those
who do not participate regularly. Drawing on their own survey data as well as previous
research, Putnam and Campbell report that “greater religiosity tends to produce increased
giving, volunteering, and civic engagement” (462), as well as greater levels of empathy,
altruism (464), and trust (470). This is true even when controlling simultaneously for
“gender, education, income, race, region, homeownership, length of residence, marital
and parental status, ideology, and age” (452). Putnam and Campbell compare this
improvement directly to the civic benefits of education—“the civic difference between
Americans who attend church nearly every week and those who rarely do so is roughly
equivalent to two full years of education” (454). Education that draws students away
from religious participation thus may be undermining some of its own civic goals, and
should not be entered upon lightly.
It’s very important to note that these benefits do not accrue as a result of beliefs or
personal spirituality—quite oppositely, in every major national survey they reviewed
Putnam and Campbell found that what they call “good neighborliness” is correlated to
participation in a religious social network and shows no significant correlation with
individual religious beliefs (476). They are clear on this:
Once we know how observant a person is in terms of church attendance,
nothing that we can discover about the content of her religious faith adds
anything to our understanding or prediction of her good neighborliness—
nothing about her views of the Bible or life after death or evolution or
eschatology, or her personal experience of God, or the kind of God she
believes in, or the importance of religion in her life or in her personal or
political decisions, or her views about morality or salvation or evolution or
Judgment Day or the Rapture, or her habits of saying grace or reading
scripture. (467)
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Underlining this point, they note that an atheist who get deeply involved in a religious
social network “is much more likely to volunteer in a soup kitchen than the most fervent
believer who prays alone” (473). Separating belief from belonging is not entirely
possible, of course, as it may well be religious belief that spurs the push to begin
belonging in the first place. But to the extent that belief is implicated, it is noteworthy
that the effect of religion on citizenship is stronger for moderate and progressive religious
participants than for conservatives. Putnam and Campbell find, “for many measures of
civic engagement, such as club membership, organizational leadership, and . . . local
reform activities, religiosity matters more for self-described liberals than for selfdescribed conservatives” (456). Thus, these benefits aren’t likely to go away if religious
participants shift into more liberal and tolerant modes of religious belief or religious
practice—but if the religious participation creating the benefits drops off, these benefits
assuredly drop off as well, Putnam and Campbell find within just one year’s time.

The Weak Middle
The third, most pervasive and troubling, response to the dominant construction of
religion in America is the relative silencing and political passivity of moderate and
progressive religious students. When conservative representations of religion dominate
people’s perceptions of what religion looks like, and when instructor-representatives of
liberal academe echo and act upon these dominant representations of religion as
reactionary, they stifle (or at least slow) the ability of young religious moderates to
practice, represent and publicize their alternative or emergent religious practices as
legitimate religious practices. This felt lack of agency, so often leading to moderates’
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silence, is cogently expressed by students in Thomson’s study. One of her informants
writes, “As long as Christians stay, you know, as long as they don’t let their religion seep
out and try to change other people, I think most people are fine with that” (106). Christian
students report “avoiding topics with which their instructors may disagree; choosing not
to disclose their religious beliefs; striving to be ‘neutral’ in their work” (206). They
silence themselves on the assumption “that to identify as Christian is to invite doubts or
preconceived notions about their intellectual abilities, their political views, and their
openness to people of other faiths and worldviews” (124).
Thomson’s religious informants, like writing instructors and writing scholars,
seem to struggle against this dominant negative representation of religion. But they fear
they are not capable of representing their very different religious practice adequately in
the face of these more dominant representations. As one student explains,
I feel a lot of times that I’m not equipped enough . . . I just have a hard
time getting out what I mean, so when I talk to people that’s one of my big
concerns, that I’ll say something I don’t mean, that it comes off the wrong
way, or that I’m presenting my faith in a poor way. I just get really
insecure about that . . . I definitely do get scared, because I don’t think I’m
the wisest person alive. (105)
Another student, Quinn, describes feeling embarrassed and angry after seeing the way a
preacher represents Christianity on the quad. He wants to differentiate himself from “that
guy”—but he’s not sure he can. Thomson writes that Quinn feels “he has little control
over how others might forge connections between him and that which he rejects” (96).
These pervasive negative representations leave students feeling “a lack of control over
how the label ‘Christian’ (or even just ‘religious’) will be interpreted by their peers and
instructors” (105). Thomson describes the effects of this loss of control: “The lack of
power they have (or feel they have) over people’s perceptions of them contributes to a
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feeling that being Christian at UM involves a certain amount of risk and requires a
willingness to explain oneself” (97). Many students feel fearful and defensive in such
settings. As a result, “All but two student interviewees mention fear as part of their
experience as a Christian student”; particularly, Thomson suggests, fear at “the prospect
of dredging up other people’s negative associations with Christianity” (104). These
students are frustrated by popular constructions of Christianity, but experience feelings of
inarticulacy when they wish to challenge them. In the end, they don’t feel they have a
chance to fairly represent themselves and their religion in the face of such challenges. So
a lack of control over their representation leads to silence, and this silence in turn
increases the misperception of religion that leads to instructor hostility, silences moderate
religious students, and places conservative religious students even more strongly in the
spotlight and on the defensive. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle.
These students, however, do not only feel this lack of agency in the academy: they
feel silenced and out of control in churches as well. While Kinnaman argues that at least
half of Christian young people are disaffected and feel at odds with the dominant
religious representation and its norms, only about ten percent are actually explicitly
engaged in trying to create change within Christianity. Some stay passively; others leave
entirely; others wander for a few years; and that leaves only a meager ten percent who
consistently “are trying on new ways of Christ-following that make sense to their
communities and careers. Their rejection of some mindsets and methods common to the
North American church stem from this desire” (You Lost Me 77). As Kinnaman explains
this passivity, “The details differ, but the theme of disengagement pops up again and
again, often accompanied by a sense that the decision to disconnect was out of their
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hands” (10, emphasis mine). He goes on to quote two online comments from an article on
Catholicism that underline this lack of agency: “I wonder what percentage of . . . ‘Lost’
Catholics feel like I do, that we did not leave the Church, but rather, the Church left us.”
“I hung in for a while, thinking that fighting from within was the way to go, but I
ultimately realized that it was damaging my relationship with God and my relationship
with myself and I felt no choice but to leave” (10).
Christian Smith, observing many of the same attitudes and behaviors in collegeaged Americans, classifies them as generally disengaged from religion—he says they just
don’t care (288-89). Others have similarly noted some decline in religiosity among
younger Americans, though they don’t draw the same strong conclusion. In fact on a
number of scales, religious practice is up among young Americans. But it seems to me
that Kinnaman and Thomson’s in-depth research on young Americans’ religious
experiences demonstrates how negative engagement and blasé disengagement may be
two sides of the same coin. Both might be interpreted as symptoms of a shared history of
commitment and estrangement from religion, and both appear to draw upon a similarly
liminal sensibility, or posture towards it—neither for nor against, neither in nor out. In
either case—a generalized muting of religious feeling or a shared exilic posture—we can
say with some certainty that there is an emergent religious formation in which many
young Americans participate, and while it is decidedly not aligned with dominant
constructions of religion, it is also not yet aligned with any other easily articulable,
definite position. It is, then, mostly potential.
The most prescient takeaway from these findings for writing teachers is not
merely that so many young Americans who grow up as Christians are unhappy with
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Christianity, or different from the dominant representation of religion—although whether
they stay, hang around on the fringes, or leave entirely, this appears to be true. The most
prescient takeaway is that most young Americans don’t believe they can change
Christianity, or practice Christianity in the moderate or progressive ways they’d like to
within institutional Christianity, or represent their Christianity in ways that differ from
popular perceptions; worse, only a small percentage of them are even really trying. All
three responses—incorporation, opposition, silence—seem practically to assume that
religion is what it is—that the current manifestations of religion and secularism in
America are real, essential, universal. When combined with the currently prominent
forms of religion, this assumption, so counter to Asad’s vision of religion, is successfully
muting the political, social, and even theological potential of young Americans. By
investigating the transformational processes responsible for creating this version of
religion and pointing out how we participate in those processes, I hope to identify
strategies for creating religion differently through our classroom practices.

Chapter Summaries
In Chapter Two, I argue that approaches to religious students previously
forwarded by rhetoric and composition scholars fail to adequately address the material
conditions of the writing classroom and larger American religious culture in which
students and teachers interact. I ground this argument in published accounts of instructor
interactions with religious students, finding that while scholars often recommend
encouraging students to bring religiously-inflected resources into their academic writing,
their approaches and representations of such interactions tend to homogenize religions
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and their practitioners, treat such acts of representation as transparent, overlook ongoing
asymmetrical power relations, and construct religious experience as self-evident. I argue
that students are denied the opportunity to deliberate and act on their religious resources
when instead of investigating the heterogeneity within their religious communities and
exploring its sources and consequences, they are encouraged to represent those practices
or attitudes in generalizing terms. I explore how failing to help a student highlight the
losses, contradictions, and transformations created by translating her religious resources
into new language falsely separates writing from thinking and living. I suggest that an
opportunity for re-negotiating the asymmetrical power relations between academic and
religious discourses is lost when instead of deliberating on, manipulating, or challenging
the conventions of academic discourse, a student is simply encouraged to revise his
religiously-inflected text to be more audience-effective. I point out that when a student’s
religious experiences are reported on as self-evident rather than interrogated as sites of
cultural shaping, that student is denied the opportunity to intervene in the cultural forces
shaping those experiences.
In Chapters Three and Four, I use American evangelicalism as a test case for the
relevance of my “transformational” approach to religion. These chapters are aimed, first,
at accounting more fully for the material conditions that affect our classroom interactions
with religious students; second, at constructing religions as sites of heterogeneity and
conflict continually shaped by the ways individuals represent religious organizations,
experiences, and identities in writing and speaking. To accomplish these aims, I analyze
representations of American evangelicalism in a wide array of genres and media
produced by lay practitioners and leading voices, including institutional policy
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handbooks, denominational belief statements, organizational websites, blog entries, open
letters, media networks, pop culture celebrities, sociological survey data, and previously
published student and instructor interviews. These texts highlight the power struggles and
transformations enacted through intra- and inter-formational debates as American
evangelical practitioners work to shape evangelicalism’s membership, public discourse
on Christianity, and religion more generally. The transformational approach aligns with
the work of Raymond Williams and Judith Butler to argue that all such hegemonic
formations are also continually transformed by a multitude of external forces. I
demonstrate this by analyzing evangelical texts and movements inflected by progressive
strains of religion, generational differences, feminism, and gay rights discourses; but I
also point out how the discourse of such alternative and emergent formations remains
largely tethered to the hegemonic account as they continually define themselves with and
against its stereotypes, terms and logics.
In Chapter Five, I explore the relevance of a transformational approach to religion
for our everyday classroom practices. More specifically, I explore its alignment with
translingual approaches which aim to use writing to not only respect and include
students’ multiple personal discursive resources traditionally undervalued in the
classroom, but to recognize and develop students’ capacities for actively shaping and
reshaping the very languages, identities, and social relations playing a key role in their
writing and learning. To accomplish this, translingual scholars suggest helping students
deliberate on the traffic between those different resources and draw on them to participate
in matters of concern extending beyond the writing classroom. I turn to student writing
featured in previous scholarship in rhetoric and composition to examine how instead of
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merely allowing students to bring religiously-inflected resources into the writing
classroom, a transformational approach might help students attend to how and why they
are interested in employing such resources, and how and why they might best go about
re-creating and transforming their religious experiences, identities, and communities in
the process of writing about them. Instead of encouraging a student to provide or defend a
single definition of religion, a transformational approach would help the student to
deliberate on the sources of her definition, the context of asymmetrical power relations in
which her definition participates, and alternative definitions she might choose to forward.
Instead of encouraging another student to find genres for expressing his frustration when
a romantic break-up interferes in his relationship with God, asking that student to explore
the socially-orchestrated nature of supernatural experiences might allow him to
interrogate his experiential struggle, deliberate on its external sources, and make plans for
intervention.
The increasingly rapid global flows of people, objects, signs, monies, ideas, and
emotions across borders, which our discipline recognizes as a positive development in so
many ways, also transmits religious conflicts—not to mention religious militancies—
around the globe. That is my starting point in this dissertation: there is necessarily
religion and religious conflict flowing into our classroom spaces (whether we recognize
it, or not). Religion flows across the thresholds of our classrooms through the bodies of
our students, through objects we or they bring to class, through texts we read or they
carry in their e-readers, through ideas churned up in class discussion or the arguments of
a paper, through the emotional responses that arise in our classes. Last year one of my
students, Ambreen Paracha, composed a wrenchingly beautiful essay for my class
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describing the murder of her family members at a mosque in Karachi during a religious
holiday. Her creative non-fiction piece, which was supposed to be contained to eight to
ten pages, sprawled to almost twenty—there was no stopping the flow of story and details
once begun. The sectarian violence of Pakistan had materially entered Ambreen’s life,
and through her, our classroom. In such ways, religion continually flows through our
classrooms, and we must not shirk the responsibility this brings. Classroom strategies for
approaching religion in respectful, yet transformative ways are all the more necessary in
such a world. A transformational approach to matters of religion, informed by a
translingual approach to writing and teaching, can better address the needs and interests
of students across races, ethnicities, classes, and genders by assisting them in making
critical use of their own religious practices and alignments when writing and learning.
That is what this dissertation attempts to accomplish.
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CHAPTER II
CAUGHT IN BETWEEN

This second chapter takes a transformational approach to religion in the writing
classroom. Believing that intersections between religion and the writing classroom
represent one particular site of transformational action by which religion is continually
re-formed, I attempt to identify some specific formational processes and relations of
power by which writing scholars have constructed the forms of religion visible in our
classrooms and scholarship over the past twenty years. I begin by sketching an image of
our current classroom situation as it is described in writing scholarship. Following this, I
briefly trace the development of the assumptions and logics framing our current approach
to religious students, which I term “inclusive.” I then spend the majority of the chapter
identifying and re-evaluating four moves characteristic of this inclusive approach—representing religion, teaching translation, downplaying conflict, and resourcing religious
experience.
I argue that our representations of religion and religious students, constructed as
they are through these four pedagogical strategies, are more likely to draw out stability
and homogeneity in religion than they are to construct religions as the fluid, participatory,
contested formations that Asad has suggested. Because of this, students are unlikely to
see any more clearly their own active role in maintaining and potentially transforming
their religions. I conclude that such constructions of religion, for all the good that they
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may do, offer our students—most of whom fall within that “weak middle” I describe in
chapter one—little or no new means of agential intervention in the polarizing religiopolitical climate of our time, and thus either fail to address, or actually run counter to, our
stated desire for politically transformative pedagogies. While I largely examine extant
strategies here in chapter two, I do offer the beginnings of alternative approaches at
several points. I devote considerable time to developing those new transformational
strategies in my final, fifth chapter.

The Current Context
Thomson’s 2009 dissertation, When God’s Word Isn’t Good Enough, presents the
best snapshot to date of the relationships between Christian students, their instructors, and
issues of religious representation in college writing classrooms. Thomson finds that
writing instructors tend to see Christian students as “cling[ing] to the idea of universal
truth” (74) and “unable or unwilling to think critically” (80). While instructors try to
“make distinctions between Christian students whom they see as radical, evangelical,
conservative, and judgmental and those who appear to blend more seamlessly into the
academic environment” (68), the radical, evangelical, conservative, judgmental Christian
student seems to drive generalized instructor perceptions of “Christians.” Moreover,
Thomson’s findings indicate there is a markedly high degree of similarity between
writing instructors’ perceptions of Christians and writing scholars’ published
representations of religious students. These published representations have come under
strong critique from Thomson, DePalma, and Rand. Rand notes that Christian discourses
in the writing classroom are associated in our texts with a number of negative terms:

32

“quaint naïveté,” “dualistic thought,” “lack of reasoning ability,” “immature thought”
(357), “simplicity,” “superficiality,” “foolishness,” and lack of awareness (358). Further,
the representatives themselves are rendered as “dogmatic” (357), “narrow,” rigid,
“obedient,” and lacking “independent and critical thought” (362). She rightly worries that
these negative and inaccurate representations can produce damaging interactions with
religious students in the classroom.
In many rhetoric and composition articles, religious representatives are depicted
in this anti-intellectual way, embodying the twin academic heresies of unquestionable
truth and unquestioning obedience. But crucially, the religious representative also usually
displays some form of political, social, and theological conservatism. Religious students
are often seen in the literature opining politically and socially conservative positions on
topics like evolution, abortion, women’s rights, and homosexuality (for instances of
students writing on these topics, see Goodburn; Shafer; Dively; and Downs).
Theologically conservative religious students are also usually selected as religious
representatives in our articles, indicated either by labels or by reported practices. Chris
Anderson describes the “’sweet,’ ‘foolish’ discourse” of a “born-again paper” (Rand 358;
Anderson 12); Janet Neuleib describes disgusted instructor responses to a written
“testimonial about the saving power of Jesus Christ” (Rand 357); Goodburn focuses on a
Christian fundamentalist who dominated her classroom, and connects his conservative
religious beliefs with the political action of the Religious Right (333, 335); Ervin
connects the rhetoric of Christian fundamentalists with the rhetoric of Creationists (454);
Perkins’ students are described as fundamentalist evangelicals whose religious beliefs
cause their economic subjugation (588); Carter’s students and their “inappropriate” and
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“unacceptable” academic behavior are explained in terms of “evangelicalism” (578, 581);
Douglas Downs’s “true believer” student, who predicts that gay adoption will lead to
mass pedophilia and increased teen suicide, espouses “orthodox LDS doctrine,
assumptions, and language” (40); Williams’s student, though Muslim rather than
Christian, espouses conservative Muslim ideological positions and protests Salman
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses without having read it (109); Juanita M. Smart describes the
discourse of a student who compares Frankenstein’s monster to Jesus Christ as
“evangelical discourse” (20) and connects it with politically charged issues such as
abortion and gay rights; and Gregory Shafer’s student, whose arguments for traditional
family values and gender roles are mocked as anti-intellectual by her classmates, is
identified as a Christian fundamentalist.
The combined result is a collective literature on religious students focused largely
on representatives whom Mark C. Taylor would call either contemporary
foundationalists—those who stubbornly privilege “simplicity, security, and certainty over
complexity, insecurity, and uncertainty” (4), religious reactionaries—religious and
political conservatives characterized by tendencies to “absolutize faith in unquestionable
foundational principles” and exercise “total obedience to authoritative figures” (23), or
(usually) both. In contrast, studies highlighting students’ subscription to moderate or
progressive theological, political, or social viewpoints have only appeared in Thomson’s
unpublished dissertation and to some extent Rebecca Schoenike-Nowacek’s essay. This
disparity in representation exists despite the demographic reality that most American
religious students hold religiously, politically, and socially moderate to liberal views
(Pew; Kinnaman; Putnam and Campbell). Those religious students simply don’t get a
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chance to “represent themselves” in the literature. To look at our articles on religious
students, it would appear that we teach a lot of religious reactionaries whose religious,
intellectual, social, and political habits are deeply and negatively implicated in one
another. This perception leads to what Laura May, in one of the only comprehensive
histories of writing on religious students within rhetoric and composition, calls the
“original or core problem: the problem of ideological and pedagogical friction between
more liberal secular teachers and more conservative religious students” (9).
In articles that advocate a critical pedagogical approach to religious students,
these tensions rise immediately to the surface. Vander Lei and Lauren Fitzgerald sum up
the common sentiment driving such critical approaches: “Given our allegiance to critical
thought, most of us can identify with the frustration that results from students (and
instructors) who hobble scholarly inquiry with unexamined belief” (188). That vividly
described stock character—the deluded, trapped, hobbling, unreflective student—
represents the antithesis of critical ideals. Where we perceive these students in our
classrooms, it is understandable that our instinctive response has, as DePalma notes, often
been an attempt to change their relationship to their religious discourse. We do this by
either directly “challenging students’ religious viewpoints or teaching the language and
posture of critique” (223), the latter often intended as an indirect way of mounting the
same challenge. Anderson, whose three page “The Description of an Embarrassment:
When Students Write about Religion” initiated this line of scholarship, exemplifies this
critical mindset. He suggests the following tack in working with “born-again” religious
students: “if we change the way students write, change their language, we also change
what they think, what it is possible for them to think” (362). Rand explains the mentality
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she sees underlying this attempt at change: “For composition studies, evil results from a
lack of critical consciousness”; so “we want students to get saved and to resist subject
positions that discourage critical awareness” (360, 364). This emphasis on the
responsibility to create “change” is central to the critical approach, and features strongly
in articles by Ronda Leathers Dively, Perkins, Downs, and Shafer.
It is important to note, though, that while writing instructors and scholars may
have these tendencies to perceive and describe religion negatively, they are also often
visibly struggling against these tendencies, not attempting to perpetuate them.
Instructors, for instance, are quick to indicate that they’re aware and concerned about the
effects of this negative account. As Thomson wrote, instructors try to “make distinctions
between Christian students whom they see as radical, evangelical, conservative, and
judgmental and those who appear to blend more seamlessly into the academic
environment” (68). The instructor responses Thomson highlights in her study
demonstrate this struggle with the negative stereotype as they simultaneously forward it
and counter it. When asked, “What characteristics come to mind when you think of a
Christian student?” one instructor writes, “I feel like I should say either ‘conscientious
and kind’ or ‘radical and evangelical’ but Christian students, like others, seem to be
individuals” (65). Another writes, “There are radical Christian students and normative
Christian students” (67). A third actually responds, “I see this trap and will try to avoid
it” (66).
This “trap” is evidently felt by our published writers as well: most of the same
writers who depict conservative representatives actually provide caveats or try to mount
challenges to this hegemonic account of religion, consistently affirming that they are as
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concerned to respect religious students as they are to change them. Every prominent
critical approach to religious students (beginning with Anderson, and moving through
Goodburn, Perkins, Downs, on down through Shafer) offers self-reflexive critiques of its
own critical approach, worrying that these produce a hegemonic situation in which
academic discourses threaten and disrespect religious students’ identities and discourses.
While she doesn’t cite them, Rand similarly positions evangelical students’ experiences
of the academy as a matter of resistance to a dominant culture. Specifically referencing
Anderson’s seminal article on Christian students, Rand critiques popular disciplinary
representations of Christians as “condescending” (358), challenges the assumption that
we can and should improve students’ faith as “lacking in respect” (362), and criticizes
attempts to change resistant religious students and their discourse “into a respectable
academic form” (362). Rand argues that students’ religious discourses and experiences
should be respectfully included in the writing classroom, rather than challenged.
The central trope justifying such calls to respect is identity. Rand writes, “spiritual
identity may be the primary kind of selfhood more than a few of [our students] draw upon
in making meaning of their lives and the world around them” (350). (She seems to use
spiritual and religious interchangeably.) This means for Rand, “religion should be
considered a difference along with identity markers such as race and sexual orientation”
(350). She notes, crucially, that it is religious discourse that forms this religious
subjectivity—as she writes, instructors need to recognize how “faith is ‘enacted’ in
discourse and sustained through particular kinds of textual and interpretive practice”
(350). This, in turn, leads to her argument against attempts like Anderson’s to alter
students’ religious discursive practices. She describes these as “lacking in respect for the
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deeply intimate and profoundly personal ways that human beings come to make meaning
of what is sacred” (362).
In the ten years since its publication, Rand’s focus on identity as discursive
subjectivity has become the touchstone quotation for scholarship on Christian students,
directly cited multiple times within the texts of Carter, Nowacek, and DePalma. DePalma
notes that if we accept Rand’s identity claim a critical or challenging “posture toward
students’ religious discourses becomes pedagogically ineffective and ethically
questionable” (223), again linking religious identities with religious discourses and
making both relatively un-challengeable. Vander Lei and Fitzgerald observe how “much
of the scholarship on religious belief in composition studies extends research on cultural
and social identity, an extension that can make talking about religion seem like
trespassing” (190). Through its continual citation, Rand’s identity claim establishes and
re-establishes an intimate connection between religious identity and religious discourse as
well as the tension between respect and change that drive our efforts at respecting
religious discourse in the classroom.4
These same claims about discursive subjectivity also undergird the push for the
inclusion of religious discourses in the writing classroom. Vander Lei, for example,
argues that asking students to keep religion out of the composition classroom “suggests to
students that to succeed in our composition courses they must deny who they are” (4). In
classrooms where it goes undiscussed, Vander Lei argues, religious faith is comparable to
a missing gun in an empty holster—the absence of the gun is still recognizable and
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I find that writers evince little need to explicate why these descriptors demand respect—
apparently, writers feel they can rely on generalized assent that discourses and identities
should be respected.
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significant. DePalma, too, worries that students will feel that they must compartmentalize
or relinquish their religious identities if their religious discourses are not included and
treated with respect in the classroom. To help students avoid this self-alienation, scholars
often recommend that instructors “embrace the ideals of pluralism and inclusiveness” by
accommodating students’ religious discourse (perspectives, valued texts, experiences) in
the classroom (Carter 572-73; DePalma 220). Carter’s logic is paradigmatic; students for
whom the Bible constitutes a “primary sense of selfhood” must not be made to feel that
discourse centered on the Bible is inadequate or that it must be replaced (586), so she sets
about utilizing religious discourse to help students see the plurality of discourses and help
students acquire academic discourse as one more discourse. She hopes this will allow
students to become better academic writers without losing their highly valued religious
discourse.
These attempts at achieving respect and inclusion for religious discourses and
identities generally rely on four overlapping moves that I believe are at once useful, and
yet ultimately undermine these goals—producing new representations, teaching academic
discourse, downplaying conflict, and privileging personal experience. Because religious
discourse is generally approached as a source of difference in the writing classroom, both
analogues and critiques of these strategies can be located in other areas of writing
scholarship, like basic and second-language writing. This particular correspondence
might best be explained by the ascription of “irrationality” to students of all three
categories (see Stenberg 276-77; Thomson 28). One could compare the litany of negative
representations of religious students, above, to similar litanies describing basic writers in
Lu’s “Conflict and Struggle” (891) and Glynda Hull, Mike Rose, Kay Losey Fraser, and
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Marisa Castellano’s “Remediation” (311-312); the level of vitriol is certainly quite
different, but the attitude and implications are quite similar.

Move One: Homogenize Religion and Its Practitioners
The first move we make in trying to improve relations between instructors and
religious students is to re-present religious students and their discourse in more favorable
ways. This is done to increase instructor respect, or at least understanding, of religious
students and their religious discourses. Rand, for instance, wonders, “Perhaps if we tried
to collapse the binary between ‘rebelliousness’ and ‘religiosity’ (even evangelical
religiosity), we would find new ways of talking about faith. This vocabulary might in turn
be useful in our classrooms as we respond to students whose views diverge from our
own” (356). So she collapses the “binary” by offering an alternative representation of
Christianity drawn from alternative Christian representatives like Paulo Freire and
Stephen Carter. Perkins, too, makes this attempt, drawing upon liberal theologians like
Leslie Newbigin and relative progressives like Arthur Holmes to locate religious
alternatives that are not only unobjectionable, but might actually inform instructors’
rhetorical practice.
Carter, following a similar logic, points out several parallels between religious
communities of practice and academic communities of practice in order to establish that
religious communities of practice are not (any more) anti-intellectual (than academic
ones): she directly points to the academic merits of “faith” (585) and “orthodoxy” (586),
two of the most seemingly anti-intellectual components of religion. DePalma too focuses
on faith parallels, and adds experience—he argues that these dimensions of knowing, so

40

crucial to religious discourses, are highly valued within pragmatist accounts of
knowledge and crucial to academic knowing as well. DePalma seems to hope this might
lead to a re-valuation of religious knowing. Rand makes a similar argument in describing
the conversion focus of critical pedagogues—as she writes, “Composition studies itself
preaches a kind of born-again faith; we want students to get saved and to resist subject
positions that discourage critical awareness” (364). Given this emphasis on conversion,
she doubts the “dichotomous relationship we maintain between the ‘evangelical’ and the
work we ourselves do in composition studies” (356). The implication of this set of
arguments is, if admittedly only in part, a fascinating sort of backhanded compliment:
“Perhaps we aren’t really any better than them, since our discourses and theirs do many
of the same things: for this reason, we should re-consider our dismissive stances towards
them.”
Though he is making a slightly different point than I am here, I believe DePalma
presciently diagnoses the problematic tendency towards homogenization underlying all
these efforts at more positive representations. DePalma argues that in constructing their
representations of religious students, writers in our field have tended to over-emphasize
official, homogeneous accounts of religion while under-emphasizing individual religious
practice:
Narratives of this kind tend to start with a description of how religious
students think about language and texts, based on definitions generated in
religious studies or elsewhere, and move on to an illustration of student
texts that fit those definitions. Such research, in my view, is limited,
because it works from generalizations that do not account for the complex
notions about texts and language that many religious students have. (239)
DePalma largely limits his critique to the way we represent religious “notions about texts
and language,” but I think it could be argued that we often do this more broadly by
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providing definitions of religions that highlight official or at least dominant descriptions
and perspectives, and the practices that neatly enact these doctrines. Specific religions
and religious groups are defined in our literature essentially, homogeneously, and often
ideologically; then these definitions are taken to directly inform individual student
practices. While the homogeneous representations we offer are pressed into the service of
creating greater respect or understanding for religious students, Raymond Williams
points out the significant cost attached to such generalizations: “The relatively mixed,
confused, incomplete, or inarticulate consciousness of actual men in that period and
society is thus overridden in the name of this decisive generalized system” (109). In other
words, our habit of moving directly from dominant accounts to exemplary practices
leaves too little room for the heterogeneity, change, conflict, and creativity in students’
lived religious practice.
Goodburn’s article offers one version of this tendency to explain individual
behavior through a dominant account of religious ideology:
In defining Christian fundamentalist discourse within this essay, then, I am
not referring to a description of practices or institutional affiliations, but
rather to a set of guiding assumptions . . . “a tendency, a habit of mind,
rather than a discrete movement or phenomenon, . . . a body of discourse
arising from belief in the sole authority of an inerrant Bible.” (Kintz 10,
qtd. in Goodburn 336, emphasis mine)
The textual behaviors of the student Goodburn writes about, Luke, are then explained
through this universal description of fundamentalists (which corresponds directly to the
dominant representation and its norms discussed in chapter two). But Goodburn’s
explanations depend upon her own characterization of Luke and other students as
fundamentalists, not on their own profession of fundamentalism or of any specific
religious doctrine (336). She writes, for instance, “Luke’s resistance to a revisionist
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reading of this biblical story is understandable given how he views the authority of
biblical text as the literal and unmediated word of God” (339). Just a paragraph later,
Goodburn writes, “Given Luke’s perspective on the authority of meaning within biblical
texts it’s not surprising that he does not mention the other two articles that were
assigned…” (339). She explains, “for him, the Bible is the sole source of authority for
interpreting all other texts” (339). This explanation again derives from a homogenizing
and unilinear causal relation Goodburn appears to be assuming between official doctrine
and individual practice: “fundamentalists do not view texts as offering multiple readings”
(339). This representation implies that Luke is entirely defined by the official religious
discourse—and while this isn’t a denial of “agency” because Luke is still acting with his
discourse and maintaining his discourse through performing it, it certainly is a
representation that fails to highlight all of the potential differences between official
religious discourse and Luke’s performance of it.
A second manifestation of this move encourages our students to act as official
representatives, often when we imagine that they and we are involved in cross-cultural
negotiations. I see this particularly in Carter’s text where students are asked to explain
evangelicalism to her, and in Bronwyn Williams’s negotiations with Mohammed. In
Williams’s text, Mohammed is positioned (or positions himself) as a sort of spokesperson
for Muslims, and Williams positions himself as a spokesperson for liberal, Western
values. As spokespersons, the two engage in a negotiation process intended to create
better understanding across “cross-cultural conflict,” here represented by a discussion of
divergent Western and Muslim reactions to Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (117).
Given both Williams’ and Mohammed’s background and stated positions on issues, this
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seems fairly reasonable, all the more so in that each individual appears comfortable
speaking as such within the conversations. But in the process, both Williams and
Mohammed also frequently display a tendency to present a singular, unified conception
of the positions they represent that stems in part from this spokesperson status and in part
from the Western form of argument they enact.
In order to talk cross-culturally in this manner, both reduce their traditions
selectively without much acknowledgement of these selections. Here, for example, is
Mohammed: “The entire Islamic system consists of the so-called ‘Hodud’ or limits
beyond which one should simply not venture. Islam does not recognize unlimited
freedom of expression. Call them taboos, if you like, but Islam considers a wide variety
of topics as permanently closed” (109). Interestingly here, Mohammed confidently
attributes positions and assumptions to “Islam,” but seems to recognize practical variation
in the very next line, writing, “Most Muslims are prepared to be broad-minded about
most things” (109). In the same way, when Williams describes his position he does so in
fairly singular terms: “Quakers search for truth in contemplation and consensus” (107);
“As a Quaker I had been raised” (110); “Quakerism also privileges human discussion and
consensus” (111). While I am certainly not in a position to deny the general accuracy of
any of these statements, I think it is notable that in such phrasings particular positions are
reified and homogenized—rendered official. At one point Williams insightfully
acknowledges the differential role of class in Muslim’s experience of religion; at another
Mohammed points to the role of education and poverty in Muslim responses to the West.
But these sources of intradiscursive difference don’t receive the attention that
interdiscursive differences do, and I wonder whether that is a result of the construction of
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the rhetorical situation as a “cross-cultural negotiation” between representatives. When
we construct ourselves and students as representatives in this way, we may actually
perpetuate hegemonic logics of homogeneity and generalization, even if in the short term
we do not perpetuate specific hegemonic relations.
Third, I think that this tendency to privilege the official and under-emphasize
intradiscursive difference is further exacerbated by emphasizing religious “identity” as a
rationale for respecting religious discourses. This, too, can easily lead to downplaying the
critical differences between students with religious identities. If we say an “evangelical
subjectivity” is many of our students’ “primary kind of selfhood,” as Rand would have it
(350), this can easily become a way of understanding our evangelical students primarily
in terms of official ideology or dominant representations, as well as a way of
homogenizing heterogeneous experiences of evangelical discourse. Goodburn and
Perkins both note this complication in their footnotes, though they elect not to discuss it
within the text of their articles. Goodburn explains, “I realize that reading a student’s
responses or actions as shaped by one overriding discourse is problematic because such a
reading seems to decontextualize this discourse from its relationship to others, like race
and class,” yet she chooses to do so because “naming the discourses that shape student
response helps teachers examine how their own discourses shape their practices” (352).
Perkins similarly notes, “Though the majority of evangelical Christian students aspire to
a seamless reading of Scripture, their interpretations are overdetermined by aspects of
their identities—senses of their own whiteness or blackness, cultural ideologies of family
or political power—that most of them cannot change (not that they would)” (609).
Unfortunately, Perkins like Goodburn relegates this important caveat to a footnote.
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Undeniably, these writers make understandable choices given their own purposes;
however if our goal is to counter a dominant representation that seems to effect religious
students by negating their differences from the dominant representation, I think relegating
such qualifications about students’ multiply-constituted discursive identities to a footnote
is a mistake. Perkins’s and Goodburn’s choice to de-emphasize students’ multiple
identities in favor of their religious identity has seemingly contributed to later scholars’
elision of these complexities. Carter and DePalma, writing after Perkins and Goodburn,
don’t even provide a footnote explicitly noting how other traditional sources of difference
impact religious identity. Religious students and even a church service Carter attends, for
example, are described using a number of racial markers that might suggest the church
and some of the students are black, yet Carter never explicitly acknowledges that both her
race and that of the congregants are inflecting the way evangelicalism is being enacted
and experienced in the service or in the classroom. (If it is even evangelicalism—most
sociologists do not classify African American churches as evangelical, despite quite a
few similarities.)
This erasure of other components of student identity, like all the others, keeps us
from seeing differences in students’ religious experiences; for example, an evangelical
woman may sharply feel the differences in evangelical identity between herself and
evangelical men; men can take on a much larger range of leadership roles in most
conservative evangelical churches, yet surprisingly women are more active in both
leadership and recruiting in these churches (Woodberry and Smith). Evangelical men
may not even be aware of the difference between these evangelical subjectivities.
Pointing to another source of such difference, a student named Lauren Lewis in one of
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my classes once wrote an autoethnographic essay on the historical relationship between
black women and Christian churches in America. She used sociological research to
develop several lines of thought reflecting on the church’s relation to the legacy of
slavery as well as shifting gender roles. But she also used interviews with family
members and video footage of her deceased grandmother, a pastor, leading worship.
Together, these resources allowed her to deliberate on not just religious experience or
black women’s religious experience, but on the religious experience of black women in
her family across three generations. She reminded me that in Christ, as Galatians 3:28
says, there may be “neither Jew nor Greek, . . . neither slave nor free, . . . no male and
female”—but in the church and at school, all of these categories still exist, and so do
many more.
So if we say that students participate in some form of evangelical discourse that
constructs their sense of self, we must not fail to note that students participate in that
particular evangelical discourse in different ways relating to other discourses and subject
positions they embody: one individual might participate in evangelicalism as an
evangelical man, as a (rare) black evangelical, as a homosexual evangelical, as an
(increasingly common) upper-class evangelical, as an (also increasingly-common)
college-educated evangelical, as a gamer who is evangelical, as a Southern evangelical,
as a scientist evangelical, as a liberal evangelical, and as a young evangelical. This
conception of a plural evangelical identity introduces sources of difference—first, a
dissonance experienced by the individual who moves within these various discourses and
communities; second, dissonances experienced between individuals’ experiences of
evangelicalism. Both create the deliberative space in which change, re-organizations of
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the relations among discourses and individuals, can occur. Representations that elide such
heterogeneity are (or can quickly become) tools of the dominant order—no matter their
intended use. So in such attempts to represent religion respectfully and protect students
from academic hegemony, we merely substitute one essential definition for another, and
thus contribute to a homogenizing and essentialist construction of students’ religion.

Move Two: Translate Religious Discourse Transparently
The second move we’ve made in response to conflicted relations between
academia and religion is to encourage students to transparently “translate” their religious
discourse into academic discourse for us. Because our goal is often improved relations
between religious and academic discourses and improved relations between religious
students and their academic instructors, we tend to help religious students take up
specifically academic ways of representing their religious discourse that might make
religious discourse more palatable and even respectable to instructors whom we assume
are generally suspicious of religion and religious students. In this model, respect is
directed towards the religious discourse while change is directed instead largely towards
the ways that students practice discourse in the classroom.
Rand’s argument sets this up, too: in her conclusion, she quotes Thomas Newkirk:
“It is one thing to demonstrate an alternative—to extend a repertoire; it is another to try to
eradicate a ‘lower’ form of consciousness” (102, qtd. in Rand 364). As Vander Lei reframes the essential conflict of the writing classroom, the question is really, “How do we
respect the writer’s rhetorical commitments (both cultural and religious) while
simultaneously preparing her to meet the expectations of an academic audience?” (103)
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Downs offers our paradigmatic answer: translation. “As with any other home Discourse,
we would not necessarily wish students to leave Affirmation behind. If our project is
teaching Discourses of inquiry, then, our task is to help translate” (50, emphasis mine).
Downs elaborates on this process of translation:
A “translator” response from me would have been to explain to Keith
more about the audience he faced and what sorts of support for his case
they would value. I could have shown him how “real scholars” probably
wouldn’t accept a “the Bible tells me so” argument on its face but might
accept similar arguments framed in cultural terms, or how to reframe his
question more usefully for them, or how “real scholars” who are unable to
accept a “true believer’s” received knowledge of spiritual experience
might be more sympathetic to “felt sense” (Perl and Egendorf 1986). (50)
Teaching students to translate their religious discourse—a term that seems variously to
refer to religiously inflected perspectives, experiences, values, feelings, behaviors, texts,
genres, as well as the communities in which they circulate (Thomson 7)—into academic
discourse (again, defined variously) will respect students’ religious discourses and
identities while changing their academic discursive habits.
This logic of translation informs even casual approaches to religious students. In a
recent article, Nancy Sommers and Laura Saltz discuss religious students in the context
of a larger project, and so discuss such students’ writing without subjecting their
discussion of religion to careful reflection and elaboration. This provides us with a better
view of the disciplinary doxa on religious students than do articles focused on them.
Discussing Jeremy, a “deeply religious” student at Harvard, Sommers and Saltz
negatively evaluate what they call Jeremy’s early proclivity for “personal writing”: “If
students are only writing to understand their personal experiences, if their expertise
comes only from their personal connection with the material, or if they see the personal
and academic as opposites, their writing remains a form of self-expression” (146). But
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Jeremy eventually arrives at “argument,” where he “learns to locate his questions within a
wider circle of readers, seeing himself as part of an ongoing critical discussion about
what compels people to accept or reject their faiths, a discussion that is legitimate in
itself, not just a topic that tells him more about himself” (145). The implicit goal of
college writing courses, for Sommers and Saltz, is to see students move “from personal
writing to argument” (145)—so the “personal” must be translated (here, we can think of
translation in the religious sense of being raised to a higher state) into academic
discourse, that which is legitimate in itself, they say, because it is suitable for this
particular public’s consumption and is potentially of interest to that readership. Academic
discourse on religious topics in this sense means progressively creating distance from
personal experience, choosing proper methods, evidence, and authors for citation, and
employing explanatory (analytic) modes of thinking and writing. Other explicit examples
of pedagogy-as-translation, all of which also offer us an implicit definition of academic
discourse, appear in attempts to arrive at mutual understanding through rational discourse
(Williams; Goodburn; Smart) attempts to help students achieve critical consciousness
(Perkins), to help them make persuasive arguments defending religious viewpoints
(Downs; Shafer), and to effectively convey religious experiences for academic audiences
(DePalma).
Frequently, the claim that such translations will not damage students’ religious
commitments seems to rely upon the assumption that religion can be separated from the
ways in which it is discussed. This in turn often depends on constructing religion as,
essentially, beliefs. We see these dual assumptions repeatedly: Mark Montesano and
Duane Roen argue that the challenge for the writing teacher is to “provide opportunities
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for students to actively engage their belief systems in writing classrooms . . . without
diluting one’s own beliefs” (85). Perkins explains that a student named Clifford’s
religious faithfulness has been salvaged though he acquired some level of critical
consciousness because he learned to read and write academically “Without . . .
abandoning the beliefs that shaped his personal relationships and that gave meaning to his
existence” (605). And we see this definition early on in Goodburn, who argues that
instead of attempting to change core religious beliefs and assumptions in students who
are satisfied with them—this would be “a bit arrogant”—students should be encouraged
to articulate these fundamentalist assumptions and their consequences for the purpose of
better mutual understanding (350-351). Elizabeth Vander Lei sets her goals for religious
students similarly: “not that they alter what they believe”—that is, the apparent essentials
of their religion—but their expressions and their thinking: she hopes to see them “bring
their religious faith to their writing,” “respond effectively to the religious faith they
encounter in the public square,” and “use tension between faith . . . and academic inquiry
as a way of learning more and learning better” (8).5
Outside rhetoric and composition, Giddens best articulates the divide between
belief and discourse—between religious content and religious language—that this view
constructs. Giddens argues that a fundamentalist is not a fundamentalist because of her
tradition, but because of the way she justifies her tradition. So there is religion on the one
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This representation of religion as primarily a matter of belief is also strongly if subtly
reinforced by our generalized use of “believer” to designate religious adherents. This
construction is specious at best, depending upon a definition of religion as centrally or at
least essentially a matter of beliefs, similar to Geertz’s definition. Since Asad’s article
almost thirty years ago, such views have largely fallen out of favor in scholarship on
religion. See chapters one, three, and five on this point.
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hand, and then there are the ways people talk about religion in public on the other.
Fundamentalism, according to Giddens,
is tradition defended in the traditional way—by reference to ritual truth—
in a globalizing world that asks for reasons. Fundamentalism, therefore,
has nothing to do with the context of beliefs, religious or otherwise. What
matters is how the truth of beliefs is defended or asserted. Fundamentalism
isn’t about what people believe but, like tradition more generally, about
why they believe it and how they justify it.
We in rhetoric and composition seem to agree with Giddens. So long as students are
willing to fully adhere to conventional forms of academic discourse when speaking and
writing in academic spaces, our rhetoric runs, students may believe (and often argue for)
whatever they want.
Carter offers us perhaps the most overt and fully elaborated version of this logic
and pedagogy for religious students. She explains here her basic understanding of the
classroom context:
I argue that inasmuch as these believers “live in a world always already
biblically written” (Kintz) and large segments of the academy are likely to
remain hostile to faith-based ways of knowing, we would do better to help
students speak to and across difference by employing what I have called a
pedagogy of rhetorical dexterity, an approach that trains writers to
effectively read, understand, manipulate, and negotiate the cultural and
linguistic codes of a new community of practice (Lave and Wenger) based
on a relatively accurate assessment of another, more familiar one. (574)
We might paraphrase Carter to be saying that the tensions between conservative religious
students (and religious discourses) and academics (and academic discourses) are not
changing. By implication, neither are the discourses—conflict is inevitable. Because of
this conflict, becoming a part of the academic discourse community risks loosening
students’ bonds to their religious discourse community. So religious students need to
protect themselves from that by getting better at learning new discourses. Specifically,
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they need to acquire the discourses of power—as she puts it, “those the academy expects
them to exhibit” (574). This will allow them to keep their religious identities intact,
Carter says.
But writing scholars have begun intimating a growing concern that religious
identities aren’t being protected as much as we think in such acts of “translation,”
because language can’t really be separated from thinking and living. bonnie lenore
kyburz explains:
We struggle to attend to context [elsewhere she calls it an oversimplified
audience concept] in ways that we imagine as helpful, and we believe that
we are making various “transitions” easier for students to experience (I
dare say that we imagine the transitions as unproblematically necessary,
which should be alarming). Rarely do we consider our work on/in
audience as harmful; more often we think of it in terms of “rites of
passage” (139)
This concern finds fuller elaboration in Smart’s essay, which quite typically begins by
arguing that “Faith embarrasses our attempts to articulate it because it is otherworldly and
thus other-word-ly: Faith asks us to explain the unexplainable” (14). Early on, she seems
sure that when instructors recognize this difficulty and “help faith-oriented students move
from ‘embarrassment’ to engagement by asking students to examine their religious
assumptions and the language they use to articulate those assumptions” (14)—helping
them get better at meeting audience expectations for explanation and articulation, in other
words (20)—they can help to “legitimize the faith-centered voices of our students” (14).
She enacts this herself by asking a religious student writer to revise his paper and
“consider his rhetorical situation and the need to address his purpose and audience
appropriately by composing a paper for a literature class, not a sermon for church” (20).
Smart intends for these strategies to help her student think critically about his faith while
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they also “recommend him to, rather than alienating him from, an eclectic audience of
academic mentors and peers” (20). So the student responds to Smart’s request by
scrubbing out the overtly religious forms of evidence and re-writing the paper with an
academic audience’s rhetorical conventions in mind (20-21). This seems to be a perfect
example of the translation Downs calls for. Smart recognizes, however, that her student’s
success may have come at a cost—she ends up asking the crucial question: “what costs
do such acts of re-vision exact on the privately-intuited, epistemological registries of the
student?” (21)
I think we can best answer Smart’s question—what are the actual costs of
translation?—by borrowing a critique from scholarship on language difference.
Pedagogies that encourage students to translate their religious discourse into academic
discourse might be said to take something of an accommodationist approach to religious
difference. Such approaches are purportedly more progressive than earlier pedagogies in
that they don’t want to eradicate differences—instead, they acknowledge them, codify
them, and grant individuals a right to them. They do this by teaching students contextual
appropriateness—learning to use the right discourse in the right “specific, discrete,
assigned social sphere” (Horner, Lu, Royster, and Trimbur 306). In “Conflict and
Struggle,” Lu argues, however, that these accommodationist approaches are troubled
from the start because they problematically depend upon Giddens’ separation between
content and form to justify their audience-focused strategies. Speaking of a similar
separation in Mina Shaugnessy’s approach to basic writers, she notes it is only “because
of her essentialist assumption that words can express but will not change the essence of
one's thoughts, [that] her pedagogy promises to help students master academic discourse
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without forcing them to reposition themselves—i.e., to re-form their relation—towards
conflicting cultural beliefs” (906).
In other words, it is only when languages are separated from thinking and
living—from other aspects of culture—that they can be reduced to codifiable sets, and
distinguished from the forms of life and thought they merely “describe.” In this
accommodationist conception of language’s relation to thinking and living, language
does not shape thinking and living, but is simply asked to represent them accurately, the
way that a French translation is separate from (has no impact on) the English book it
translates. The concerns for a translator, in that case, are basically limited to accuracy to
the original on the one hand, and audience-effectiveness on the other. We risk enacting
both accommodationist assumptions in transparent translation approaches to religious
students: On the one hand, if we act as though students’ religion can be spoken about in
new, academically appropriate ways without altering its essential qualities or their
essential religious commitment, we risk forgetting the intricate relation between thinking,
living and language. Forgetting this allows us to believe students who translate their
religious discourse into academic discourse must only concern themselves with an
accurate and/or appropriate representation of their religion. On the other hand, if we
acknowledge that religious discourse is, in fact, a discourse connecting speaking, writing,
thinking and living, then religion cannot be thought about in just any way, any more than
it can be spoken of in just any way, without producing alterations and new relations to the
discourse. The specific ways of thinking about religion are themselves a part of the
religion, so introducing new ways of thinking about religion can alter an “essential”
aspect of students’ religion, too.
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If language is understood as wrapped up in thinking and living, then switching the
language you use to describe something is more than just exchanging one word for
another. The same is true of approaching religion from a new perspective—these
exchanges will actually change meanings, as well as users’ relations to their original
discourses; transformations become inevitable in the process of opaque translation. As
Mary Soliday explains in “Translating Self and Difference through Literacy Narratives,”
parts of the original self, discourse, community, or experience may be left behind, or
contradicted, by translation into a new discourse: “the translation of self, cultural
categories, and felt experience can be incomplete” (515). This incomplete or
contradictory translation is literally felt by those who learn new discourses. Lu discusses
this throughout “Conflict and Struggle” and exemplifies it in “From Silence to Words,”
as she recounts both the contradiction and compartmentalization she experienced in
shifting between different languages. She attributes these experiences of loss and
contradiction to the ways of thinking and living that attach themselves to ways of
speaking—Standard Chinese at school and English at home were not simply linguistic
codes, but entire conflicting cultural ways of being that immersed Lu in dramatic internal
conflict (443). From this perspective, we can see that translation is neither solely a
question of accuracy—no discourse, identity, experience, or community can be fully
transferred into another—nor of audience-effectiveness—speaking or writing in new
ways affects not only the audience but also rebounds upon the speaker or writer and upon
the discourses, identities, experiences, and communities spoken. A whole system of
meanings and ways of seeing and feelings are attached to words, and these new meanings
and ways of being may well contradict with other ways of being. New sets of relations
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are established. Thus translation is always a process of creating losses, contradictions,
and choices.
We can see something of the actual opacity of translation between religious and
academic communities in Carter’s interactions with Keneshia. In keeping with an
accommodationist perspective, the codification of discrete communities’ features
prominently in Carter’s pedagogy and Keneshia’s translation. Carter poses her questions
for students more generally this way:
What are the “territorial imperatives” within this community of practice?
That is, what are the “rules” that govern what one should or should not
say, think, or feel in this context, as well as how one must behave, dress,
and carry oneself in order to be considered a “churchly child” rather than
merely “a child that goes to church”? How is membership in this context
expressed? What strategies must one use to be “heard, understood, taken
seriously” within this community of practice? In other words, what
strategies or ways of being mark some children as “churchly” and others
as children who just “go to church”? . . . What kinds of things did you
have to do before you could consider yourself Christian-literate? . . . What
might you have to learn, recognize, and embody in the academy before
you may be able to feel literate as a writer and reader in various schoolbased contexts, too? (587, emphasis mine)
Students like Keneshia are said to have succeeded in Carter’s class if they have
“developed ways . . . to make sense of her own Christian literacies in terms legible and
accessible to those much less literate in Christianity” (591). But as we can see, in order to
accomplish this legibility and accessibility, Carter encourages students to speak in rules
and imperatives and universals—a representational strategy that produces both
homogeneous and static representations. Nor is there any space for discursive change in
Carter’s text: note that her questions are largely synchronic. Thus, a heterogeneous and
changing discourse, translated into an academic assignment, can become static and
homogeneous.
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Carter also encourages Keneshia to translate her religious discourse into the
textually-driven form of evangelicalism that Carter—and Goodburn, Perkins, Rand, and
many others—have deployed in their texts (noted above). This representation can be
traced to Goodburn and Dively’s early disciplinary articles on conservative Christian
students. Here’s Dively, quoted in Rand:
Many [Christians] who have been fed [a] narrow view of subjectivity may
perceive themselves as rigidly defined by belief in the tenets of holy
scripture and of faith in the existence and saving power of Jesus Christ. A
'literal' interpretation of scripture becomes their rule book for living a
'pure' and productive life, and God becomes the center of their universe,
the ideal against which all thoughts, behaviors and actions should be
judged. (94, qtd. in Rand 362)
In keeping with this cited and sedimented disciplinary conception of conservative
Christianity as text-centered, Carter—not Keneshia—initially constructs evangelical
Christianity as a text-centered community of practice at the beginning of her article. Like
Goodburn, Carter quotes Linda Kintz: “all ‘legitimate participants . . . live . . . inside a
world of textual quotations and references to biblical passages, interpretations, and
reinterpretations” (578). She draws from this the inference that “many of my students
‘live inside the Book’” (578) and that for evangelical Christian students “the Bible
represents their ‘primary sense of selfhood’” (581). This last is a significantly appended
version of Rand’s words: “spiritual identity may be the primary kind of selfhood more
than a few of [our students] draw upon in making meaning of their lives and the world
around them” (350). The upshot is that Carter draws a direct line from Bible to religious
discourse, from religious discourse to spiritual identity, and from spiritual identity to
primary selfhood.
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So working from within this academic understanding of evangelical discourse as
text-centered and codifiable, Carter wants Keneshia to better articulate and codify the
connections between the Bible and her church’s community of practice. She writes to
Keneshia, “In revision, I’d like . . . [for you to] show us how these ‘rules’ as outlined in
Exodus might play themselves out in your church” (590, ellipses original). Keneshia,
who had apparently originally cited a passage from Exodus with only oblique
connections to the practices she was describing in her church, responds by quoting a new
scripture, this time from Psalms, and explaining line by line how her church’s worship
service fulfills the lines of the Psalm (591). Carter writes that in Keneshia’s revision “we
can begin to understand how the shape and function of the church might be informed by,
among other things, this passage from the Book that makes up the core guidance in this
community of practice” (591). Carter also suggests this representation is evidence that
Keneshia is “developing a deeper awareness of the various ways in which the Bible itself
informs Christian literacy” (592). This certainly may be true—a Psalm describing
worship practices does seem likely to more directly inform Keneshia’s worship practices
than the Ten Commandments, which are focused ostensibly on moral strictures. But
Keneshia’s revised account also seems simply more in line with writing scholarship’s
academic discourse about evangelical Christianity. First, it presents a stable and
homogeneous codification of her religious community by sketching a direct, linear
relationship between an official document and everyday practices; second, it places the
Bible at the rule-giving center of religious practices. Keneshia’s religious discourse has to
some extent been assumed by academic discourse through her own assumption of
academic discourse.
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It is, admittedly, impossible for me to tell what effect this emphasis on
codification and textuality actually had on Keneshia’s relationship to Christianity and the
Bible, or to predict what effect similar codifying strategies could have on other students.
Acknowledging this limitation in my work, I nevertheless want to highlight the potential
risks and affordances of this encounter that scholars have generally failed to acknowledge
or work to address in their recommendations.6 In my view, this translation may cause
Keneshia to re-construct and re-conceptualize her religion to fit academic
conceptualizations—making it potentially not “true” to the original religious discourse
community she’s describing—and it may also change the way that Keneshia relates to her
religious discourse (and confirm for us our existing relation to it). For example, contrast
the potential effects of encouraging Keneshia to connect her contemporary religious
practices to a three thousand year-old poem (and turning the poem into a set of explicit
instructions) against encouraging Keneshia to connect her contemporary religious
practices with ever-shifting historical, cultural, racial, geographic, or class trends. Or,
alternatively, contrast Carter’s codifying strategy against encouraging Keneshia to
identify variations and changes in how religious practitioners enact these instructions
from the Psalms, either over the years or within her congregation, and to contemplate the
role of culture and context in creating those shifts. I believe the former strategy seems
more likely to encourage Keneshia to understand these everyday practices as ageless or
static, while the latter strategies seem more likely to encourage Keneshia to think through
what causes her community’s religious practices to change, and what might cause them
to change again. In highlighting the relations between the Bible and Keneshia’s religious
6

I face similar limitations in my re-readings of published accounts throughout the rest of
this chapter, and in chapter five.
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practices rather than the relations between, say, social trends, the Bible, and Keneshia’s
religious practices,7 an opportunity for promoting more flexible, politically efficacious
representations of religious discourses is missed. Keneshia is not encouraged to see her
own agency in producing her religious discourse, nor how the situation is actually
involved in shaping her community’s situated practice, nor her potential role in changing
that situation. (Nor is she encouraged to consider how her academic situation is
impacting her discursive practice.) Though again this cannot be said with any degree of
certainty, it seems that translation into this particular form of academic discourse might
actually keep Keneshia from seeing the agency, change, and heterogeneity in her
religious discourse, and so prove not only ineffective but counterproductive.
An instructor’s responsibility here is not to eradicate such risks in translation—
that would be impossible—but to acknowledge the possibilities so that students can be
vigilant and actively making decisions on whether and how they want to change. This is
why in translingual pedagogies the act of translation itself comes under investigation
even as a translation is produced. When students are asked to translate from one
discourse or language into another, they are confronted with the opacity of words and the
constraints of any one discourse’s representation of “reality” and “experience.” As they
translate, they are forced to select new words from among a set of partially adequate
choices, leaving some meanings and subtle nuances out of the new translation while
drawing in new ones. Further, these translations must be made to highlight the unequal
power relations between discourses in that particular setting: these selections are made
because someone has asked for the translation; because some privilege or reward or
7

For example, Perkins would encourage consideration of the relations between social
trends and possible interpretations of that text, that in turn affect religious practices.
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punishment will be attached to its performance or failure. And while a pragmatist or
accommodationist approach might emphasize the utility and benefits of producing the
finished translation, a truly translingual approach will ask students to contemplate the
remainders, we might say—the losses, inefficiencies, and injustices also produced by the
process. Ideally, by focusing student attention on the process and its by-products (and not
only the document that results) students see how each of these discourses or languages
bring limitations and new meaning potentials not available in the other, but also how
power works through such processes. Translation is never a matter of neat, algebraic
substitution, and language use is never simply a matter of information transfer.

Move Three: Resource Religion as Compl(i)mentary
Our third move, resourcing religious discourse, retains some of the assumptions
of transparent translation while explicitly attempting to move beyond accommodationist
pedagogies. Like other inclusive methodologies, this move emphasizes respect for
religious students and their discourses by looking to locate ways in which academic
discourse can accommodate religious discourse. But resourcing explicitly goes beyond
accommodation because it looks for ways “students’ religious discourses might
contribute to discourses of the academy,” as DePalma puts it (224). He emphasizes this
shift: “religious students’ discourses are seen not as barriers to critical inquiry but as
resources that have the potential to contribute to the enterprise of knowledge making”
(225). DePalma’s approach would appear, at first glance, to be in keeping with Horner et
al.’s translingual approach to language difference, which “insists on viewing language
differences and fluidities as resources to be preserved, developed, and utilized. Rather
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than respond to language differences only in terms of rights, it sees them as resources”
(304). But I will attempt to demonstrate that there remains a crucial difference between
translingual resourcing and religious resourcing. Because DePalma’s application of
resourcing fails to help students deliberately attend to the power relations involved in this
merger between religious and academic discourses, it remains largely accommodationist
in spite of itself.
Like many others have, notably Goodburn, Nowacek, Perkins, Rand, Smart,
Stenberg, Vander Lei, DePalma emphasizes the complementarity of religious and
academic discourses as a response to assumptions of mutual exclusivity by scholars who,
like Carter and Downs, imply at times that the gap between religious and academic
discourses may be irreconcilable (574). He rightly points out that highlighting
incommensurability mistakenly shores up the porous boundaries between discourses,
reifying differences and power relations. Rehearsing the by-now familiar disciplinary
religion-academe conflict narrative, DePalma notes that it forces an undesirable binary
choice upon instructors and students (223). He wants to avoid this compartmentalization
and its binary choice, so his goal is to help students find ways to “merge” religious and
academic discourses by allowing students to utilize both. In DePalma’s presentation of an
evangelical student named Thomas’s writing, merging manifests as analyzing religious
vocabulary and key words (237-38), incorporating religious texts like the Bible (229),
reporting on religious experiences like feeling the presence of the Holy Spirit (231), and
utilizing religious discursive forms like an epistolary generic form that Thomas borrows
from C.S. Lewis (234). In these ways, religious discourse can merge with academic
discourse in one text, rather than having to be translated first.
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To justify this inclusion DePalma, like many others, emphasizes how academic
and religious discourses are actually “overlapping or complimentary [sic]” (223). He
offers a rather strong version of the anti-foundationalist position that recognizes all
discourses and discursive subjectivities as situated, and all truths as partial. DePalma
argues that since all discourses are provisional and transitory attempts “to convey the
ever-shifting stream of human experiences” (224), any discourse that helps make
meaning out of experience can have value. From such a position, users of academic
discourses must try not to invalidate other discourses and instead respect and include
diverse perspectives, acknowledging that no discourse can claim transcendent knowledge
and all discourses could have something to teach us. Religious discourses, too, might help
to convey or work through experiences. “From this vantage point,” DePalma writes, “we
are no longer forced to choose between discourses. Instead, it becomes possible to see
how students’ religious discourses might contribute to discourses of the academy” (224).
But in the process of creating epistemological equality between the discourses, he seems
to lose sight of the still-extant structural inequities between discourses that his
epistemological stance wants to rectify.
We can literally watch this erasure of conflict occur in DePalma’s text. He
specifically locates his argument for complementarity in the context of translingualism
and resource-based approaches to discursive difference drawn from Horner, Lu, A.
Suresh Canagarajah, and Joseph Harris. Here, he cites Horner and Lu:
By treating these [academic and religious] discourses as “fixed varieties
into and out of which writers can ‘translate’ their ideas without altering
what is imagined to be the discrete nature of each,” rather than as
overlapping or complimentary [sic], students are given the impression that
they must become different ‘selves’ in each context they enter (9, qtd. in
DePalma 223).
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Through the quotation, DePalma concisely brings out the risks of translation that arise
when we consider relations between discourses: first, the mistake of treating various
discourses as fixed and discrete; second, the mistake of assuming that discourses can be
translated transparently into one another without altering the discourses themselves; third,
the mistake of compartmentalizing students’ mixed and plural discursive identities.
But when looked at more closely, DePalma’s gloss on Horner and Lu’s words actually
appears to shift away from the originating text’s concerns about translation and relations
between discourses. In fact, DePalma’s rosy characterization of those relations,
“overlapping or complimentary,” proves to itself be a silent translation of Joseph Harris’s
characterization of discourses as “overlapping and contradictory,” a phrase DePalma
quotes later in the article. This elision of conflict becomes especially clear in DePalma’s
revision suggestions for Thomas—evident in both what he doesn’t ask Thomas for (any
discussion of the conflicts or struggles between discourses, communities, or identities)
and what he does (academic forms of discourse).
On a fully translingual model of translation or “merging,” accomplishing a merger
between discourses as powerful as Christianity and academic discourse should result in
losses, contradictions, transformations, and remainders; and students should be
encouraged to focus on those ruptures. But this is not the case in DePalma’s model,
because transdiscursive conflict is de-emphasized in favor of complementarity. At times,
we do see the struggles of merging in DePalma’s interactions with Thomas. He certainly
has a number of revision suggestions for Thomas’s next draft. These revision suggestions
might be interpreted as symptoms of just such a struggle between discourses (232-33,
236-38), particularly because DePalma focuses so strongly on critiques he thinks
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“academic readers” might offer when reading Thomas’s writing (232). DePalma worries
at that point that “some readers” will be concerned by Thomas’s use of biblical and
religious terminology without providing definitions or qualifications; his appropriation of
religious clichés to express personal sentiments; and the balance of metaphor and
concrete description in his narration of religious experience (232-33). DePalma notes that
these criticisms might miss the positive work of self-exploration, reflection, and
invention that Thomas is doing, but he studiously avoids rejecting the criticisms
themselves (which he himself constructed). And when he later posits his own suggestions
for revision—analytical exploration of religious key words, greater concreteness of
description, imitation of academic models of religious discourse (237-38)—these
suggestions also press Thomas towards academic modes of discourse. The religioacademic merger is beginning to look more like a take-over. For me, they index the
competition involved in such a complex web of “competing belief systems” (perhaps he
means different discourses?) and lived experiences.
But for DePalma, these simply index the struggle for adequate expression and
understanding—finding words adequate to Thomas’s experience (a crucial objective),
and finding words adequate for Thomas’s audience. We can see how DePalma
conceptualizes both expression and audience in the following phrases: he wants to help
Thomas
1) “relate these experiences to readers more effectively”
2) “[communicate] the magnificence of these experiences to his audience”
3) “convey the shift in his interior condition to his audience”
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4) “more vividly represent the fluctuation among the various forms of belief he is
attempting to articulate in his essay” (all on 236)
5) “ground his experiences in a way that is accessible to readers” (237)
6) “more effectively articulate [his] beliefs, commitments, and experiences” (237)
7) “gain a serious hearing with diverse audiences” (237)
8) “explore [his] deeply held values and beliefs in light of his experiences in an
effort to make them available to others” (238)
9) “mine [his] ‘God-terms’ and reflect on defining events in [his life] in order to
communicate them to an audience in writing . . . in a way that is meaningful to
diverse audiences” (238, all emphases mine)
DePalma seems unaware of the uneven power relations he is perpetuating by continually
casting modes of academic discourse (indicated by his specific revision suggestions
above) as ways for students to write effectively for a broad, “some readers” type of
audience (indicated by the phrasing of these goals for Thomas’s writing). So academic
discourse retains its hierarchical place; first, because Thomas’s religious discourse
remains ultimately answerable to academic norms; second, because those academic
norms themselves become transparent and naturalized into general requirements for
successful communication.
As DePalma seems to construct the issue, now that religious discourses and
experiences have been deemed academically appropriate and complementary (through his
theoretical framework), the struggle of writing comes down to a struggle for audienceappropriate self-expression (transparent translation). Or, as Carter put it using a similar
line of reasoning, the struggles between religious and academic discourses in the
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academy can be “understood as a dispute over appropriateness, rather than as a question
of whether [students] suffer from ‘false consciousness’ or, as I’m (unfortunately and
often) quick to see it, outright ‘ignorance’” (580). This does not acknowledge that a
dispute over appropriateness is indeed a dispute in which various parties exercise power
over others (who decides what is appropriate?). The political agenda behind critical calls
for merging discourses and incorporating experience—challenging hegemonic positions,
politicizing experience together (see, for instance, Anzaldua; Pratt; Soliday)—dissipates
in the face of these emphases on appropriateness or successful communication, as do the
structural pressures and constructed borders between academic and religious discourses.
There is no longer a conflict to acknowledge between powerful and competing
discourses, because they are epistemological equals working together in a bigger struggle
to make language align with and communicate experience. Because of this, like Carter
and the accommodationists before him, DePalma can’t seem to see that he, too, is asking
for a particular type of discourse that will only be effective for certain audiences. These
approaches promise to reduce conflict, and do—by simply requiring students to surrender
for their own good.
Mary Soliday asserts that writing classes should help students actively participate
and deliberate on conflicts—not avoid them. In contrast to pedagogies that treat the
collision of discourses as a problem to be resolved through adequate expression and
audience awareness, and the classroom as a space where harmonious and complementary
mergers are privileged, Soliday’s vision is of texts and classrooms as contact zones:
“social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in the
contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power” (Pratt 34, qtd. in Soliday 512). It is
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only through deliberately writing in these contact zones and through deliberating on
those forms of contact that students will be enabled to more critically participate in and
shape the cultural forces shaping them. Within the discipline of that time, Soliday saw
“considerable debate . . . on whether writing teachers and their students should assimilate,
critique, or reject dominant discourses,” but she notes that instructors seemed to be
arrogating students’ rights to make their own decisions. Soliday suggests that students
have significant contributions to make in those debates and decisions; ironically, she
argues that they might think through cultural conflicts by focusing precisely on the sorts
of processes of translation and merging that DePalma and Carter recommend as a means
of avoiding conflict.
Soliday imagines a pedagogy that might help students “to ponder the conflicts
attendant upon crossing language worlds and to reflect upon the choices that speakers of
minority dialects and languages must make” (512). By deliberating on translations,
students may be enabled to contend
with complicated affective and social issues of translation that the
scholarship boy could not resolve without losing a sense of self: how to be
independent from teachers, yet also how to accept direction from them;
how to switch codes according to context without being an opportunistic
rhetor; how to enter one discourse world without losing the words and
values of another. How, in short, to translate self and difference between
language worlds without becoming “a stranger to yourself.” (519)
In other words, Soliday argues it is only through deliberating on acts of merging and
translation that students can truly contend with questions of social power and cultural
conflict that arise in the multicultural classroom—not merely by performing the mergers
and producing the translations. I will return to this argument for deliberation below.
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Move Four: Report Religious Experience as Self-Evident
A fourth move we have made in our efforts to counter hegemonic classroom
relations is the incorporation of religious experience in academic writing. We are now
encouraging students to write richer, closer reports of their own lived religious practice
(Rand; Carter; DePalma) just as we work on developing our own richer, closer
examinations of religious practices (Moss; Crowley; Thomson). This critical
autoethnographic approach to religious experience can be traced back to Daniell’s 1994
essay, “Composing (As) Power.” Daniell asks informants to report on their religious
discourse—and often personal experience—in order to help us reflect on our work. Rand
similarly proposes that instructors ask students to represent their religious experience to
us in order to complicate our misconceptions of religious students and their religious
discourses. She recommends instructors ask the following questions:
We should ask students to explain how their resistance to mainstream
values and culture has shaped their lives and how those outside their
immediate faith communities respond to them. (Have they faced rejection
from family members, friends, coworkers, classmates, etc.? How do those
in the secular world react to their religious identity?) Christians are
admonished to be "in" the world but not "of" it (John 17:15-16): how is
this detachment from the secular world lived out on a daily basis, and do
the effects of sin make this kind of separation a struggle? (363)
We should note that Rand’s questions here are focused on the conflicts students
experience between religious and academic ways of being. She suggests that representing
personal experience in these ways—in terms of inter-discursive conflict and for instructor
viewing—might help instructors overcome crippling misconceptions of religious students
while also engaging “students in further conversation about the complex negotiations of
selfhood they undergo” (363). In other words, representing personal religious experience
is seen as a strategy for countering popular, hegemonic accounts of religion and for
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coming to greater understanding; this is certainly in keeping with Soliday’s vision of
autoethnographic writing.
Such uses of personal religious experience present a significant positive
development in our approaches to religious students. But as with other moves we’ve
made, the turn to the personal retains a troubling tendency to elide the conflicting and
contingent social forces structuring both religious experience and its representation. I
argue in what follows that including religiously-inflected experience in student writing is
not inherently critical work; to be fully critical—a goal espoused by nearly all of the
writing scholars who write on religious students—experience must be written on in ways
that interrogate and respond to the complex cultural forces and conflicts that shape that
experience.8 Lu and Horner offer three questions for instructors and students to consider
when incorporating personal experience in their academic writing: “how to represent the
experience of an other,” “how to represent experience to an other,” and “how to politicize
experience with the aid of others” (“Problematic” 262). I argue that we have neglected to
fully answer the third question. In order to write on experience in a way that would
politicize it, experience would have to become a medium for deliberation on and
intervention in power relations, rather than simply a resource for learning a new discourse
or reporting on a history, as in our heretofore approaches to religious experience. I
designate this here as the critical difference between interrogating experience and merely
8

Stenberg has rightly noted that this, too, is a sort of required translation, and I agree: my
position is that any writing we ask students to do on their religious experience will be a
translation—the question is what sort. I justify this particular form of translation on the
basis of the logic outlined in my first chapter: research suggests religious students would
like to practice religion differently, but feel “out of control” and unable to change
religion—so I take up a critical approach to help students achieve a sense of the
instability of religion and their own ability to effect desired change within religion. This,
to me, constitutes a politically transformative pedagogy.
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reporting on experience. For example, we might note in the above text that Rand begins
from a particular understanding of Christianity (“Christians are admonished to be ‘in’ the
world but not ‘of’ it”), then asks students to illustrate that understanding by reporting on
their own experiences (“how is this detachment lived out”?). This is, so far, a reportorial
use of experience. But as she goes on to ask if living that out is a “struggle,” we move to
what is potentially an interrogative treatment of experience, particularly depending on
how sin gets defined. If students are to write on religiously inflected experiences in
politically transformative ways, I argue here that our use of this interrogative mode must
be expanded.
In the most recent iteration of this move to incorporate religious experience,
DePalma emphasizes experience and encourages students to report on those experiences
in academic writing. He argues that instructors must “account for the intersections
between and constant change within every ‘discourse community’” (223). DePalma
explains the source of this constant change: “discourse that seeks to convey the evershifting stream of human experience is never going to be static or stable but will always
be in process, because its value is measured by its ability to adapt to the un-reproducible
experiences of language-users” (224). Language, for DePalma, not only “conveys” and
“adapts to” experience (224) and “describes” experiences (233); he also sees Thomas
using writing for “negotiating the contradictions, complexities, and mysteries of his
experiences” and “grappling with his experiences through the language of [Biblical]
texts” in a “cycle of action, reflection, and invention” (234). In keeping with this
conception of language, DePalma’s students are encouraged to “identify a moment of
significance in their lives and compose an essay that conveyed the importance of that
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experience to readers” (229). Writing this essay will allow students like Thomas,
DePalma suggests, to make connections between texts and experience and better
understand their identity in relation to their discourses and experiences (235). As
DePalma notes, this focus on experience affords students the opportunity to discursively
re-construct those experiences and shape their senses of self, using the discursive
resources we can add to their repertoire “to better understand [their] own identity in
relation to [their] faith tradition” (235) and to develop “rhetorical resources that might
allow them to shape themselves as they desire” (238). So DePalma importantly evokes
the dynamic nature of discourses and the intersections between identity, discourse, and
experience. DePalma’s purposes are clearly and admirably political: as with Rand, his
focus on religious experience is intended as a counter to hegemonic accounts that
inaccurately depict religion and religious students and as a means of helping students
negotiate an identity at the intersection of academic and religious discourses.
But because DePalma is concerned with the discipline’s homogenizing tendency
described in Move One, he tends to focus his discussion on the religious experience of
the individual. In several different ways throughout the article, DePalma privileges the
individuality of religious beliefs over against the “’official’ beliefs of religious
institutions” (239), and suggests ways for highlighting individual religiosity in scholarly
writing practices, instructor reading practices, and student writing assignments. First, of
our representations of religious students, DePalma complains, “much of what has been
written in this area of inquiry has relied on preconceived ideas about how ‘fundamentalist
Christians’ view the Bible, truth, and so on. This literature has not, however, seriously
investigated individual students’ perceptions on these matters” (239). Second, he
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proposes a new method of reading religious students’ texts, so that “we might seek to
understand how they as individuals conceive of their relationship to the sacred” (239).
And third, he recommends writing assignments for students to help them acquire
“rhetorical resources that might allow them to construct themselves as they desire” (238).
So DePalma counters hegemonic accounts of religion and dominant discourses with
individuality and individual experience, suggesting that this will give students the tools to
construct themselves autonomously. By thus challenging the effects of the dominant
account of religion on multiple levels, DePalma’s focus on heterogeneity and experience
appears to be a promising strategy for helping instructors and religious students improve
classroom relations.
When we arrive at DePalma’s hypothetical revision questions for Thomas,
however, we see that this individual conception of experience also places significant
limitations on the critical or interrogative potential of writing about religious experience.
He wants Thomas to elaborate on a particular religious experience by answering the
following questions:
What senses were activated in the Spirit’s presence? What did you see,
hear, smell, taste, or feel? What happens to your body in moments like
those described here? Have you experienced similar sensations in other
contexts? What are the experiences you describe here analogous to? How
do you discriminate the Spirit’s presence? Have you had other experiences
of this kind? If so, what were they like? How have such experiences
impacted your beliefs in the past? What allows you to know when the
Spirit is present? How do these experiences compare with or differ from
the religious experiences of others you have talked with or read about?
(236)
On many levels, these questions are excellent. They emphasize embodiment; they
emphasize change; they emphasize heterogeneity; and they likely will produce the vivid
descriptions that allow readers to imagine the experience. And these are, after all, goals
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DePalma espouses (see Move Three, above). But there are things these questions don’t
do. Namely, they fail to address the deeply social—that is, structured and contingent—
components of Thomas’s religious experience. I can demonstrate how crucial these
failings are for a critical agenda through a pair of brief examples.
On the one hand, we can see the dangers of constructing religious experience as
stable and given by looking back at Rand. Despite her emphasis on cultural conflict,
Rand, like DePalma, fails to emphasize the contingency and change inherent in religious
experience. Ironically, this is in part because she constructs the experience of cultural
conflict as an essential component of religion, declaring, “Religion, rightly understood, is
a subversive force” (361). Here, she is reifying both religion and cultural conflict, and dehistoricizing both. In saying “rightly understood,” Rand is asserting that there is an ideal,
true, originary religion that makes cultural conflict inevitable, rather than dependent upon
the cultures in any specific conflict. We see this dehistoricization and its consequences
even more strongly when she writes, “Christian spirituality (aside from the way human
beings have often corrupted it) seeks to take attention off of one’s own self in order to
exalt the name of Jesus” (363). This static definition of Christianity allows Rand to argue
that “a declaration of faith in Jesus is far from being pious cliché or a sign of dull
conformity” because true Christian discourse already represents a critical challenge to
secular discourse (363). On the basis of this construction of religion, Rand can
recommend that instructors ask students to report on their community’s (and their own)
ongoing critical relation to secular discourse, rather than demanding that students
critically interrogate their religious discourse. Rand’s choice here is characteristic of the
inclusive turn: writing scholars have focused nearly all of our attention on interdiscursive
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conflict between religion and academe while neglecting entirely to attend to the
intradiscursive conflict and change within religion that produces change and variation in
religio-academic relations. The result is the implicit stabilization of the religious status
quo.
In a sense, Rand calls for students to provide their personal experience in writing
classes as proof of this religious constant, which will challenge secular and uncharitable
constructions of religion and religious discourse. Carter similarly uses student reports on
religious experience to assert/confirm stable truths about evangelical literacy that point
out conflicts between religious and academic discourses related to faith and the Bible’s
centrality (576). By working from this definition of religion and describing religious
experience in the terms Rand’s questions suggest (see above), students certainly should
become more aware of religious experiences of cultural conflict, as should instructors.
Self-understanding and outside sympathy may increase. But if religion exists “aside from
the way human beings have often corrupted it” then this ultimately renders all changes
and differences in people’s religious experiences ephemeral rather than material. People’s
behaviors are merely corruptions and superstructural variations—religion itself is not
changed by people’s performances of religion. This may explain why Rand’s
recommended questions for helping students investigate their own religious subculture
ultimately emphasize commonalities rather than differences—despite a recommendation
that students gather individual stories, she focuses on helping students create generalizing
descriptions that highlight neither change nor heterogeneity—and why her questions
about differences in religious practice frame those differences in terms of sin and the
human condition, rather than as matters of social context or contingency (363-4).
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Whatever the intended goal, this has the effect of insulating religion, particularly
Christianity, from historical change and human participation. Un-qualified by an
ongoing, changing history and independent of practical manifestations, religion must
continue to exist in the same set of relations. Such representations of religious experience
and conflict will ironically only reify religious experience into an essentially
homogeneous, stable entity. Worse, for the purposes of educators and religious reformers
alike, such reports will make students’ religions into homogeneous, stable entities
immune to human intervention. Like Carter’s interaction with Keneshia, Rand’s
stabilizing questions could potentially reduce students’ ability to see themselves as agents
of change in their religious communities. Representing experience is reduced to reporting
on experience, not changing it.
On the other hand, we should also beware the danger of constructing religious
experience as completely individual and spontaneously achieved. Looking back at
DePalma’s questions for Thomas (above), supernatural experience appears to
spontaneously happen. The experience’s socially- and individually-orchestrated aspects
are not discussed. This is first because DePalma’s questions evoke no exploration of the
ways that Thomas’s encounters with the Holy Spirit involve Thomas as an active agent.
He asks, what happens to your body? rather than, what do you do with—and to—your
body? What role did you play in producing this experience? How could we readers have
an experience like this? Nor, second, does DePalma ask Thomas about the social aspects
of the experience, outside of the Spirit and one comparative question that seems more
likely to encourage closer description than to highlight the role of culture in producing
the experience. Asking how Thomas’s experience compares or contrasts with other
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accounts of supernatural experiences does not suggest social influence—whereas asking
how other accounts of supernatural experiences might have shaped Thomas’s experience,
or at least his ability to recognize the supernatural character of his experience, would
have. Moreover, as I will discuss in detail in chapter five, Thomas’s account of the
supernatural experience appears as the climax of a long, detailed narrative of Thomas’s
spiritual journey, one kicked off by a break-up with his girlfriend and ending by the lake
of a religious camp where Thomas interacts with the Spirit. Happily for Thomas, his
spiritual crisis ends just days before he is set to attend a secular college. This is notable
because the camp as described appears to be a sort of boot camp for getting Christian
students ready for the spiritual challenges of the college year. It is disappointing that
these contextual factors—relationships, chronologies, and spatial locations—are treated
as unrelated to Thomas’s spiritual experience.
In contrast, anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann has found that achieving the
supernatural sensational experiences that Thomas describes, and the personal relationship
with God they index, are difficult for most religious adherents to achieve, and require
significant social production. As she explains, writing with Howard Nusbaum and Ronad
Thisted,
it takes effort to accept that a particular interpretation of the supernatural is
correct, and it takes effort to live in accordance with that interpretation—
to live as if they really do believe that their understanding is accurate. It
requires learning, and the learning can be a slow process, like learning to
speak a foreign language in an unfamiliar country, with new and different
social cues. That learning is often stumbling and gradual for those who
convert, take on new roles, or go through an initiation process. People
must come to see differently, to think differently, and above all to feel
differently, because to believe in a particular form of the supernatural as if
the supernatural is truly present is, for most believers, to experience the
world differently than if that form of the supernatural were not real. (67)
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Maintaining this experiential relationship through seeing, thinking, and feeling differently
is difficult, contingent on a process, and must be acquired and worked at by religious
practitioners. The relationship and the sensations are thus the products of a continual
learning process. Elsewhere, Luhrmann argues there are three different types of learning
involved in contemporary U.S. evangelical Christian practice: cognitive/linguistic,
metakinetic, and relational. “Together,” she writes, “they enable new believers to do
something quite remarkable—to construct, out of everyday psychological experience, the
profound sense that they have a really real relationship with a being that cannot be seen,
heard, or touched” (“Metakinesis” 519).
This social learning process lends religious experience a sense of situated
contingency and agency that can be contrasted with the spontaneous and a-social
construction of religious experience assumed by Rand’s reifying questions and
DePalma’s individualizing questions. Within such constructions of religious experience,
students may be aided in sharing their experiences, reflecting upon them, and retroactively shaping their meaning for themselves or others—seemingly DePalma’s and
Rand’s chief goals—but not in accounting for, transmitting, or intervening in the cultural
forces shaping those experiences. Religious experiences as reported in both cases, then,
are not practiced and formed, but undergone and then re-formed afterwards. But as
previous sections have made clear, a politically challenging use of personal experience
must do more than that. Writing on personal experience must be an opportunity for
students to actively deliberate on the cultural forces shaping their experience and an
opportunity for them to use accounts of those experiences to respond to those cultural
forces—both of which forms of agential action are denied or partially denied to students

79

when some of those cultural forces are treated as static or spontaneous. But there is
another requirement for a critical use of personal experience: it must present students
with an opportunity to intervene and re-think the way cultural forces will shape their
future experiences. While the first two requirements have been dealt with extensively
above, the final, future orientation is at once the most critical and the least discussed. I
will elaborate briefly here, but will offer a far more thorough articulation of how this use
of experience might be accomplished in chapter five.
Lu and Horner suggest in “The Problematic of Experience” that we must
recognize discourse as always “an act of shaping—giving form to—experiences” (262),
rather than expressing or transparently reporting them. This phrase has a sort of double
meaning that is easy to miss: if discourse “gives form to experiences,” this doesn’t
necessarily mean the forming occurs only after-the-fact. Lu and Horner are suggesting
that discourse does not merely re-shape past experiences, ordering them or making sense
of experience in some cognitive sense, as DePalma tends to imply; nor is discourse
merely shaped (determined) by the past. Acts of representation and experiencing shape
the way we will perceive and relate to ongoing and still-to-come phenomena, engaging in
and altering reality and future experience. They go before us, in a sense, even as they are
themselves already structured by lived conditions. When we acknowledge that discourse
and experience are mutually informing in this way, then students must be encouraged to
pay far more attention to the choices they make in reporting on their experiences for us—
they can no longer simply focus on conveying those experiences effectively, because their
instructor’s understanding is not the only thing being affected by what they write. Their
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future reality and their future experiences, too, are shaping and being shaped through acts
of representation.
This is why representing experience is potentially an effective political act:
Resources and experiences, critical ethnographic approaches would emphasize, are not
static but instead formed by the ways in which we use and represent them: “the relation
between experience and discourse is not polar and hierarchical but dialectical” (Lu and
Horner, “Problematic” 259). If we acknowledge this, that discourse on experience is
always already culturally informed, “an act of re-forming experience” in culturally
structured directions, this gives discourse significant sway, though not full determination.
Because discourse and experience are inextricably related but not identical, reporting on
an experience in a new way is potentially a means for challenging the dominant
discourses on that experience; but discoursing differently is also a potential means to
changing our experiences (262). So a truly critical use of personal experience will focus
more attention on how writing about religion is a political and constructive act—on the
ways in which religious students don’t merely report on their faith experiences, critique
their faith experiences, reveal what lies beneath their faith experiences, but instead how
religious students form and re-form their religious experiences through the
representations they create when they write in our classroom. This sort of writing extends
beyond the constructing or expressing of the self (DePalma’s chief concerns) to
participate in cultural definition and cultural representation through the de-naturalization
of experiences and in turn cultural forces. Discourse only truly becomes the means for
critical self-shaping that DePalma imagines if students deliberate on the choices they are
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making in discoursing on their experience, and on the cultural consequences of those
choices.

Conclusion
Schoenike Nowacek’s ethnographic work corroborates the perspective I’ve been
suggesting here: she finds that when religious students write they are often negotiating
with religion and academia in far more complex ways than we may realize. In their
papers as well as interviews, it becomes clear that her student informants’ religious
discourses reciprocally exert their own force on (and through) academic discourse, on
(and through) the body and experience of the students, and on (and through) the writing
they do. Each of the students in Nowacek’s study experiences writing assignments
differently depending upon the relationship they have with organized religion—one sees
himself as a strong Catholic, and so feels comfortable questioning aspects of his faith in
writing assignments at his Catholic university, whereas another, a Quaker, sees herself as
“an uncertain outsider” at that same university and so experiences the same writing
assignments as narrowly-designed and coercive. The third student enters college already
questioning the reality of religious claims, and in her papers Nowacek perceives evidence
of two different struggles: “Underneath the surface of this paper, . . . are Tigra’s religious
experiences and concerns as well as her efforts to write about them in ways that would be
satisfactory in an academic context” (164). The relations move in multiple directions—at
times, religious and academic forces work together harmoniously, as in the first student’s
case; at times, as for the Quaker student, they seem to directly conflict; and at other
times, students know they are negotiating and struggling with both simultaneously.
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All of this occurs, Nowacek writes, within “a subtle and shifting nexus of
individual beliefs, classroom contexts, and institutional culture” (162) in which students’
religious identities “are not separable from institutional religious culture” (155). While
Nowacek intends the religious culture of the university institution where the classroom
experience takes place—and so remains focused on academic institutional forms of
hegemony—I believe we need to recognize, actually, that religious students always
operate in relation to a larger academic culture and a larger religious culture; that both
discourses structure students’ experience of writing in the academy, in concert with their
many other social locations; and that all those discourses enter into conflict through the
bodies and texts of students. Religious students’ relations to religion are not uniform;
neither, then, are religious students’ relations to academia. Conflicts traverse all of these
relations. Our pedagogies must begin from this acknowledgement: that religious and
academic discourses, identities, experiences, and communities are neither entirely at
odds, nor entirely complementary, but instead reciprocally shaping one another at all
points through conflictual, complementary, and mostly uncategorizable relations.
So it is true, as Goodburn writes, that academic discourses and religious
discourses “are engaged in constant struggle” (351). But in the course of this struggle, the
lines around “religious” and “academic” are constantly changed. Moreover, we (students
and instructors) constantly participate in these struggles as representatives and makers of
those discourses. In our calls for respectful “merging,” dexterous switching, better
articulation, and greater understanding, the critical focus on multi-directional change (that
is, the reciprocal relations between “realities,” discourses, translations, and
representations), so central to a truly critical approach, has disappeared. This causes us to
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pay only lackluster attention to the relations between discourses that occur at the border
formed by our translations. In light of these constant movements and struggles, our
approaches to religious formations have to be flexible enough to incorporate the
heterogeneity of personal religious experience while also keeping track of the power
relations and multiple cultural discourses that inform those experiences in shared ways.
In the next three chapters, I will examine means by which we might retrieve a fuller sense
of these relations, and help our students to deliberate on and participate in them.
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CHAPTER III
ACCOUNTING FOR RELIGIOUS POWER

In chapter two, I describe the disciplinary turn towards incorporating religious
discourse in the writing classroom. We have used such writing to accomplish important
goals: chiefly, to help students combat a dominant negative representation of religious
students held by outsiders and to help students succeed in college writing contexts. But I
argue there that we haven’t achieved our dual goals of practicing and promoting tolerance
with religious students for four chief reasons: a homogenization of religion, a transparent
conception of translation, an incomplete acknowledgement of the conflictual and
mutually shaping relations between discourses, and a spontaneous and individual
conception of religious experience. Put otherwise, we haven’t placed sufficient emphasis
upon the inter- and intra-formational sources of change, contradiction, and conflict in
religious discourses. If we are to include religiously-inflected perspectives, values, terms,
texts, genres, and experiences in the writing classroom, chapters one and two suggest that
we must better attend to the heterogeneity, change, and conflict of living those out—and
how the writing classroom participates in producing those differences, changes, and
conflicts. This chapter sets out to produce one such account of religion, in the process
suggesting terms and concepts to help us produce more such accounts.
As I discuss in the opening, Asad argues that we should investigate the mutually
shaping relations between forms of religion, social disciplines, and material conditions
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that cause religions to take particular forms, and then cause those same religions to take
new forms. So in these next three chapters I attempt to apply Asad’s perspective on
religion to American evangelical Christianity, producing a new account of it that
emphasizes its forces, heterogeneity, changes, contradictions, and conflicts. I demonstrate
in this chapter that evangelicalism depends for its existence on a number of social forces
and institutions that in effect create and maintain evangelicalism by disseminating a
hegemonic account of it. I call this account, its proponents, and its institutions “official
evangelicalism.” Official evangelicalism maintains itself by setting pressures and limits
on the religious experiences, practices, and representations of religious practitioners, to
the point that I believe most religious Americans must experience, practice, and represent
their religion in relation to that official account. I connect this account of official
evangelicalism back to the writing classroom throughout the second half of this chapter,
arguing that writing scholars, instructors, and students are actually complicit in the
reproduction of official evangelicalism.
As I argued in chapter one and two and continue to demonstrate here in chapter
three, scholars, instructors and students alike continue to struggle against a homogenizing
and reifying account of contemporary American Christianity that is often explicitly
connected to evangelicalism. This account obscures the ability of both parties to view the
actual practices of religious adherents, and it obscures the actual hegemonic relations
between religious adherents and official evangelicalism. In the face of the hegemonic
account presented to them in the larger culture and at school, neither students nor
instructors possess the language and concepts necessary to articulate the varieties of
actual religious practice in America, nor to envision the means for changing existing

86

relations among students, religion, and academia. I choose to focus on evangelicalism, in
other words, not only because it is a powerful force in American religion, but even more
so because evangelicalism affects the rest of us, too.
But this power of official evangelicalism is not total or without interruption,
precisely because it depends upon so many institutions and participants for its continuing
power. So I will argue in chapter four that in contrast to the homogeneity of this
hegemonic account, official evangelicalism’s definitions are heavily contested and its
norms practically contradicted. In contrast to the hegemonic account’s stable and given
constructions of evangelicalism, I will demonstrate that evangelicalism, like all religions,
is constantly forming and transforming, and describe several more of the unstable
mechanisms that religions like evangelicalism depend upon for their transmission.
Chapter five will discuss ways in which these mechanisms could be highlighted through
our students’ writing. If we want to respect the place of religion in students’ lives and
with them re-negotiate its place in our classrooms and our shared spaces, we must first
locate its actual place(s) in their lives and our classrooms, as well as the forces that render
those places various and contingent.

I. Defining Evangelicalism
After surveying a set of popular tropes for conceptualizing the essence of
religion—baseball (ritual institution), Coca-Cola (fetish), rock ‘n’ roll (potlatch)—David
Chidester concludes that each is both useful and limited in its ability to convey religion’s
essence. Through people’s use of such tropes, he writes, “religion is revealed, once again,
not only as a cluster concept or a fuzzy set but also as a figure of speech that is subject to
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journalistic license, rhetorical excess, and intellectual sleight of hand” (758). Such
definitional possibilities and difficulties, Chidester suggests, “signify both the problem of
defining religion and the complex presence of religion in American popular culture”
(761). I want to argue that the same might be said of the term evangelicalism—the word
designates a cluster concept, a fuzzy set, a figure of speech. In writing scholarship, we
know this. Running up against the need to define evangelicalism for her readers, Carter
provides the following caveat first: “Even the most influential leaders of this movement
are unable to reach a consensus about what it means to be an evangelical Christian”
(581). The reason for Carter’s difficulty—and these influential leaders’ difficulties—is
that the evangelical “movement,” as Carter calls it, does not strictly exist. Whereas the
Catholic Church might, from one perspective, be said to exist in an ordinary sense—there
is a monolithic institutional hierarchy with the broadly recognized (if challenged) power
to include and exclude others from the Catholic formation—this cannot be said of
evangelicalism. Evangelicalism is only a cluster concept; a fuzzy set; a figure of speech.
As such, the definitions of “evangelical” and “evangelicalism” are also sites of conflict.
The Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals, an organization associated
with institutionally-evangelical Wheaton College, explains the difficulty of defining
evangelicalism on its website: “The term ‘Evangelicalism’ is a wide-reaching definitional
‘canopy’ that covers a diverse number of Protestant traditions, denominations,
organizations, and churches” (Eskridge, “Defining Evangelicalism”). There are
evangelical churches, denominations, schools, seminaries, associations, and political
organizations, each with some degree of coercive power over their individual members,
or at least member churches or groups—but there is no one Evangelical (capital E)
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institution with coercive power over all these smaller evangelical assemblages. And yet
despite this lack of a coherent coercive apparatus for regulating membership equivalent to
that of the Catholic or Mormon church, and despite the apparent diversity among
members, Luhrmann notes “About 40 percent of Americans describe themselves as born
again or evangelical” (When God Talks Back 13). Actually, Gallup indicates that as
recently as 2005 a stunning 47% of surveyed Americans answered yes when asked if they
would describe themselves in this way (“Another Look”). Such an astounding number
suggests that evangelicalism has some sort of significant presence in American society—
but it doesn’t yet tell us what that presence is.
In trying to define and explain this evangelical presence (and the power of this
term as an identity-marker and widely-used descriptor) in the absence of Evangelicalism,
scholars (and others) define the terms “evangelical” and “evangelicalism” in a variety of
ways, and to a variety of ends. The Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals
offers three of the most common referents for the term (all text comes directly from their
webpage):
The first is to view as “evangelical” all Christians who affirm a few
key doctrines and practical emphases. British historian David Bebbington
approaches evangelicalism from this direction and notes four specific
hallmarks of evangelical religion: conversionism, the belief that lives need
to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a
particular regard for the Bible; and “crucicentrism,” a stress on the
sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Bebbington’s definition has become a
standard baseline for most scholars. . . .
A second sense of the term is to look at evangelicalism as an organic
group of movements and religious tradition. Within this context
“evangelical” denotes a style as much as a set of beliefs, and an attitude
which insiders “know” and “feel” when they encounter it. As a result,
groups as disparate as black Baptists and Dutch Reformed Churches,
Mennonites and Pentecostals, Catholic charismatics and Southern Baptists
can all come under the evangelical umbrella—demonstrating just how
diverse the movement really is. . . .
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A third sense of the term is as the self-ascribed label for a largely
Midwest-based coalition that arose during the Second World War.
Importantly, its core personalities (like Carl F.H. Henry, Harold John
Ockenga and Billy Graham), institutions (for instance, Moody Bible
Institute, Wheaton College, and Fuller Theological Seminary), and
organizations (such as the National Association of Evangelicals and Youth
for Christ) have played a pivotal role in giving the wider movement a
sense of cohesion that extends beyond these “card-carrying” evangelicals.
(Eskridge, “Defining the Term”)
We might say that the Institute identifies an evangelical ideology consisting of articulable
ideas; an evangelical style marked by less-articulable but still-recognizable behaviors,
knowledges, and feelings; and an evangelical institution of leaders, coalitions, and
organizations connected by a shared label and a shared history. All three are critical to
any account of evangelicalism, but alone none of these definitions can fully account for
its cultural force. The point Larry Eskridge and the Institute make so well here is that one
cannot pin down a single, coherent “Evangelicalism,” but there are plenty of things that
are “evangelical.”
Such a motley definition is unwieldy at best when academics try to speak
authoritatively and definitively about evangelicals. So most writing scholars, and many
scholars outside writing studies, have tried to positively define evangelicalism and
identify evangelicals by privileging one definition or another. Sociologist Sarah
Diamond, for example, describes evangelicals in terms that are quite typical of definitions
offered across academia (including in writing scholarship):
In general, evangelicals are Christians, Catholic as well as Protestant, who
have had a born-again experience [“a conversion experience in which they
made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ”]. They believe the Bible is
the accurate, inspired word of God, and they also believe that the only way
to salvation is through belief in Christ’s divinity and resurrection.
Evangelicals believe they are required to share their faith with
nonbelievers in an effort to win new converts to Christ. (9)
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This is a largely ideological definition—note the five explicit references to belief.
Putnam and Campbell, in contrast to such ideological definitions, define evangelicalism
as a loose category for grouping together a wide band of largely unaffiliated, independent
Christian churches. “Evangelicals” are then those individuals who identify themselves
with one of those denominations or churches—a somewhat “institutional” definition,
although not an institutional definition that necessarily refers back to the midwestern
coalition the Institute describes (14, 602). Both of these definitions work to include and
exclude different people—Putnam and Campbell’s definition would exclude those who
affirm evangelical ideology but don’t identify with an evangelical church; Diamond’s
definition would exclude those who attend an evangelical institution but don’t affirm
evangelical ideology; and neither gives much weight to actual behavior or evangelical
style.
The point, then, is not to find the right definition: the point is to find a definition
that might highlight the conflictual uses and definitions of its own term. For my purposes,
I follow Chidester and Asad’s transformational approach. First, I take “evangelical” to be
an adjective, applied and defined variously, which nevertheless generally designates very
real “evangelicalisms”: sets of ideas, ways of being, populations, and organizations.
Second, it follows that these definitions and applications of the adjective are situated and
partial; all uses of “evangelical” are necessarily selective, carrying along sources,
motivations, and consequences. Third, I understand these definitions to participate in
social conflict and power relations. Various groups and individuals within and outside of
evangelicalism attempt to gain some measure of social power through gaining control
over the term—by asserting the right to define its essential doctrines, or its behavioral
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norms, or its membership criteria, or its institutional hierarchies; and in turn using these
to shape ideas, behaviors, people, and organizations. Academics in writing scholarship,
for example, utilize definitions of evangelicals that allow us to explain, understand,
sympathize, resource, and improve religious students and their relations within our
classroom—though those students’ actual relations to our idea of evangelicalism are not
entirely certain or even entirely positive. So all uses of this evangelical label, and any –
isms those uses collect and define, should be understood as contested, the locus of power
relations. Below, I attempt to elaborate on how what I call official evangelicalism is
“winning” the struggle to define and control “evangelicalisms.” Following that, I will
highlight the heterogeneities and fluidities obscured by official evangelicalism’s
hegemonic account.

II. Terms for Analysis
In order to describe this struggle over evangelicalism and explain the social
processes that produce evangelicalism’s profound cultural force, I utilize organizing
concepts and vocabulary drawn from critical theory: namely, Louis Althusser’s concept
of the ideological apparatus and Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus. While Bourdieu and
Althusser’s approaches to culture focused on accounting for the production and reproduction of asymmetrical economic and class structures, their concepts have been
successfully applied by subsequent scholars to account for certain other aspects of
culture—we are likely most familiar with Butler’s performative approach to gender and,
more recently, with Pennycook’s practical re-conception of language (Gender Trouble;
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Language as a Local Practice). Asad’s work suggests that the same conceptual approach
can be applied to understanding religion.
In attempting to account for the operation of hegemony in “Ideology and State
Ideological Apparatuses,” Althusser points the finger at cultural institutions,
acknowledging that the coercive power of the state cannot by itself explain the
effectiveness of “ideology”—that is, why people actually seem to enjoy their subjection
and to believe in the metanarratives that maintain existing power relations, for instance,
when they can’t be made to believe them. He distinguishes between these cultural
institutions, which he calls Ideological State Apparatuses, and Repressive State
Apparatuses like the police. The difference for Althusser is in the proportions of coercion
and ideology used by the apparatus to achieve conformity: whereas Althusser imagined
that repressive apparatuses rely heavily on violence and coercion, “the Ideological State
Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology,” although he concedes,
“they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this
is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. (There is no such thing as a purely
ideological apparatus.)” (145). Althusser identifies several of these apparatuses: the
religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the
trade union ISA, the communications ISA, and the culture ISA.
Importantly, these ideological apparatuses simultaneously achieve two functions.
First, as Raymond Williams notes, they have a practical effect: they “teach, confirm, and
in most cases finally enforce selected meanings, values, and activities” by “exerting
powerful and immediate pressures on the conditions of living and of making a living”
(118). On the other hand, they also offer an account of those practices that makes them
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seem not only normal, but right and natural. Althusser divides these operations into
“know-how” and “ideology.” Take school, for instance: Althusser says the education
system
takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the
years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable’, squeezed between the
Family State Apparatus and the Educational State Apparatus, it drums into
them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of ‘knowhow’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history,
the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state
(ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). (155)
He goes on to explain the economic function both serve: education reproduces the
necessary relations of production (the “know-how” that will enable jobs to be performed
successfully) even as it inculcates the ideology that makes people want those jobs, feel
good about that work, and believe that getting the job and the pension is the only way to
be a responsible, respectable citizen.
This ideology, at least for Althusser, is obfuscatory: it obscures the asymmetrical
power relations those know-hows will serve and maintain (the “real” purposes and
mechanisms of the school) by making them seem natural. “The mechanisms which
produce this vital result for the capitalist regime are naturally covered up and concealed
by a universally reigning ideology of the School, universally reigning because it is one of
the essential forms of the ruling bourgeois ideology: an ideology which represents the
School as a neutral environment purged of ideology” (Althusser 157). Althusser cogently
points out that the maintenance of the status quo, hegemony, depends upon making
contingent social structures seem natural and given and making culturally-specific logics
feel like “common sense.” Elsewhere, Althusser describes this ideological function as
instilling a sense of “obviousness” in social constructs:
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It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without appearing to
do so, since these are “obviousnesses”) obviousnesses as obviousnesses,
which we cannot fail to recognize and before which we have the inevitable
and natural reaction of crying out (aloud or in the “still, small voice of
conscience”): “That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!” (Althusser 172)
So for Althusser, an ideological apparatus functions practically by reproducing the social
bodies necessary to the maintenance of existing power relations, and ideologically by
reproducing a hegemonic account of that formation that naturalizes the power relations
and social conditions it maintains, making them feel obvious, right, and true.
Scholars have since worked to move beyond Althusser’s treatment of ideology,
however, by more intricately connecting practical “know-how” with “ideology.”
Religion, gender, as well as economic and class structures all depend on ideas, of
course—definitions, discursive spaces, and assumptions (which themselves operate in the
material world). But scholarship throughout the disciplines has increasingly granted a
more central place for the practical in ideology, producing a subtle reversal of Althusser’s
logic. As Terry Eagleton remarks, “It is no good reminding myself that I am opposed to
racism as I sit down on a park bench marked ‘Whites Only’; by the [act] of sitting on it, I
have supported and perpetuated racist ideology. The ideology, so to speak, is in the
bench, not in my head” (40, qtd in Rickert 117). Latour would point out, as Eagleton’s
own phrasing implies, that the ideology is not simply in the bench, but actualized in the
active relation between Eagleton and the bench: ideology is materialized by Eagleton’s
sitting. This, of course, is a different meaning of ideology than that being used in
Althusser’s quotes, above. Eagleton’s broader understanding of ideology here might best
be distinguished, as Bonnie Brennen suggests, by using a different term like “hegemony”
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(8). Hegemony, Raymond Williams explains, incorporates both know-how and ideology;
it
is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living:
our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of
ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values—
constitutive and constituting—which as they are experienced as practices
appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for
most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality
beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move,
in most areas of their lives. (110)
Articulating this intertwining of ideology and know-how within rhetoric and
composition, Thomas Rickert quotes Slavoj Zizek to underline practices’ roles in
hegemony: “belief, ‘far from being an ‘intimate’, purely mental state, is always
materialized in our effective social activity’” (117).
Bourdieu advanced his notion of the habitus to account for this hegemonic
relation between practice and ideology, specifically focusing on the transmission of
culture and social structures through the body. As Bourdieu saw it, “Practical belief is not
a ‘state of mind’, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and
doctrines (beliefs), but rather a state of the body” (68, qtd in Lee 159). The habitus refers
simultaneously to a social context—as in the ideological apparatuses I mention above—
and to individuals’ incorporation and participation in those apparatuses through those
bodily states that he references. According to Bourdieu, this incorporation is achieved
through the enculturation Althusser aptly describes above as “drumming in”: the life-long
experiential process of prolonged exposure to meanings, values, norms, practices, and
ideological accounts of those that causes those ways of being to become a part of our
living. Bourdieu speaks of this incorporation process in terms of “internalized, embodied
schemes” (Distinction 467), and “social necessity made second nature, turned into
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muscular patterns and bodily automatisms” (474) through constant repetition and
discipline. Experiences in our social and physical milieus actually change the structures
of our body, and thus the way we will experience and interact with (perceive, respond,
and thus change and be changed by) all future environments. This sort of incorporation in
Bourdieu’s descriptions may seem like a metaphor describing a social process—but it has
an analogue in a material, neurological reality. Philosopher Evan Thompson sums up the
considerable body of neuroscience supporting Bourdieu’s finding: “one’s lived body is a
developmental being thick with its own history and sedimented ways of feeling,
perceiving, acting and imagining” (33). So we might say that our experiences within
ideological apparatuses really do shape the bodily structures and practices of perception,
feeling, action, expression and imagination that structure our responses to new
surroundings, literally naturalizing culture. Bourdieu’s concept of bodily incorporation
helps us to better understand some of the ways in which Althusser’s ideological
apparatuses work to create the obvious, right, and true, but Bourdieu’s concept allows us
to do so without resorting to false consciousness and a separation between know-how and
ideology.
Marcel Mauss spoke of this enculturation process almost a century ago,
introducing the concept of the habitus in relatively innocuous terms by pointing out how
very different ways of swimming, sleeping, and even having sex can seem like the natural
way to various populations. But writers like Bourdieu, Williams, and Butler charged
Mauss’s idea with its full political weight by applying it to the notion of hegemony and
power relations. Prolonged exposure (and systems of attached rewards and punishments)
created by practices themselves—quite apart from any explicit or implicit ideology—can
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cause cultural practices to seem right and good. As perceptions and feelings are brought
into alignment with culture and behavior, people come to expect to see what they
generally see, and to act in accordance with their expectations (thus often bringing those
expectations about). Together, these actions and perceptions act as a sort of mirrorstructure, as Althusser himself says. The resonances between what we are taught to
perceive in the world and what we therefore experience (and cause to be) in the world are
mutually confirming, constituting and affirming the reality of cultural stories about the
world—and maintaining existing social conditions.
This is, roughly, how Butler accounts for the cultural production of gender. She
uses Althusser’s mirror-structure and Williams’ “reciprocally confirming” practices and
perceptions to explain how gender operates as a credible cultural fiction:
Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit
collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar
genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those
productions—and the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in
them; the construction that “compels” our belief in its necessity and
naturalness. (Gender Trouble 140)
If our society is part of our bodily structure, shaping the way we relate to the world, the
way that we feel in response to it, what appeals as common sense or natural to us, and the
choices that we see there, we cannot ever just “get outside” and reject the social structure
entirely. One’s gender, like Bourdieu’s classed subject and Althusser’s interpellated
subject, feels and therefore is entirely too real. Given these intertwinings between society,
our bodies, and the way that we experience reality, Butler argues in Gender Trouble that
“power can be neither withdrawn nor refused, but only redeployed” (124). These crucial
redeployments will be the focus of chapter four and five.
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These concepts of the ideological apparatus and the habitus, with a concomitant
focus on linking institutions, accounts, practices, and dispositions, drive my
transformational analysis of evangelicalism. I argue that we should understand the
religion that appears in our rhetoric and composition classrooms and texts in hegemonic
and transformational, rather than essential, terms: particular individuals and institutions
work with and through ideological apparatuses to persistently disseminate, confirm, and
enforce selected doctrines, meanings, values, and activities of religion, namely
evangelicalism, as religious. Those evangelical forms of religiosity are rendered natural
and normal through their repetition, which sediments them into the (habitual) practices
and perceptions of individuals, as well as through hegemonic accounts of those religious
practices and representatives as natural and normal (what Althusser would call ideology).
Through their continual presence, these representations and norms come to be construed
as really religious; thus creating a hegemonic religion to which individuals are forced to
act in response. So here I examine some of the ideological apparatuses that do this work
of realizing a particular, hegemonic brand of religion that I call “official
evangelicalism”—namely the media, the political system, arts and entertainment, and
education (including rhetoric and composition).

III. Evangelicalism and Ideological Apparatuses
The deployment of ideological apparatuses to promote evangelicalism has been a
calculated choice made by the evangelical establishment. We might look, for an early
indicator of this calculation, to Carl Henry’s The Uneasy Conscience of Fundamentalism.
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This book, written in 1947 by the first editor of Christianity Today, represents one early
and consequential manifestation of the Christian Right’s institutional logic. Henry writes,
. . . the church’s prime task is to challenge men and women individually
in such numbers that the manifesto is global. As the world felt Hitler’s
threats at the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland and England, and
Mussolini’s at the border of Greece, so too must it feel the promise of
deliverance by Jesus at the fringe of our civilization, calling men to
spiritual decision. The Christian life must be lived out, among the
regenerate, in every area of activity, until even the unregenerative are
moved by Christian standards, acknowledging their force. (71)
Elsewhere in the text, Henry calls this imperialistic practice—comparing Christians to
Nazis only two years after the atrocities of World War II—“salting.” The reference to
Hitler and Mussolini is at best remarkably tone-deaf, and at worst quite frightening. But
clearly, Henry doesn’t intend that this Christian “force” will be literally coercive. Instead,
he believes that Christian force must be exerted ideologically as Christianity is lived out
in public. He argues that to attain such a global force Christians must first build up
ideological apparatuses that instill an evangelical disposition in their own population.
From there, Christianity can then be practically represented in public—“lived out, among
the regenerate, in every area of activity.” Henry’s plan at once indicates the importance of
explicitly evangelical ideological apparatuses in raising up representatives, and at the
same time indicates Henry’s intention to subsequently place those representatives within
secular ideological apparatuses: Henry’s representative not only is shaped by Christian
social institutions, but in turn exerts normative pressure on people through his practical
activities in non-Christian social institutions—challenging them, making them feel,
calling them to decide, moving them by his standards or living out.

Evangelicalism and Education
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The first ideological apparatus I want to examine is the religious educational
apparatus. Not only does this accord with Carl Henry’s manifesto, but describing the
religious educational apparatus also allows me to set out some of the basic and most
readily recognizable characteristics of official evangelicalism—beliefs and behaviors,
specifically—to which I can attach less obviously evangelical beliefs, attitudes,
behaviors, representatives, and groups in my descriptions of subsequent ideological
apparatuses. Evangelicalisms, we must remember, constitute fuzzy sets: loose
conglomerations of individuals, ideas, and organizations associated (or not) in various
ways—by shared beliefs, shared representatives, shared commitments, shared
dispositions, etc. The religious educational apparatus and the representation of official
evangelicalism I draw from it, then, simply represent nodes in that network on which I
can proceed to articulate a series of connected apparatuses and representations.
Because representatives must be raised up before they can act as evangelical
representatives in public, Henry calls for an evangelical education system that can effect
his incarnated evangelical “manifesto”: he writes,
Perhaps the answer is the building of evangelical educational plants, with
attractive auditoriums that will serve for worship purposes, providing a
week-round program that out-educates the secular educators. . . . Beyond
doubt the time is here for an all-out evangelical education movement, and
alert churches will think through the wise investment of their funds. The
maintenance of evangelical grade and high schools, and of evangelical
colleges and universities, with the highest academic standards, promises
most quickly to concentrate the thinking of youth upon the Christian
world-life view as the only adequate spiritual ground for a surviving
culture. (71)
Lest we fail to take seriously how Henry’s vision of evangelical education as a social
force may have influenced the Christian Right, consider that evangelical educational
institutions have exploded in the decades following Henry’s call: according to the
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National Center for Education Statistics, over four million children in America today
attend private religious schools (United States, “Private School Universe Survey”).
Moreover, 9 out of 10 conservative Christian religious schools (the second largest
category of private school) began after 1960 (United States, “Other Religious
Conservative Christian Schools”). The reasons for this are manifold—desegregation
might explain some of the rise in private schools, for instance—but the desire to inculcate
a Christian disposition through children’s education must not be discounted. We can
examine two specific ways in which evangelicals utilize educational apparatuses to
enforce a particular brand of evangelicalism within their own populations, an
evangelicalism then reproduced in culture at large through secular ideological
apparatuses. Because of the structure of education, this is one of the more coercive forms
of reproduction available to evangelical leaders while all others that I describe make
more use of ideological pressure. This distinction comes in part of necessity: whereas
students can be coerced into conformity, they are intended to become witnesses to those
“unregenerative” who cannot generally be forced to conform to evangelical norms of
belief or practice unless through governmental policy.
At times, evangelical education can focus on shaping evangelical students’
external behaviors. At Appalachian Bible College in West Virginia, a highly conservative
evangelical college, the rules of conduct for students are published in the Servant’s Staff.
Rules range from dress code for specific occasions—men’s hairstyles, class apparel,
Sunday apparel, casual apparel, and recreational apparel require almost three full pages
(11-13)—to hosting—“Single student commuters who are not living with parents must
notify the Student Deans before hosting mixed groups or any members of the opposite
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sex in their home” (10)—to sexual behavior—“fornication, adultery, incest, sexual abuse
of a minor, homosexuality, indecent exposure, sexual harassment, and other such
activities are forbidden” (8)—to hygiene—“Personal cleanliness and neatness are vital to
one’s personal testimony. Clothing and shoes should be clean and neat at all times”
(21)—to quotidian religious observance—“Everyone is expected to have a personal time
of prayer and Bible study” (31). Religious doctrine, too, is dictated at colleges like
Appalachian Bible College, and conformity to these and other norms are self-evaluated,
measured, recorded by institutional agents, used to assess eligibility for continued
enrollment, and even evaluated one last time to determine a student’s right to graduate
(37-38). I think ABC’s Servant’s Staff outlines a form of evangelicalism most often
associated with fundamentalism—a reactionary religious stereotype extensively
represented/lampooned in media representations of religion from Footloose to Saved. It’s
certainly not the norm, and I don’t present it as such: instead, I want it to stand in for one
extreme of institutional evangelicalism. Its rules represent here a highly invasive attempt
at enforcing a particular version of Christianity, as homogeneously as possible. Lest we
forget the purpose of such standards, note the reason those shoes must stay clean, because
“Personal cleanliness and neatness are vital to one’s personal testimony” (21). The goal is
to inculcate an evangelical disposition, and in turn the reproduction of a proper
evangelical representative, who can exert force on his neighbors by living out his
evangelicalism well, in public.
In addition to shaping students’ dispositions, however, the evangelical educational
apparatus exerts considerable coercive force in an attempt at managing evangelicals’
beliefs. These evangelical beliefs, like the behaviors described above, should be familiar
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to most American readers. In order to secure and maintain employment at Southern
Baptist Theological Seminary, for instance, all professors must sign and believe (see
discussion below) both the “Abstract of Principles” (Manly) and “The Baptist Faith and
Message.” These documents, available online, together seem to represent one explicit
account of what I will here call “official evangelicalism.” What I mean by this should
become clearer below, but I generally mean to indicate a simultaneously powerful and
popular account of evangelicalism that most Americans will recognize in some way,
regardless of how they feel about it.
Official evangelicalism, at least in this particular Baptist instantiation, is
designated by orthodox stances on a number of beliefs and practices including the
following: the Bible (“It has God for its author, salvation for its end, and truth, without
any mixture of error, for its matter”); gender (“the gift of gender is thus part of the
goodness of God’s creation,” so “the office of pastor is limited to men as qualified by
Scripture”); salvation (exclusive to Christians, through faith, from a literal Hell);
witnessing (“seek constantly to win the lost to Christ by verbal witness undergirded by a
Christian lifestyle”); society (“seek to make the will of Christ supreme in our own lives
and in human society” by speaking against “racism . . . greed, selfishness, and vice . . .
adultery, homosexuality, pornography . . . speak on behalf of the unborn . . . ”);
government (“The church should not resort to the civil power to carry on its work. The
gospel of Christ contemplates spiritual means alone for the pursuit of its ends.”9); and
family (“God has ordained the family as the foundational institution of human society . . .
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Many who follow contemporary politics may be surprised by this position, but it is
actually a traditional Baptist stance. How it is interpreted and enacted, clearly, is a matter
for debate.
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Marriage is the uniting of one man and one woman in covenant commitment for a
lifetime . . . A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her
husband even as the church willingly submits to the headship of Christ”) (“The Baptist
Faith and Message”). Each of these positions in the “Faith and Message” is followed in
the document by citation strings similar to those found in academic texts—the only
difference is that these citations reference particular Bible verses. We can see that these
beliefs are tied not only to theology, but also to practices and attitudes on cultural hot
button issues. Staff at SBTS are required to adhere to particular definitions of the family,
gender, religion, sexuality, and government, among others. These definitions translate
into conservative political and social stances to which staff and faculty must adhere—
signing, believing, and we must assume practicing in other senses as well.
I say sign and believe because as Southern’s president Albert Mohler writes,
professors at SBTS must sign these documents “without hesitation or mental reservation”
(“Southern Baptist Theological Seminary’s Response”). In demanding that the staff’s
signature be written in an ideal complete sincerity, Mohler and his evangelical institution
exert both ideological and coercive force on those individuals. This is somewhat ironic,
in that the Faith and Message’s Preamble affirms the following:
Confessions are only guides in interpretation, having no authority over the
conscience . . . they are statements of religious convictions, drawn from
the Scriptures, and are not to be used to hamper freedom of thought or
investigation in other realms of life . . . Baptists . . . deny the right of any
secular or religious authority to impose a confession of faith upon a church
or body of churches.
Regardless of such claims, the signature requirement directly impacts the consciences of
hundreds of Southern Baptist Seminary employees who are required to subscribe to and
espouse this ideology; it both directly and indirectly impacts the Seminary’s thousands of
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students who are educated into it, not including the families they bring to campus who
also participate in the Seminary’s culture; and through those thousands of seminary
students and their families this particular religious educational apparatus indirectly
impacts millions of Southern Baptist congregants and missionary targets. Southern
Baptist Seminary utilizes coercive institutional contexts to deploy an “official”
evangelical ideology through a whole chain of organized sponsors. Without such
systems, SBTS’s definitions are no more significant than anyone else’s. And conversely,
those who wish to differently represent evangelicalism must make use of their own
mediated networks—or perhaps the same networks—to make their representations
similarly influential. Such efforts are described below.
But the larger reality is that it is more than possible, in spite of these examples, to
participate in many evangelical organizations for years without ever becoming subject to
such disciplinary procedures or codified doctrinal demands. Most evangelicals, however
defined, would refuse to subscribe to the code of conduct put forward by Appalachian
Bible College (sociological data cited below strongly supports this supposition) and
would likely quibble with one or several of the doctrinal points asserted by “The Baptist
Faith and Message.” In point of fact, most evangelicals report that they behave and
believe generally like the rest of the American population—as has been pointed out by
the Pew Forum, the Barna Group, Kinnaman, Smith, and Putnam and Campbell, among
others—and most evangelicals do not ever belong to institutions with this sort of
significant coercive power to shape their behavior. And yet “evangelicalism,” and usually
at least some aspects of ABC and SBTS’s versions of evangelicalism, have significant
influence on popular identifications, perceptions and representations of evangelicalism.
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As Henry predicted, evangelicalism’s power derives not from pervasive coercion, but
from its pervasive, hegemonic presence in American culture—highly visible on the one
hand, deeply sedimented in people’s minds and bodies on the other. So we should instead
consider the effectiveness of Henry’s plan as he detailed it—by examining the sorts of
public representatives that evangelicalism produces, how they maintain their presence in
culture, and the types of pressures and constraints (forces) the prominence of these
representations actually place on individuals.

Evangelicalism and the Media
The representatives of official evangelicalism, and particularly the loose coalition
of conservative politico-religious organizations often (self-) labeled evangelical,
participate in a vast media network that has been described in detail by Diamond. These
religious organizations often publicize their own religious stances, but also rely on nonreligious media hubs to more widely distribute those. Both religious and secular media
benefit in page views, ads, ratings, and sales from this arrangement. This is not
necessarily a partisan issue: the New York Times and Daily Beast stand to benefit just as
much from running stories on religious conservatives as do Fox News and Breitbart, even
if viewer interest may stem from different motivations. Because of the tendency towards
sensationalism in news, these portrayals often select highly visible official “personalities”
like Billy Graham, or highly quotable and inflammatory personalities like Pat Robertson,
to act as representatives. Most of us will likely remember, to name two widely-reported
instances, Robertson’s suggestions that 9/11 was a punishment for American
homosexuality, and that Haiti’s earthquake was the result of a long-ago deal with the
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Devil. To take an even more extreme example of religion’s presence in the media, as I
write this there are reports in the American media that over 160 schoolgirls and their
teachers in northern Afghanistan have been poisoned because a sectarian group finds the
idea of educated women intolerable—likely reinforcing secular suspicions (and resulting
from sectarian suspicions) that education and conservative religion are incommensurable.
Such strongly negative representations notwithstanding, the media does enable
evangelical leaders to disseminate a visible and broadly recognizable evangelicalism to
groups well beyond their own followers. To offer one quick example, we can look again
to Mohler. He is not merely the President of Southern Baptist Seminary: he is also on the
board of Focus on the Family and The Council for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood,
both heavily politicized and publicized conservative religious organizations. Most
importantly, Mohler is the de facto voice of the Southern Baptist Convention—which has
a membership of over 16 million members and sponsors “more than 5,000 missionaries in
153 nations” (“About Us”). Through religious media networks (which include his blog,
podcasts, radio show, and books) Mohler disseminates official constructions of
Christianity; multiplying the effect, a Google search immediately turns up at least twenty
re-postings, re-publications, and twitter links to the full text of most of his articles or blog
entries. But secular media plays a significant role in amplifying Mohler’s representations:
he has appeared on NPR’s Fresh Air and Larry King Live, blogged for the Washington
Post’s On Faith religion column, and serves as a representative voice for evangelicalism
in multiple national publications. As Molly Worthen notes in a cover story on Mohler in
Christianity Today, “Time magazine has turned to Mohler for the conservative
evangelical perspective on issues ranging from evolution to Christian missions in Iraq,
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calling him the ‘reigning intellectual of the evangelical movement in the U.S.’.”
Together, these mediated platforms, including Worthen’s article—described by
conservative evangelicals as a condescending hack job—continually cement Mohler’s
station as a highly visible representative of evangelicalism (for an example, see Justin
Taylor’s blog Between Two Worlds). Mohler’s official representation of evangelicalism,
deriving from a centralized location in evangelical networks, is disseminated through a
large number of local, traceable channels, creating something of a “global” effect.
Through these media apparatuses, leaders like Mohler not only implicitly
represent, but also explicitly define, evangelicalism. In a pamphlet on Southern Baptist
Seminary’s website, for instance, Mohler sets out the doctrines that are “fundamental and
essential to the Christian faith.” He asserts, “Where such doctrines are compromised, the
Christian faith falls” (“The Pastor as Theologian” 8). Mohler accordingly excludes those
who don’t believe the essential doctrines from the religious formation—and heaven—as
“unbelievers” (8), and argues that any church that doesn’t hold to these central doctrines
is similarly outside the religious formation. This is enacted in a piece Mohler wrote about
Dutch heretics, where he makes clear there that any Christianity, church, or individual
failing to subscribe to his essential doctrines “is not a new form of Christianity. It is a
new religion meeting in historic Christian church structures” (“A Laboratory for
Christianity’s Destruction”). Those heretics, for Mohler, are not explicitly excluded from
Christianity by any evangelical institution, although he thinks they should be—but
nevertheless they are definitionally outside of Christianity, and Mohler is merely
reporting this reality. This definition, disseminated through contemporary media forms,
directly impacts thousands of Mohler’s blog readers; it indirectly impacts many
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thousands more who read bloggers sponsoring Mohler’s ideology and distributing it
through links and postings as well as indirect citations.
The book publishing industry contributes to disseminating official evangelicalism
as well, of course: Diamond and Sharon Crowley have both noted (and in doing so
illustrated) the massive publishing success and cultural force of the apocalyptic Christian
fiction series, Left Behind. In that sixteen book series, co-authors Tim LaHaye and Jerry
B. Jenkins fictionalize a particularly violent, literalist, Manichean interpretation of the
Bible’s last chapter, Revelation. A more recent example might be Heaven is for Real,
advertised on its website as “the true story of a four-year old son of a small town
Nebraska pastor who experienced heaven during emergency surgery.” The book, released
in November 2010, had sold over 6 million copies by February of 2012, managing to
hold the top spot on the New York Times Paperback Nonfiction list for 53 weeks
(www.christianretailing.com). Heaven is for Real has what might be recognized as a
characteristically evangelical message; like Mohler’s discussion above, it blends a certain
religious optimism about the reality of God and an afterlife with something far less so,
something closer to Left Behind, actually: as the book’s online press declares, “the
disarmingly simple message is that heaven is a real place, Jesus really loves children, and
to be ready . . . there is a coming last battle.”
But Mohler’s exclusionary focus upon right belief, to offer an example somewhat
closer to home, also gets regularly disseminated through representations of
evangelicalism in academic texts. I previously described this phenomenon in reference to
rhetoric and composition’s published representations in chapter two, but we can also see
an example of this by looking again at the work of Kinnaman, head of the well-respected
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religious research firm Barna Group. In a pair of extensive book-length studies on the
attitudes of young Americans towards religion, Kinnaman attempts to differentiate
between the attitudes of various religious groups, including evangelicals. For Kinnaman
and co-author Gabe Lyons, “Being classified as an evangelical is not dependent on
church attendance or the denominational affiliation of the church attended” (249-50).
Instead, Kinnaman and Lyons—themselves evangelicals—define an evangelical largely
in terms of belief. To be defined as an evangelical for Kinnaman and Lyons, respondents
must be “Born-again Christians”: “people who said they have made a personal
commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important in their life today, and who also
indicated they believe when they die they will go to heaven because they have confessed
their sins and have accepted Jesus Christ as their Savior” (249). Respondents must also
meet seven other conditions: “1) saying their faith is very important in their life today; 2)
believing they have a personal responsibility to share their religious beliefs about Christ
with non-Christians; 3) believing that Satan exists; 4) believing that eternal salvation is
possible only through grace, not works; 5) believing that Jesus Christ lived a sinless life
on earth; 6) asserting that the Bible is accurate in all that it teaches; 7) describing God as
the all-knowing, all-powerful, perfect deity who created the universe and still rules it
today” (249). So in a book not ostensibly intended to define evangelicalism, Kinnaman
and Lyons’s definition nevertheless serves to perpetuate belief-centered definitions of
evangelical formations that are also being perpetuated by the official evangelical
establishment.
Moreover, their narrow definition reciprocally shapes their demographic
information on “evangelicals.” The exclusionary work here is that other sorts of
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evangelicals (say, those who don’t believe in Hell) will be excluded from statements such
as, “evangelicals tend to…” throughout the book. In this way, evangelicalism becomes
incrementally more homogeneous (evangelicals believe all of the same things, and
perhaps evangelicals act in more of the same ways). Thus, when Kinnaman and Lyons
reject behavioral or institutional definitions of evangelicalism in favor of cognitive
definitions, they are not merely setting research parameters: they are broadcasting
ostensibly “official” definitions of evangelicalism that are forcefully and explicitly
exclusionary. That representation got picked up, notably, by other media outlets who
reported on Kinnaman and Lyons’s findings: articles from Time, USA Today, Publisher’s
Weekly, and The Atlantic are all linked on UnChristian’s website. In this way, Kinnaman
and Lyons’s scientific definition perpetuates the hegemonic strategies that work to
present a particular version of evangelicalism as the evangelical formation, and their
influence is amplified by their representation’s dissemination throughout the secular
media apparatus.

Evangelicalism and Political Systems
As is probably apparent to the reader, however, the evangelicals who attain the
heaviest publicity and public influence are often not pastors but politicians or those
explicitly connected to politics. The political system is perhaps the ideological apparatus
where we see most clearly the power of official evangelicalism. Goodburn rightly
connects evangelicalism’s highly visible presence in American culture to the political and
cultural relevance of the Christian Right, a political group with strong, redundant ties to
some elements of evangelical Christianity (the Christian Right as a whole has been
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characterized by Diamond as “a political movement rooted in a rich evangelical
subculture” [1]). While the names and organizations change, the Christian Right has been
front and center in American political and religious consciousness for at least thirty years,
embodied most recently in George W. Bush’s proclaimed evangelical Christianity, Sarah
Palin’s vice presidential nomination, and Rick Santorum’s primary campaign for the
2012 Republican presidential nomination. Evangelicals like Santorum, Palin, and Bush
may well represent religion for this generation the way that Falwell and Robertson did
for other generations—after all, Thomson’s student informant Quinn does complain,
“they think that we’re all like George Bush” (Thomson 90).
Leading historians of evangelicalism including George Marsden, Randall Balmer,
and Mark Noll offer a narrative that traces the articulation of American evangelicalism
with conservative social and political policy all the way back to the Puritans (Noll 40).
Following these sources in a recent dissertation on evangelical rhetoric, Amy King traces
the increasing prominence of evangelicalism in the religious and political imagination
through American history—through the Puritans, the Great Awakening, the Second Great
Awakening, abolition, the Social Gospel, Prohibition, the Scopes trial, communism, Roe
v. Wade, the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, the Carter, Reagan, and Bush
presidencies. Such events and movements served to not only tie together religion and
politics, but also “solidified the position of evangelicalism at the center of American
religious life” (Prothero 221, qtd. in King 38). That is, media attention and politics
together solidified evangelicalism’s central place within American religion. So long
before we arrive at the Moral Majority of the 1980s and the Tea Party of the 2000s,
King’s sweeping narrative of America, politics, and evangelicalism draws together many
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familiar names: George Whitehead, Jonathan Edwards (35); Charles Finney (39); Dwight
L. Moody (42); William Jennings Bryan (45); and Graham (49). By the time we arrive at
Billy Graham’s representation of evangelicalism in the second half of the 20th century,
evangelicalism has firmly established itself as the chief representative of American
Protestant Christianity. As King notes, quoting Prothero, eventually “‘Evangelical’
became the usual term to refer not only to the more moderate heirs to the broader
fundamentalist coalition, but also to conversionist Protestants of any heritage” (234, qtd.
in King 50). This evangelical prominence within hegemonic accounts of American
Christianity was only cemented and extended in the latter half of the twentieth century.
Evangelicalism’s more recent political power is just as familiar a narrative: in the
70s, 80s, and 90s, evangelical leaders fronted the famed Christian Right that drew
together conservative politics and evangelical religion through organizations and media
outlets like the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family, and the 700
Club. Much has been written about the media and organizational strategies of leaders like
Jerry Falwell, Robertson, Oral Roberts, Charles Colson, James Dobson and the rest.
During their decades in the spotlight, each of those men carried on dual agendas as both
spiritual and political leaders. Diamond paints a vivid picture of a politico-religious
media conglomerate that used all available forms of media to motivate religious
individuals to political action: “the evangelical subculture . . . thrives through an array of
institutions that may not, on the surface, seem political. These include Christian
broadcasting, literature and music, Promise Keepers rallies, and the practice of
homeschooling” (11). These evangelical leaders both represented and shaped the
evangelical populations they reached through their media organizations. With the
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influence these leaders acquired by ostensibly representing millions of evangelical
voters, well-placed Christian Right leaders of the 90s were even more importantly,
perhaps, able to shape Republican Party platforms, pressing what should still be a
familiar set of social issues. The platform remained conservative on issues of “abortion,
gay rights, and sex education in the public schools,” Diamond explains, “because these
[were] the concerns raised by the religious milieu of evangelicalism” (11).
While in 2009 King hopefully hypothesized that the influence of the evangelicalconservative coalition was in decline after the Obama election, in hindsight we can see
that this was not entirely the case (196-214). We must now add the Tea Party to the list of
political movements with strong ties to evangelicalism. As Putnam and Campbell found,
the Tea Party draws much of its constituency from conservative religious sources.
Next to being a Republican, the strongest predictor of being a Tea
Party supporter today was a desire, back in 2006, to see religion play a
prominent role in politics. And Tea Partiers continue to hold these views:
they seek “deeply religious” elected officials, approve of religious leaders’
engaging in politics and want religion brought into political debates. The
Tea Party’s generals may say their overriding concern is a smaller
government, but not their rank and file, who are more concerned about
putting God in government.
This inclination among the Tea Party faithful to mix religion and
politics explains their support for Representative Michele Bachmann of
Minnesota and Gov. Rick Perry of Texas. Their appeal to Tea Partiers lies
less in what they say about the budget or taxes, and more in their overt use
of religious language and imagery, including Mrs. Bachmann’s lengthy
prayers at campaign stops and Mr. Perry’s prayer rally in Houston.
(“Crashing the Tea Party”)
All of this is increasingly relevant to us as I write this chapter and the second straight
Republican Vice Presidential candidate is a vocally conservative Christian and staunch
political conservative—this time, Catholic budget hawk Paul Ryan.
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This articulation of political, social, and religious conservatism in the public
imagination is compounded by published agendas from Christian Right organizations like
the Christian Coalition. Their 2013 agenda includes the following items: “Defunding and
Rolling Back Obamacare”; “Stand with Israel”; “Reducing Government Spending and
Debt”; “Defending Our Second Amendment Rights”; “Stop Public Funding of
Abortion—And End Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research”; “Defending Traditional
Marriage”; “Energy Independence and Reform”; “Ending Religious Discrimination
against Christians in the Military”; “Opposing Liberal Judicial Nominees”; and
“Opposing any Re-introduction of the ‘Fairness Doctrine’.” Incredibly, the Christian
Coalition manages to embody almost all of Americans’ preconceptions about religion in
one brief agenda. They espouse a politically conservative ideology—that somehow
extends to a religious stance on fiscal policy and guns—while arguing against scientific
research, abortion, homosexuality, social welfare, and liberal ideals of critical thought
and conversation (the Fairness doctrine). Perhaps most remarkably, they perform
hypocrisy and intolerance by evincing concern over religious discrimination in the
military while at the same time eliding the more pressing issue of pervasive
discrimination against homosexuals in the military, and looking to defend “traditional
marriage”.
The Christian Coalition, Dobson, Michelle Bachman, Palin, and the rest concisely
demonstrate why the pervasive perception of religion held by most Americans (religion is
hypocritical, politically reactionary, uncritical, antihomosexual, antiscience,
judgmental—see below) seems to mirror this politicized evangelical Christianity: not
only because they make such neat representatives, but because these official evangelicals
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successfully disseminate (and translate into public discourse and policy) their version of
evangelicalism broadly through public channels—“secular” political systems, “secular”
media, and (as I’ll demonstrate below) and the “secular” entertainment industry. As Asad
has suggested, this historic inter-relation between religion and so many key public
apparatuses should cause us to question entirely the notion of a truly “secular” public
space that can be separated from the religious sphere. In fact, our American public sphere
is deeply imbued with religion and particularly with evangelicalism. Below, I note
several other intersections between religion and secular ideological apparatuses that only
make that conclusion more compelling.

Evangelicalism and Entertainment
This power to raise up high-visibility evangelical representatives that shape
American religion is not only present in political, theological, and academic circles,
however: the connections between media and official evangelicalism extend into
entertainment industries as well. To offer just one indication of the power of this
mediatized evangelical network and the way it creates its own representatives, the album
of Christian rapper LeCrae debuted at #3 on the Billboard 200 last month. While the
music has received fairly positive critical reviews, LeCrae’s success might also be linked
to his appearances at Christian youth conferences like Passion, an annual Christian
teaching and worship conference aimed at 18-25 year olds, and the vocal support and
media publicity lent him by the leaders of the white evangelical establishment. On this
connection between a young black rapper and white evangelical leaders, we might point
to evangelical pastor, editor, and blogger Tim Challies’ oft-cited “The Middle-Aged
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White Guy’s Guide to Christian Rap.” Challies attempts to do as he indicates—introduce
Christian rap to groups who have likely never listened to (or approved of) rap. He is
clearly aware of the strangeness of this partnership at the levels of cultural history, race,
and age: his guide is jokingly subtitled, “all about represent’n, front’n…and a bunch of
other stuff you don’t understand.” By way of introduction Challies admits, “It has to be
one of the most unexpected phenomena in the church today—that white middle-aged
pastors are talking about rap music and, even more strangely, actually listening to it and
recommending it.”
Challies documents the connections between Christian rap and conservative
evangelical leader John Piper, whose name, sermons and books are cited in rap titles,
lyrics, and even sampled by Christian rappers (“John Piper’s Unexpected Career in HipHop”). The sixty-six year old Piper, importantly, prominently represents the official
evangelical positions I’ve been describing above. He edited 1992’s Christianity Today
book of the year, Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood: A Response to
Evangelical Feminism. We might also find notable his published assertion that a tornado
in Minneapolis was “a gentle but firm warning” from God to an association of
Evangelical Lutheran churches who had gathered to consider a policy change allowing
practicing homosexuals to pastor churches (“The Tornado”). Piper interviewed LeCrae at
Passion 2011; in the interview, LeCrae describes himself as “an indigenous minister in an
urban culture” providing “solid biblical truths” that “are Christ-centered and Godcentered” and articulating “the revealed will of God” (Piper, “Lecrae”). This is not an
obscure interview: the link provided has, as of the date of this writing, 2835 comments.
Its YouTube video companion currently has 117,317 views and 769 “likes” (compared to
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only 10 “dislikes”). We can imagine that this has a reciprocal effect—producing a wider
net for both Piper and LeCrae. While LeCrae’s citations of Piper certainly send publicity
Piper’s way—he has a song entitled “Don’t Waste Your Life,” which is also the title of a
popular Piper book—LeCrae almost certainly has gained visibility in certain circles
through his networked connection to the pastor and author.
But Billboard successes like LeCrae’s should also be understood as indicating a
particular cultural network of evangelical celebrities, too—visible in the vocal support
LeCrae has received from Christian celebrity-athletes including Tim Tebow, Jeremy Lin,
and Bubba Watson. NBA player Lin’s own wave of popularity (dubbed Linsanity) was
spurred not only by his Asian heritage and his (rare for a professional athlete) affiliation
with Harvard, but also by his outspoken evangelical religious affiliation, detailed in a
USA Today post by Cathy Grossman. Jim Lee, another evangelical blogger, makes this
context for Lin’s popularity explicit: “Jeremy Lin intrigues me in more ways than
one. First, he is a Christian. Secondly, he is an Asian American of Chinese
descent. Thirdly, his Christian faith spells out in real life by doing all things in excellence
unto the Lord including in academics, evident by the fact that he is a Harvard Economics
Graduate.” Lee’s blog post offers a single picture of Lin with one finger pointed as if to
heaven, wearing a Harvard jersey—though by then Lin was actually playing for the
NBA’s New York Knicks. The blogger provides links to an interview with Lin from the
Evangelical Channel, and Lin himself has a “Faith” tab on his personal website that
provides links to multiple Lin interviews on the subject. So while any thorough
explanation of Lin’s popularity would have to account for his multiple subject positions
and personal attributes, including his stunning initial success as a rookie NBA point
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guard in the bright lights of New York City, and his underdog story (going undrafted,
then sleeping on his brother’s couch while playing for the Knicks), the point I’m trying to
make is that Lin’s evangelical identification, coupled with access to evangelical media
networks, amplifies (again that word) Lin’s overall visibility.
Lin also, as we’ve seen in other ways, reciprocally amplifies the visibility of
official evangelicalism. Notably, one of those links on Lin’s “Faith” page takes readers to
the website of InterVarsity, a Christian organization that works on college campuses.
High profile evangelical representatives are often redundantly tied into evangelical
institutions through overt connections like this. This is the case with Passion in LeCrae’s
case, and Focus on the Family in Tebow’s. (Tebow, an outspoken evangelical and son of
a missionary, appeared as a sort of celebrity endorser for Focus on the Family in a prolife commercial that aired during the Super Bowl in 2012.) The results of such
arrangements are complex: Lin’s interview with InterVarsity may at one time have
increased his public visibility; now the link from Lin’s website returns the favor by
increasing traffic on InterVarsity’s website; institutional evangelicalism directly and
indirectly gains by its connection with a high-profile celebrity representative; and the
hegemonic account of “evangelicalism” gains a new contribution—a modest, intelligent,
attractive young Chinese-American who credits God for orchestrating specific events in
basketball games (Grossman). So even the entertainment industry continually creates new
evangelical representatives for official evangelicalism that legitimate the authority of
other evangelical representatives and organizations to speak as evangelicalism. Through
such connections to specific organizations, official evangelicalism’s representational
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network and cultural presence grows more expansive, or perhaps dense, and certainly
harder to fully escape.
While his study doesn’t focus on athletes, Tebow, Lin and LeCrae nevertheless
corroborate D. Michael Lindsay’s basic finding in a sociological study of evangelical
elites and their social networks: “the incorporation of powerful leaders into social and
professional networks that overlap with evangelicals has been fundamental to achieving
greater visibility for the movement” (78). Lindsay points for illustration to nonevangelical George H. W. Bush’s participation in the National Prayer Breakfast.
Similarly, even if Lin, Tebow, and LeCrae turn out to be outspoken Christians but not
strictly evangelicals, their participation as celebrities in organizations that overlap with
evangelicalism like InterVarsity, Passion, and Focus on the Family still will have resulted
in greater evangelical visibility. Tebow, Lin, and LeCrae are official representatives of
official evangelicalism because they are connected to both institutional evangelicalism
and the hegemonic account of evangelicalism through organizational and mediatized ties,
even if they are not themselves ideologically evangelical. Their visible support
strengthens the hegemonic account of official evangelicalism and helps to disseminate its
norms to a wider audience. Taken together, the effect of all of these ideological
apparatuses suggests one partial answer to Asad’s question—how does power make
religion?—through publicity. As Henry charged, official evangelicalism’s version of
Christianity is being “lived out, among the regenerate, in every area of activity,” so that
“even the unregenerative are moved by Christian standards, acknowledging their force”
(71).
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IV. Recognition: The Evangelicalism Under Our Skin
Everything I’ve described might seem to describe a circle of elites affirming and
recognizing one another in a sort of mediated echo chamber; how this prominent account
of evangelicalism actually impacts “normal people,” including instructors and students,
may remain somewhat unclear. Research and theory have together argued for decades
that the effects of the media on individuals are neither totally determining nor linear.
Why does Tim Tebow make my experience of evangelicalism any different? To answer
this, we return to the concepts of recognition and misrecognition by which individuals
respond to ideological apparatuses. Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus reminds us that our
prolonged exposure to official evangelicalism’s norms and accounts of itself,
disseminated through such a wide variety of “secular” apparatuses, probably means that
evangelicalism will have become sedimented beneath our skin, so to speak, even if we
don’t subscribe to an explicit evangelical ideology. We—whether religious ourselves or
not—are likely shaped by and recognize evangelicalism.
And in fact, there’s plenty of evidence suggesting that these official evangelical
representatives have gotten under our skin and will be recognized. In chapter two I
discuss Thomson’s findings about instructor perceptions of religious students—to present
that text again briefly, Thomson finds writing instructors tend to see Christian students as
“cling[ing] to the idea of universal truth” (74) and “unable or unwilling to think
critically” (80). While instructors try to “make distinctions between Christian students
whom they see as radical, evangelical, conservative, and judgmental and those who
appear to blend more seamlessly into the academic environment” (68), the radical/
evangelical/ conservative/ judgmental Christian student seems to drive generalized
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instructor perceptions of “Christians.” Such descriptions and perceptions of religion are
not unique to writing instructors, nor localized to conservative Christians. Putnam and
Campbell report widespread negative perceptions of Christianity; of religion more
broadly; and of the Christian Right, Muslims, and atheists most specifically (American
Grace 120-33; “Crashing the Tea Party”). They suggest in American Grace that a muchdiscussed across-the-board decline in American religiosity may be a result of what I’ve
called official evangelicalism: “religion itself and conservatism (theological, social,
moral, and political) became increasingly symbiotic and identified, especially in the
public eye, with the Religious Right” (120).
To support this claim about American perceptions of religion, Putnam and
Campbell cite studies from the Pew Forum, a number of academic studies including their
own, and the work of Lyons and Kinnaman, whose research I discussed above. In their
2006 book UnChristian, Kinnaman and Lyons report on an expansive study they
conducted of young “outsiders” to Christianity, a group they define as “atheists and
agnostics; those affiliated with a faith other than Christianity (such as Islam, Hinduism,
Judaism, Mormonism, and so on), and other unchurched adults who are not born again
Christians” (249). Among these “outsiders” aged 16-29, Kinnaman and Lyons find that
91% describe present-day Christianity as antihomosexual; 87% describe it as judgmental;
85% describe it as hypocritical; 75% describe it as too involved in politics; and 70%
describe it as insensitive to others (34). Kinnaman qualifies that “too involved in politics”
means outsiders think “Christians . . . promote and represent politically conservative
interests and issues” (30).
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So instructor perceptions seem to correspond closely to at least young Americans’
conceptions of “Christianity”—hyper-conservative, judgmental, hypocritical, and
narrow-minded—and to the behaviors and representations forwarded by official
evangelicalism through the cultural apparatuses described above. As Putnam and
Campbell interpret this and their own similar findings among the general population,
“this youthful generation seems unwilling or unable to distinguish the stance of the most
visible, most political, and most conservative religious leaders from organized religion in
general” (American Grace 131).
But strangely, Kinnaman and Lyons find that younger Christians seem to agree.
In the same study from 2006, Kinnaman and Lyons find that among young churchgoers,
80% would describe present-day Christianity as antihomosexual; 52% would describe it
as judgmental; 47% would describe it as hypocritical; and 50% would describe it as too
involved in politics (34). And in a more recent study, Kinnaman identifies six issues
raised by disaffected Christians aged 18-29. These disaffected, according to Kinnaman,
make up approximately 60% of all young Americans with Christian backgrounds. They
feel Christianity is, first, over-protective—“The church is . . . a creativity killer where
risk taking and being involved in culture are anathema.” It’s also shallow—“Easy
platitudes, proof texting, and formulaic slogans.” Third, it’s anti-science—“Many young
Christians have come to the conclusion that faith and science are incompatible . . . What’s
more, science seems accessible in a way that the church does not; science appears to
welcome questions and skepticism, while matters of faith seem impenetrable.” Fourth,
it’s repressive—“Religious rules—particularly sexual mores—feel stifling to the
individualist mindset of young adults.” Fifth, it’s exclusive: “[Young Americans] have
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been shaped by a culture that esteems open-mindedness, tolerance, and acceptance. Thus
Christianity’s claims to exclusivity are a hard sell.” Finally, it’s doubtless—“Young
Christians (and former Christians too) say the church is not a place that allows them to
express doubts. . . . Many feel that the church’s response to doubt is trivial and fact
focused, as if people can be talked out of doubting” (92-93).
Kinnaman observes that young Christians’ complaints about Christianity are
weirdly similar to one another—he writes, “It feels as if they are reading from a script”
(9). This phenomenon is clearly occurring across American culture more generally, too:
the same script is being employed in our rhetoric and composition descriptions, general
societal descriptions, and descriptions from religious practitioners themselves.
Altogether, these descriptions of Christianity, and of religion at large, do begin to feel
“scripted”—and having observed how official evangelicalism promotes itself through our
ideological apparatuses, this should be less than surprising.
To begin to consider the consequences of that recognizability, we can look again
to examples of religion in politics and entertainment. The success of evangelical parodies
indicates the extent to which evangelicalism is generally recognizable. A recent episode
of NBC’s Parks and Rec on abstinence education provides an example: in that episode,
“Sex Education,” a married Christian couple crusades against teaching comprehensive
sex education to senior citizens (there’s been an outbreak of Chlamydia in the nursing
homes), saying that this will lead to “babies in thongs.” The kicker, of course, is that the
wife is portrayed as sharp-faced and unhappy while the husband is flamboyantly gay—
but doesn’t know it. He refers to the “urges” he keeps down, and mentions that he and his
wife waited till well after marriage to have sex. To be clear, the word evangelical never
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gets used. But the specific references to God, sin, and abstinence do enough to connect
the couple’s discourse directly to the official evangelical rhetoric on sex, homosexuality,
and marriage I describe above.
This sounds like a result that evangelicals would not want—people’s perceptions
of evangelicals seem generally negative. But scholars of presidential rhetoric have
pointed out how recent presidents—though particularly George W. Bush—have utilized
this general recognizability of evangelicalism to their rhetorical advantage by pairing
“God talk” with ideals of freedom, and with prophetic, hortatory modes of discourse that
display the certainty characteristic of such religious discourses (Coe and Domke, Hart
and Childers, Brown). As Kevin Coe and David Domke put this, “Reagan and Bush are
distinct [from other presidents since Roosevelt] in at least three crucial ways: their greater
amount of God talk, their greater propensity to claim that a divine being has a special
connection with freedom and liberty, and their much greater likelihood to speak
declaratively about God’s wishes for these principles” (323). Coe and Domke connect
these rhetorical patterns with “the ascendancy of religious conservatives in the political
sphere and the desire of presidents—particularly those in the Republican Party—to
connect with this voting block” (320), noting Bush’s ascription to the belief that “political
leaders should ‘signal early, signal often’ their religious views” (312), and pointing out
that “in the 2000 election Bush received 79% of White evangelicals’ votes” (313). But
plenty of non-evangelicals voted for Bush—the more interesting question might be to
what extent the general incorporation of evangelical logics causes non-evangelicals to
similarly recognize Bush’s evangelical discourse.
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Wendy Brown is less circumspect. She argues that the blurring of religious and
political discourse “facilitates the reception of the de-democratizing forces of
neoconservatism and neoliberalism” (706) by utilizing religious discourses’ dependence
on a “declarative modality of truth” combined with an “inner conviction or certainty” that
makes “interrogation, deliberation, and facts” irrelevant (707). Brown believes that this
religious discourse activates a sort of authoritarian mindset in which those possessing the
requisite evangelical disposition will simply submit to leaders who perform evangelical
discourse. But Althusser’s conception of ideology suggests that no such blindly coercive
relation need be imagined—Bush’s discourse might be more successful with evangelicals
precisely because it doesn’t require their submission (a coercive logic): it instead merits
trust in those who recognize its evangelical logics. Because of this recognition, Brown is
right to note that when evangelicalism’s logic “seeps from religious to political
rationality” it “transforms the conditions of legitimacy for political power” so that
“executive power obtains a prerogative and legitimacy not routinely available to liberal
democratic states” (708). Put simply, Bush’s evangelical God talk may grant him
legitimacy and authority with populations in whom such discourse positively resonates.
They trust him, vote for him, and thus literally authorize him to press his religious logic
forward into government policy.
In a less incendiary instantiation of the same basic argument, Ann Powers of NPR
argues that the appeal of a number of immensely popular contemporary bands similarly
derives from their resonances with Christian sensibilities. She describes
a new generation of fans emerging not only for Mumford but for acousticleaning American bands garnering ever-larger and more fervent audiences
on the club and theater touring circuit. A lot of this stuff has unmistakably
churchy overtones: The Head and the Heart shares a name with Garry
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Wills' popular history of American Christianity; The Avett Brothers sing
of carpenters and (indirectly) “Corinthians”; the rousing choruses of bands
like The Lumineers musically connect to both old hymns and
contemporary praise and worship music. It may not be cool on the secular
scene to play up these Jesus people leanings, but they're a huge part of
what attracts fans to these artists. Many pop fans are or have been
churchgoers, and the comfortable feeling of singing along, nurtured in
many during childhoods spent in the pews, allows for a form of release
that's edifying without proving too scary.
The most incisive distinction Powers makes here (though it can be easily over-looked for
its seeming obviousness) is between the explicit and the implicit: music evocative of
religious sensibilities attracts American listeners; music that is explicitly religious might
repel them.
Powers goes on in this vein, describing the levels at which the experience of these
bands resonates with people’s religious sensibilities—reminding them of church without
being specifically or directly religious:
I know the feeling that radiates from a room full of Avetts or Mumford
fans singing along with every overly sincere, earnest word; I've been there
myself. At sixteen, I was a confused Catholic kid struggling to figure out
how I could be my parents' daughter and still want to make out with boys,
dye my hair funny colors and dance all night to ridiculously loud music.
U2's music didn't present an alternative to the church life that had made
me, in part, who I was then; it showed me how to struggle within that life,
and get to the point where I could either walk on within it or walk away.
I'm not a practicing Catholic now, but when I hear Mumford & Sons or the
Avett Brothers, I recognize the same internal fights, the same desire to
grapple with impossibly big terms like "sincerity" and "belief," that U2's
music helped me through twenty years ago.
Powers is not the only one who recognizes these feelings and fights: globally, Mumford
& Sons’ 2010 Sigh No More sold over 2.5 million copies, while its new album Babel (a
notably religious reference) had the biggest debut week of any album in 2012—moving
600,000 copies—and won the Grammy for Best Album of 2012. That sales number, by
the way, almost doubled the debut sales of the year’s next highest album, Justin Bieber’s
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Believe (G. Smith). The point I’m making through these examples is that Christian
discourse (often, specifically evangelical discourse) pervades not only institutional
apparatuses, but through these apparatuses also injects itself into the sensibilities and
even the tastes of ordinary people. They, in turn, recognize and sediment that discourse
through a number of consumer practices—buying albums, attending concerts, wearing
band gear, sharing songs, quoting lyrics, creating Pandora streams, and many more—that
ensure its continuation.10

V. Misrecognition: The Evangelicalism in our Writing Classrooms
But hegemonic enculturation leads not only to the recognition of evangelicalism,
but also to the misrecognition of official evangelicalism. To reiterate, the chief
hegemonic work of ideological apparatuses is to cause individuals to accept as natural
the selective version of the world they are offered by those apparatuses: misrecognizing
culturally contingent relations for natural ones; misrecognizing their own participatory
role in the maintenance of those relations; and missing their potential for transforming
those relations.11 Individuals’ incorporation of cultural norms as behaviors, expectations,
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All of these citational examples speak, of course, to evangelicalism’s discursive power,
but not necessarily its effects or potential uses: given that the bands, satirists and
politicians speaking in evangelical terms are not necessarily evangelicals or working
from evangelical motives, we can see how the power of evangelical discourse can be
harnessed for alternative purposes and articulated with non-evangelical perspectives.
Rhetors often draw on religion’s power for non-religious purposes: to intensify listeners’
sympathetic experience of romantic sentiment, to elevate citizens’ sense of togetherness
or human responsibility, or even to add the “recognition” necessary to much
contemporary comedy while critiquing the behavior of the religious community being
recognized.
11
Within rhetoric and composition, this has been discussed thoroughly in Richard
Miller’s “The Nervous System” (in Bourdieusian terms) and even more thoroughly in
Rickert’s Acts of Enjoyment (in Lacanian terms).
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and perceptions—the enculturation of the habitus—effects such misrecognitions. I deal
with several more key forms of misrecognition, and the stories that produce them, in
chapter five: religious boundaries as stable, religious communication as transparent,
religious experience as spontaneous. But here in chapter three I want to briefly point out
another key form of misrecognition: religious representatives as really representative.
Writing classrooms offer an instructive example of this particular misrecognition, so I
turn my focus there to identify the individual, often non-conscious levels at which this
misrecognition of official evangelicalism occurs.
We might say that instructors and students encounter (perceive, recognize,
respond to) three levels of sponsors promoting official evangelicalism. First, as discussed
above, there are the official spokespersons of a minority religious population—that is,
fundamentalist adherents, many of whom participate in institutions loosely tied together
by the term evangelicalism—who have come to dominance in both American religious
representations and American religious norms by successfully “representing” far larger
and more heterogeneous religious populations (including the broader population of
“evangelicals”). By claiming to speak for “Christianity,” and by being perceived as doing
so, this 13% of the American population claims authority to speak for almost 68% of the
American population (to put the numbers roughly—see discussion in chapter four). The
relative accuracy of this representation will vary from issue to issue—for example,
Putnam and Campbell find that most religious adherents do remain against abortion, but
that doesn’t mean they also favor the death penalty and oppose gay marriage (they don’t,
in fact). The official spokespersons are perhaps the easiest to recognize because they may
maintain official positions, or will self-identify as evangelical or born-again, or may be
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associated explicitly with evangelical institutions. On this primary level, hegemony
depends upon explicit representations.
But second, there are the performative, temporary representatives: anyone who
acts in the name of this representation, or even anyone whose behavior is perceived to
align with this representation. When this happens, they at least temporarily slip into the
role of representative—for the length of the encounter, they become the evangelical that
secular instructors write about. This is the case with Powers’ chosen representatives for
Christianity more generally, Mumford and Sons. The band’s lyrics are generally
religiously thematic rather than religiously dogmatic, and yet for Powers, Mumford and
Sons’ music remains recognizably Christian (“churchy”) and affects people through
activating that recognition. So we must acknowledge these sponsors’ representational
role while we continue to resist the temptation to believe every representation actually
refers to a concrete reality—instead, the representation itself is a reality that activates
further realities, connecting discrete behaviors and groups, motivating collective and
individual actions, realizing itself even in spite of the intentions of the actors like Marcus
Mumford. These temporary instantiations of evangelicalism are only a situated actingout, making-real, of the hegemonic account of evangelicalism. This is actually how I read
our tendency to write about evangelical students, described at the beginning of chapter
two—I believe that often students act as what I’m calling secondary sponsors of official
evangelicalism.
There is no reason to suggest that our disciplinary portrayal of religious students
is an intentional misrepresentation of the religious population: none of our scholars seem
to be attempting to portray “religion” as conservative, and so choosing conservative
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students as representatives. And none of our writers suggest or even imply that all
religious students are political, social, and theological conservatives. After all, in almost
every case the writers are clear that they are talking about evangelicals (not all Christians
or religious practitioners). There is no reason, even, to suggest that our representations
are inaccurate—the individual students we describe as conservative religious adherents
probably are just that. Frankly, conservative religious practitioners are likely the ones we
write articles about for the right reason: because we’re struggling to find good ways to
teach them. They seemingly choose themselves. They announce themselves to us, or we
have difficulty teaching them, or they struggle in our class, and so we write about them in
an effort to help. But through our reporting on these apparently discrete encounters, one
set of representatives seemingly dominates our literature, and those representatives
correspond to generalized perceptions of Christian practitioners that are prevalent among
Christians and non-Christians alike. To me, the relative similarity of religious
representatives in our articles, arising without conscious intention, as a result of a series
of apparently discrete encounters between individual teachers and their religious students
over a period of twenty years, and yet displaying significant coherence, should be
interpreted as a symptom of the hegemonic power of official evangelicalism to shape
what rises to our attention. So at this level, official evangelicalism is dependent upon
markable behaviors and remarking perceptions of those behaviors.
This act of recognition, then, implicates two parties—the recognized and the
recognizer. So I want to suggest here that the third group of sponsors of official
evangelicalism consists of everyone who perceives these temporary representatives, gives
credence to the official representatives, and then cites evangelicalism to explain their
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experience. That’s where academics often come in: we are tertiary sponsors of official
evangelicalism, maintaining its norms and forwarding its account in spite of ourselves.
Perpetuation of official evangelicalism occurs, I would argue, every time instructors
really do have bad experiences with a hypocritical, judgmental, absolutist, repressive, or
conservative religious adherent. When we quite naturally interpret and occasionally represent this adherent as an expression or actualization of the official “Christian” or
“religious” representation, we make them a representative of official evangelicalism. The
stereotype gains reality through its confirmation: as Williams puts it, hegemony “is a
lived system of meanings and values—constitutive and constituting—which as they are
experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming” (110). Every time we give
credence to that evangelicalism’s apparent “expression” in our interactions with religious
adherents, we strengthen the authority (and possibly power) of official evangelicalism
(the account and its institutionally-powerful backers) while eliding the practical challenge
posed to official evangelicalism by our interlocutor’s religious life or the challenge that
might be presented by identifying different sorts of representatives.
This reality effect, in which individuals internalize, activate, and thus realize and
misrecognize the hegemonic account, can also be seen at work in Thomson’s student
informants. Official evangelicalism shapes these students’ expectations, their perceptions,
their emotions, and their behaviors in the writing classroom, specifically because they
operate as both secondary and tertiary sponsors. First, we can see how official
evangelicalism has shaped religious students’ expectations. Heather E. Thomson’s
research indicates that Christian students expect to be negatively perceived by
instructors—thus, there are instructors expecting to see official evangelicals, and there
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are students expecting instructors to see official evangelicals—and the result is political
paralysis. As Thomson notes, “nearly all interviewed students raised the issue of
stereotyping without being prompted” (97); they believe that instructors stereotype
Christians as politically conservative (94), judgmental (96), ignorant, backward (104),
“naïve, ill-informed, biased, ignorant” (110). Consistently, the religious students
Thomson interviews are frustrated by popular representations of Christians put forward
by non-Christian individuals and groups on campus (not only instructors but student
newspapers, student groups on Facebook, and the like). One complains of his campus’s
student newspaper staff, “they think that we’re all like George Bush, like Nazis, like
we’re all conservatives” (90); and another observes of instructors, “I think they
understand the concepts of, you know, the religious right and religious left, but not that
most people aren’t either” (95). We can see that the students’ expectations have been
shaped by official evangelicalism: they expect to be perceived as that kind of Christian.
Thomson describes the emotional and relational effects of this loss of control
(that is, the effects of official evangelicalism’s overwhelming presence): “The lack of
power they have (or feel they have) over people’s perceptions of them contributes to a
feeling that being Christian at UM involves a certain amount of risk and requires a
willingness to explain oneself” (97). Many students feel fearful and defensive in such
settings. As a result, “All but two student interviewees mention fear as part of their
experience as a Christian student”; particularly, Thomson suggests, fear at “the prospect
of dredging up other people’s negative associations with Christianity” (104). Another
student, Quinn, describes feeling embarrassed and angry after seeing the way a preacher
represents Christianity on the quad. He wants to differentiate himself from “that guy”—
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but he’s not sure he can. Thomson writes that Quinn feels “he has little control over how
others might forge connections between him and that which he rejects” (96). These
pervasive negative representations leave students feeling “a lack of control over how the
label ‘Christian’ (or even just ‘religious’) will be interpreted by their peers and
instructors” (105).
Not only are their feelings and expectations being shaped by official
evangelicalism’s cultural presence; religious students also feel unable to represent
religion differently, given the constraints under which they must attempt those
representations, and so they write differently. As one student explains,
I feel a lot of times that I’m not equipped enough . . . I just have a hard
time getting out what I mean, so when I talk to people that’s one of my big
concerns, that I’ll say something I don’t mean, that it comes off the wrong
way, or that I’m presenting my faith in a poor way. I just get really
insecure about that . . . I definitely do get scared, because I don’t think I’m
the wisest person alive. (105)
Or as another of Thomson’s informants writes, “As long as Christians stay, you know, as
long as they don’t let their religion seep out and try to change other people, I think most
people are fine with that” (106). As a result these Christian students report, “avoiding
topics with which their instructors may disagree; choosing not to disclose their religious
beliefs; striving to be ‘neutral’ in their work” (206). They silence themselves on the
assumption “that to identify as Christian is to invite doubts or preconceived notions about
their intellectual abilities, their political views, and their openness to people of other
faiths and worldviews” (124). This mutual expectation (ours, theirs) and attendant
feelings stifle (or at least slow) the ability of young religious moderates to actually
practice, represent and publicize their alternative or emergent religious practices as
legitimate religious practices.
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These students, however, do not only feel this lack of agency in the academy: they
feel silenced and out of control in church as well, and part of this can again be understood
in terms of misrecognition. One student, Theresa, activates official evangelicalism in her
own description of other religious adherents. She
remembers feeling afraid at times to “voice [her] more liberal opinions” to
the Christian student group because they are sometimes looked down
upon. She also wonders if “maybe it’s easier if you agree with the
stereotypical Christian [than] to voice your opinion in that sense because
it’s not like you’re going outside the lines that have already been set for
you.” (95-96)
Remarking on this quote, Thomson ties Theresa to the population of religious students
who have “endeavored to both differentiate their religious selves from stereotypical
representations of evangelical Christianity and perform or behave in ways that
consistently reflect that identity” (Bryant 2, qtd. in Thomson 96).
But here I think we see another relation to official evangelicalism for religious
students, too: Theresa is not only struggling against the stereotype in the classroom,
where she fears being constructed as a secondary sponsor of official evangelicalism—
she’s now using and perpetuating official evangelicalism as a tertiary sponsor. Feeling
fearful around other Christians and anticipating negative responses, whether in fact
there’s any actual social risk, constructs the participatory hegemony Raymond Williams
describes—that “whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our
senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world”
(110). Further, through telling her story to Thomson, Theresa is transforming the
stereotype into a real conversant, or perhaps turning her peers into the stereotype. We
might say that conservative members of the Christian student group are actively
perceived and constructed by Theresa as embodying the stereotypical Christian; thus both
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the liberal and the conservative members of the group together participate in perpetuating
the dominant representation and reinforcing the authority of its norms. So instructors and
students alike act as tertiary sponsors, or “recognizers.” When we activate the
representation through a reference or partial reference, or when like Theresa and Quinn
we read behaviors in terms of the stereotype, even those who oppose official
evangelicalism become its spokespersons. The representation is, in other words,
hegemonic; dislocated, distributed, partial, and participatory, not merely coming “down
from above.” And we are all its spokespersons through our recognitions and
misrecognitions.

Conclusion
We can conclude from this that official evangelicalism has not only attained direct
influence (power) within religion and within American culture through visible positions
within official institutions, but its leaders have also gained indirect influence (authority)
by sedimenting their status as religious representatives in the bodies and minds of
Americans. They may have institutional power apart from the hegemonic account; but
official evangelical spokespersons derive much of their authority from ideological
apparatuses like education and the media that move official evangelicalism beneath our
skin, and from the recognition students and we learn to give to its representatives.
Official evangelical credibility and legitimacy is at the very least reinforced every time
what primary and secondary sponsors say and do in the name of their religion aligns with
people’s perception of Christianity and religion more generally. This means that for the
majority of Americans, the more homophobic or anti-science or anti-abortion a religious

137

spokesperson is, the more authoritatively he or she represents religion. Simultaneously, a
highly visible creationist confirms for those who perceive religion as anti-science that
religion is, after all, anti-science. And conversely, a spokesperson for religion can quickly
lose credibility as such if his arguments or actions are shown to fall outside the range of
the hegemonic account. To the extent that writing scholars should attend to celebrity
spokespersons like Dobson or Jim Wallis, it should be an attention to what makes them
recognizable and credible to us as religious authorities, and in what ways we, as
secondary and tertiary sponsors, take up, misrecognize, and thus realize their accounts of
evangelicalism (and Christianity, and religion).
I think this pattern of misrecognition is crucial to understanding the power
relations within which religious students write on religion in the classroom. We’ve heard
from Thomson’s informants the lack of agency religious students feel over their
perception at college and at church, and the self-muzzling that can result. They don’t feel
they have the authority to claim their own position in either case, because official
evangelicalism’s pervasive presence in people’s expectations (including their own) is
successfully constraining their political, social, and academic options. Recognizing this
difficulty presented by official evangelicalism, we can also recognize that giving
religious students the opportunity to bring in religiously-inflected perspectives, values,
genres, experiences, and texts may not seem as good an opportunity for them as it seems
to us. They may see it as a risk, or they may not feel they have the tools to represent their
religion adequately.
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CHAPTER IV
HETEROGENEITY AND CONTESTATION

Given the deep resonances between the dominant representation and the visible
“representatives” of the Christian Right, researchers may be tempted to believe in, or at
least look for, a homogeneous religious population that corresponds to these
representations and their representatives—a powerful, official evangelicalism that people
practice. As the previous section demonstrates, this temptation to give credence to the
dominant representation and authority to the official representative is just as strong for
individuals who encounter it in their everyday life. Michel de Certeau calls this the
ultimate power of citation, and Butler calls it a reality effect—we believe the ideal or
norm because of its ostensible representational or citational qualities. We tend to assume
that there must be something that it accurately refers to, or someone else would have
contradicted it, and we’d have heard that contradiction—citation always refers to a reality
(we think). Because of this much of our scholarly focus tends to turn on these highly
visible representatives and representations of religion. For example, throughout her recent
dissertation on contemporary American religious rhetoric—discussed above—King
constructs a rhetorical and ideological struggle between two strains of evangelicalism,
one conservative and one progressive. She focuses heavily on official representations and
representatives from each strain—namely, Dobson and Wallis—to establish the existence
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and growing prominence of these two evangelical formations and their rhetorical struggle
for the evangelical soul.

Practical v. Official
But as Thomson’s student informants above indicate, it is always dangerous to
believe that such official positions—even the ones we find sympathetic—represent, in a
strict sense, the “real” positions held by the population. Butler points out that actual
practices will always exceed or run counter to the constraining forms offered by the
dominant representation. Speaking of gender, she explains,
That disciplinary production of gender effects a false stabilization of
gender in the interests of the heterosexual construction and regulation of
sexuality within the reproductive domain. The construction of coherence
conceals the gender discontinuities that run rampant within heterosexual,
bisexual, and gay and lesbian contexts in which gender does not
necessarily follow from sex, and desire, or sexuality generally, does not
seem to follow from gender. (Gender Trouble 135-36)
Like gender, the official account of religion covers over the discontinuities of religious
practice rampant in actual congregations and on actual campuses in America. Just as
“heterosexuality offers normative sexual positions that are intrinsically impossible to
embody, and the persistent failure to identify fully and without incoherence with these
positions reveals heterosexuality itself not only as a compulsory law, but as an inevitable
comedy,” so too do dominant religious institutions offer normative religious positions
that are intrinsically impossible to embody and inevitably produce tensions experienced
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to varying extents by all religious adherents (Gender Trouble 122). This difference is
described by Raymond Williams as the difference between the practical (here, religion as
it is experienced in everyday life) and the official (ideal constructions of religion as it is
disseminated) (109).
Evidence of such discontinuities within evangelicalism and within American
Christianity more broadly abounds in religious research. First, we can see differences
between practical realities and official evangelicalism even by observing the disparities in
institutional religious affiliation. The Pew Forum’s “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey”
finds that 83% of young Americans between 18 and 29 are in some sense “religious”;
22% of all young Americans report evangelical affiliation; 43% are affiliated with all
Protestant Christian denominations; and 68% are affiliated with Christianity. Another 6%
of all young Americans fall into the category of “Other Religions,” and 25% report no
religious affiliation—though 9% of those who are unaffiliated still describe themselves as
religious. Of the religious 83%, then, evangelical spokespersons only officially represent
a little more than one fourth, and Catholic leadership officially represents the same share.
Even if we restrict our comparisons to evangelicalism’s place among young Christians,
only around one third of those call themselves evangelicals. This point is especially
important because with the partial exception of Black Protestant churches (8% of young
Americans), Putnam and Campbell’s as well as Pew Forum’s results suggest that other
Christian populations are vastly and consistently more liberal religiously, socially, and
politically than evangelical Christian populations. For example, the Pew Forum finds that
mainline Protestants and Catholics are almost three times as likely as white evangelicals
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to feel that homosexuality should be accepted in society (though even among
evangelicals, they find that 19% report that attitude).
Putnam and Campbell also indicate discontinuities between the clergy
(institutional representatives) and their congregants. Whereas religious Americans’
beliefs and practices are heterogeneous, clergy members can prove far more
homogeneous—98% of Missouri Synod Lutheran clergy, for instance, claim that
salvation comes only through Jesus, while only 14% of their Lutheran congregants agree
(540). This gap between the institutional representatives and lay membership holds true
on other counts as well: for instance, Jeremy Uecker and Glenn Lucke note that
politically lay Americans “are divided, [but] the divisions are close, with millions of
average Americans in the middle, sharing some views from one side of the cleavage and
some views from the other side” (693)—but both political and religious elites are
increasingly polarized (693, 705). While congregations are largely politically moderate,
in other words, the clergy are likely to be more strongly liberal or more strongly
conservative. It is a significant mistake, such findings suggest, to conflate official
representatives’ attitudes and norms with those of congregants (although this is not to
deny that the clergy’s views are influential, as Uecker and Lucke also note).
A closer look at American belief, attitude, and behavior confirms that these
differences between practical religion and official evangelicalism are present throughout
American culture. Sociological data suggests that most Americans are clearly practicing
religion in ways that differ from the dominant religious representation and its norms. In
terms of belief, attitude, and behavior, religious Americans demonstrate that their
practical relation to the dominant representation and its representatives is diffracted at
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best, and most likely conflictual. In terms of belief, for example, Putnam and Campbell
find that only 13% of the entire American population consists of “true believers”—what
we often call fundamentalists (542-3). (Looked at slightly differently, the Pew Forum
finds this sentiment among a still small one quarter of religiously affiliated Americans.)
Putnam and Campbell find only that small population believes that “One religion is true
and others are not”; in comparison, when asked the same question a remarkable 80% of
surveyed Americans respond, “There are basic truths in many religions” (American
Grace 543).
Putnam and Campbell find that even among evangelicals, whose members make
up 52% of the true believing population in America (note that 48% of true believers come
from other religious traditions), 75% are not true believers (547). And even within that
true believing fraction of the American population, there is significant diversity in
attitudes. For instance, in addition to the one third who would approve certain forms of
abortion, only 60% of true believers oppose gay marriage and civil unions. That is, within
the most religiously conservative 13% of our population, abortion and gay rights are
viewed favorably by at least a third of those believers (American Grace 544). And
Kinnaman and Lyons lament that in terms of moral behavior there is simply no
significant difference between evangelicals and others, Christian or not (54). So whether
the differences stem from institutional or practical sources, the data makes clear that the
hegemonic evangelical account does not even “represent” evangelicals in any complete
sense—let alone the rest of the Christian or religious population.

Performativity
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To be clear, while these statistics indicate considerable gaps in official
evangelicalism’s power to reproduce itself and make religion over in its own image, they
cannot deny its power altogether. Unable to erase the hegemonic account either from the
ideological apparatuses or from their own minds and bodies, what we find is that
religious practitioners act, as Butler predicts, to deflect and re-deploy both the hegemonic
account and its apparatuses. In Bodies that Matter, Butler concisely summarizes the
realities of subversive action from within the hegemonic:
Performativity describes this relation of being implicated in that which one
opposes, this turning of power against itself to produce alternative
modalities of power, to establish a kind of political contestation that is not
a “pure” opposition, a “transcendence” of contemporary relations of
power, but a difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably
impure . . . For one is, as it were, in power even as one opposes it, formed
by it as one reworks it, and it is this simultaneity that is at once the
condition of our partiality, the measure of our political unknowingness,
and also the condition of action itself. (241)
If I were to translate this notion of performativity into the language of my text, I would
say that if official evangelicalism is truly as hegemonic as I suggest in the previous
chapter, then the challenges and contradictions that people’s actual lives present to
official evangelicalism should merely produce new subject relations to it, not its
eradication—namely, alternative and emergent evangelical formations that continually
appear to stand in various relations to the official. Representing these alternative and
emergent formations within evangelicalism, and the modes of religious struggle,
heterogeneity, and change that they evidence, is the focus of this chapter.
First, however, I want to offer an extended example from outside of Christianity
and American culture that brilliantly highlights these related notions of the practical and
the performative within religious formations. Bahira Sherif’s research on middle and
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upper class Muslim professional women in Egypt investigates the specific ways in which
those women are never entirely within or outside of official ideology; instead, they are in
power even as they oppose it, and formed by hegemony even as their own actions rework
it. Sherif argues that within traditional ideologies being disseminated by fundamentalist
Muslim leaders in Egypt, “The ideal woman is a wife and a mother . . . wears the veil,
guards her modesty, obeys her husband, and expresses her views only through her
husband” (9). But this official representation of the ideal Muslim woman belies economic
and social realities: “there is no room for the economic constraints that force women to
work outside the home, to interact with unrelated men, or to negotiate new distributions
of duties within the home in order to deal with the pressures of marriage, work and
children” (9). These economic constraints are really matters of class; societal
expectations demand that middle and upper-class women should expect a certain level of
material wealth in their marriage that have become generally impossible to achieve on a
single income. So traditional ideas of class status, gender roles, and religion collide here
with current economic realities. As Sherif notes,
While the ideologies of the centre identify women with the household and
children, and subsume this domain to that of men, many upper-middle
class Egyptian women are in the process of creating mechanisms that
enable them to accumulate wealth for their families by negotiating central
and peripheral domains. They are thereby reworking the definitions of
what it means to be either male or female. (13)
Sherif finds, in other words, that the Egyptian women she studies negotiate these transformational conflicts by balancing their religious observation across multiple formational
levels.
Sherif describes a number of practices taken up by Egyptian women in order to
negotiate these conflicting commitments and expectations. Most interestingly, Sherif
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points out that Egyptian women have taken to wearing the veil—a very traditional
religious practice—as one of their negotiating tactics.
The hijab, the wearing of a head veil and loose fitting clothing, has come
to signify the sum total of traditional institutions governing women’s role
in Islamic society . . . This accounts, in part, for the willingness of many
professional women to adopt these new forms of Islamic dress, thereby
literally cloaking themselves in orthodoxy and modernity. (12)
When Sherif’s informants elect to wear the veil but go to work, they are practicing an
alternative way of being Muslim that responds to a variety of societal pressures without
mounting an open challenge to official ideologies of gender roles. They observe Islamic
norms on the level of appearance so as to be allowed to press its boundaries on other
levels; and they make these trade-offs so as to satisfactorily address class, family, and
gender pressures that matter to them. Sherif concludes, “the gender ‘rules’ that are often
invoked for Egyptian society only represent ‘reality’ as it exists within the limited
framework of a particular ideological system: one that relegates women to a subordinate
female sphere. Nonetheless, we find that ‘reality’ is changing as women negotiate with
the tensions brought on through divergent dominant ideologies” (9). It should not be lost
on us that women in Egypt take up these negotiations to safeguard their own economic,
social, and even physical well-being. Nor should it be lost on us how this might apply
outside of Egypt: perhaps the hijab or birka that we read as a mark of repression or even
danger (as suggested by France’s laws) is also (not instead) a mark of subversion—
paradoxically, these women may have to choose to wear the hijab in order to more freely
pursue their classed and gendered desires.
While negotiations may occur at less dangerous or less obvious levels, religious
practitioners elsewhere are similarly operating in relation to multiple, competing
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formations. Performativity will help us understand below, for example, how and why
alumni of evangelical flagship Wheaton College choose to maintain identities as
Wheaton alumni even as they openly challenge Wheaton’s official evangelical stance on
homosexuality—as a group strategically entitled OneWheaton. Those alumni are
explicitly asserting a multiple and partial, variously contradictory identity as Christians,
Wheaton grads, and homosexuals or allies; but they do so in the name of creating a
single, ideal evangelical community that never entirely separates them from official
evangelicalism. And these notions of practice and performativity, the condition of
negotiating relations of power within a complex space, will help us understand how
external discourses on women’s rights exerted enough pressure on evangelicalism to
bring about the creation of feminist evangelical organizations in the 1970s, and then how
those organizations drew counter-organizations like Piper’s Council for Biblical
Manhood and Womanhood in the late 1980s (all discussed below). In each case, while
practitioners enact their multiple commitments, I will demonstrate how they engage and
redeploy the hegemonic account of official evangelicalism. This discursive engagement
with official evangelicalism proves both a constraint and a vehicle for these groups’
agential actions and alternative representations.

Alternative Evangelicalisms
One example of the struggle for control over evangelicalism—not only its popular
representation, but also its ideological and cultural manifestations—can be seen in the
“Evangelical Manifesto.” The Manifesto was published and signed by prominent
evangelicals (including numerous Christian university presidents, magazine editors,
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C.E.O.s of international relief organizations, the publisher of Forbes Magazine, and even
the C.E.O. of Dollar General). Generally, the original signatories who published this
document could be described as having ideological or cultural influence, rather than
coercive influence, within evangelicalism. Released to significant press attention in 2008,
the Manifesto outlines exactly what its writers think evangelicalism really is. Evangelical
Christianity is characterized in the Manifesto by seven beliefs and seven defining
features, which these evangelicals claim are in keeping with true Christian tradition:
“Evangelicals are therefore followers of Jesus Christ, plain ordinary Christians in the
classic and historic sense over the last two thousand years” (5). Later in the document,
they go so far as to aver, “In sum, to be Evangelical is earlier and more enduring than to
be Protestant” (10).
But though they make these positive statements, the writers of the Manifesto
clearly recognize that such claims to Christian tradition and Evangelical definition are
contested. In fact, the document’s stated purpose is not merely to define Evangelicalism,
but to counter the dominant public perception of Evangelicalism. The writers of the
Manifesto are explicitly representing their evangelicalism and outlining its norms against
the hegemonic account.
The two-fold purpose of this declaration is first to address the
confusions and corruptions that attend the term Evangelical in the United
States and much of the Western world today, and second to clarify where
we stand on issues that have caused consternation over Evangelicals in
public life.
. . . we are troubled by the fact that the confusions and corruptions
surrounding the term Evangelical have grown so deep that the character of
what it means has been obscured and its importance lost. Many people
outside the movement now doubt that Evangelical is ever positive, and
many inside now wonder whether the term any longer serves a useful
purpose. (2-3)
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The writers indicate that the Manifesto is working to define Evangelicalism against the
hegemonic account of Evangelicalism, not just to clean up a vague misperception.
Furthermore: their efforts are not just directed against a hegemonic account, but
against the norms for evangelicalism propagated by official evangelicalism. The authors
refuse to directly indicate the sources of this dominant perception in the document or in
subsequent interviews, but it requires little effort to recognize official evangelicalism and
its representatives in their descriptions. To connect the two strains of contention: the
writers are writing the Manifesto in response to the related hegemonic forces of, first,
official evangelicalism’s explicitly ideological account of itself as truly evangelical and
truly Christian; and second, official evangelicalism’s forceful presence as habitus, which
shapes American religious and cultural norms for belief, behavior, and practice.
So to oppose these, the Manifesto’s authors set out to articulate and publicize a set
of alternative evangelical norms (dispositions, behaviors, assumptions and beliefs) and an
alternative account of evangelicalism. These norms are represented—and countered—as
in some sense normative for all Christians. Groups compete to claim, We stand as
representatives of the Christian tradition; Ours are the norms for being “plain ordinary
Christians” (Manifesto 5). In other words, they’re saying, make us the stereotype, not
them. In their account, partially reproduced below, we see these writers engaged in a
struggle to assert an authoritative definition of evangelicalism (indicated not least by their
capitalization of the E in Evangelicalism, below)—but they can’t seem to extricate
themselves from the sedimented forms of popular perception and official evangelicalism
long enough to do so in strictly positive terms. The phrasing of their own positive
defining features of evangelicalism makes this struggle—at once a constraint and a
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springboard for their progressive action—all the more clear. Note below the continual
uses of phrases like “not,” “but,” “also,” “rather than,” “always more than,” “not
only…but,” “as much in…as in,” “not limited to,” “not contained by,” “not reduced to,”
“not confused with,” “should be distinguished from,” “distinctive for,” and others (7-10).
Even for these evangelical elites—heads of universities, academics, popular authors,
CEOs—positive definitions of evangelicalism cannot get fully outside of official
evangelicalism, and in fact gain much of their specificity and motivation agonistically, if
not antagonistically.
I provide here the key phrases for each of the Manifesto’s seven “defining
features” of Evangelicalism, plus any clarifying language the writers offer that better
indicate their agonistic relation to both the hegemonic account and to official
evangelicalism. It would be a mistake to take this Manifesto’s Evangelicalism, any more
than any other, to be the real or true form of evangelicalism. That’s not why I present this
alternative account of evangelicalism in depth here. Instead, what this hopefully does is
indicate two related struggles for control. First, one within evangelicalism, over what will
be the official evangelicalism. Second, one both within and outside of evangelicalism,
over what will be the hegemonic account. All of the following text is directly from the
Manifesto:
First, to be Evangelical is to hold a belief that is also a devotion.
Evangelicals adhere fully to the Christian faith expressed in the historic
creeds of the great ecumenical councils of the church, and in the great
affirmations of the Protestant Reformation, and seek to be loyal to this
faith passed down from generation to generation. But at its core, being
Evangelical is always more than a creedal statement, an institutional
affiliation, or a matter of membership in a movement . . . whole-hearted
devotion, trust, and obedience are our proper response. . . .
Second, Evangelical belief and devotion is expressed as much in our
worship and deeds as in our creeds. . . . What we are about is captured not
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only in books or declarations, but in our care for the poor, the homeless,
and the orphaned; our outreach to those in prison; our compassion for the
hungry and the victims of disaster; and our fight for justice for those
oppressed by such evils as slavery and human trafficking. . . .
Third, Evangelicals are followers of Jesus in a way that is not limited
to certain churches or contained by a definable movement. Evangelicalism
has always been diverse, flexible, adaptable, non-hierarchical, and taken
many forms. This is true today more than ever, as witnessed by the variety
and vibrancy of Evangelicals around the world. For to be Evangelical is
first and foremost a way of being devoted to Jesus Christ, seeking to live
in different ages and different cultures as he calls his followers to live. . . .
Fourth, as stressed above, Evangelicalism must be defined
theologically and not politically; confessionally and not culturally. Above
all else, it is a commitment and devotion to the person and work of Jesus
Christ, his teaching and way of life, and an enduring dedication to his
lordship above all other earthly powers, allegiances and loyalties. As such,
it should not be limited to tribal or national boundaries, or be confused
with, or reduced to political categories such as “conservative” and
“liberal,” or to psychological categories such as “reactionary” or
“progressive.” . . .
Fifth, the Evangelical message, “good news” by definition, is
overwhelmingly positive, and always positive before it is negative. . . . Just
as Jesus did, Evangelicals sometimes have to make strong judgments
about what is false, unjust, and evil. But first and foremost we
Evangelicals are for Someone and for something rather than against
anyone or anything. . . .
Sixth, Evangelicalism should be distinguished from two opposite
tendencies to which Protestantism has been prone: liberal revisionism and
conservative fundamentalism. Called by Jesus to be “in the world, but not
of it,” Christians, especially in modern society, have been pulled toward
two extremes. . . . The liberal revisionist tendency was first seen in the
eighteenth century and has become more pronounced today, reaching a
climax in versions of the Christian faith that are characterized by such
weaknesses as an exaggerated estimate of human capacities, a shallow
view of evil, an inadequate view of truth, and a deficient view of God. In
the end, they are sometimes no longer recognizably Christian. . . . As a
reaction to the modern world, [fundamentalism] tends to romanticize the
past, some now-lost moment in time, and to radicalize the present, with
styles of reaction that are personally and publicly militant to the point
where they are sub- Christian. . . .
Seventh, Evangelicalism is distinctive for the way it looks equally to
both the past and the future. . . . To be Evangelical is therefore not only to
be deeply personal in faith, strongly committed to ethical holiness in life,
and marked by robust voluntarism in action, but to live out a faith whose
dynamism is shaped unashamedly by truth and history. . . . We therefore
regard reason and faith as allies rather than enemies, and find no
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contradiction between head and heart, between being fully faithful on the
one hand, and fully intellectually critical and contemporary on the other.
(7-10)
Later, the Manifesto’s writers also complain against individualistic constructions of
religion that they say have been confused with true Evangelicalism: “One error has been
to privatize faith, interpreting and applying it to the personal and spiritual realm only.
Such dualism falsely divorces the spiritual from the secular, and causes faith to lose its
integrity and become “privately engaging and publicly irrelevant,” and another form of
“hot tub spirituality” (15).
We can see the definitional boundaries that the Manifesto’s writers have chosen in
these “defining features” as they set themselves against official evangelical norms along
seven basic areas. It would appear from this that the hegemonic account of
evangelicalism emphasizes religious beliefs over religious feelings, commitments,
behaviors; right ideas over right actions; defined boundaries, institutional stability, and
eternal dicta over heterogeneity, diachronic change and context-dependent ways of being;
political and cultural identifications and viewpoints over religious identifications and
viewpoints (or directly articulates them); negatives over positives (exclusion over
inclusion, sin over righteousness, evil over good); anti-intellectualism and “tradition”
over intellectualism, critique, and openness to new knowledge and changing
understandings of religion; and individualism over community. Naturally, the
Manifesto’s writers would recommend a different emphasis in each case, though they do
not often engage in actual binary logics that would reduce the choice to one or the other.
But as descriptions, these statements resonate with the descriptions of Christians offered
by writing scholars, instructors, students, and public survey respondents; they also echo
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many of the publicized characteristics of official evangelicalism (presented at length in
chapter three). In other words, the Evangelical Manifesto accurately and continually cites
the hegemonic account of official evangelicalism in its attempt to authoritatively redefine the term along more flexible lines.
The same performative struggle for re-definition is evident in other sorts of
alternative evangelicalisms—many researchers have noted, for example, Jim Wallis’
efforts to establish and publicize a progressive evangelicalism through Sojourners. But
importantly, sometimes the alternative formations actually appear to be driven by
religious practitioner’s relationships with other identities and discourses. The Evangelical
and Ecumenical Women’s Caucus, to cite just one of these issue-specific alternative
alignments, hosts an extensive website and publishes Christian Feminism Today. The
EEWC-CFT is clear about its counter-cultural agenda and history:
. . . in 1974 the women’s caucus was one of six task forces or caucuses
formed by ESA [Evangelicals for Social Action] participants to study such
concerns as racism, sexism, peace, and simpler lifestyles. Thus our group
was born as the Evangelical Women’s Caucus (EWC). The EWC group
presented proposals to Evangelicals for Social Action on a variety of
topics including endorsement of the Equal Rights Amendment, support for
inclusive language in Bible translation and Christian publications,
affirmation of the ordination of women, and criticism of discriminatory
hiring policies in Christian institutions. (“About EEWC”)
While support of the ERA was clearly an intervention into the “secular” sphere, the last
three endorsements were in clear opposition to stances taken by the official evangelical
establishment I’ve described—in fact, they remain in opposition to stances still taken by
evangelical leaders and institutions like Albert Mohler and the Southern Baptist
Seminary, which houses the Council for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood. The
Council affirms the “equality” of men and women, but also affirms that God has
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established roles as part of the “created order”—citing the Bible, they call husbands to
“loving, humble headship” (not domination or passivity) and wives to “intelligent,
willing submission (but not usurpation or servility). The same paradigm of equal-butdistinct roles applies, they feel, to church settings where “some governing and teaching
roles . . . are restricted to men” (“Core Beliefs”).
In an attempt to combat this, the EEWC-CFT argues for an alternative—but
importantly still evangelical—approach to gender. On their website, the EEWC-CFT
indicates both explicitly (in name) and implicitly—through various ideological
affirmations—that it is an evangelical organization. It emphasizes its institutional
evangelical history and its advocacy of several of the ideological hallmarks of
evangelicalism discussed earlier (briefly: “conversionism, the belief that lives need to be
changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a particular regard for
the Bible; and crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross” [Eskridge,
“Defining the Term”]). So the EEWC-CFT affirms that sin separates people from God;
“that the gospel is good news for all people”; that “the Word of God, inspired by the Holy
Spirit, . . . is a central guide and authority for Christian faith and life”; and emphasizes
the simultaneous humanity and divinity of Jesus, along with the importance of his death
and resurrection. Having established these evangelical credentials, they then argue (in
direct contradiction to the Council) that their alternative stance on women’s equality
derives from their evangelical ideology, namely the Bible’s authority: “EEWC affirms
that the Bible supports the equality of the sexes”; “We proclaim God’s redemptive word
on mutuality and active discipleship.”
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Other alternative articulations have arisen to challenge evangelical institutions
from within on the question of sexuality—OneWheaton, for example, is a local
organization of Wheaton College alumni who came out to vocally support gay Christian
students in 2010. Illustrating again the importance of the media, the group released and
publicized its letters of support through a media campaign that included offering press
copy on their website and providing links to the articles in the New York Times, Houston
Chronicle, Newsweek, Christianity Today, and other major media outlets that reported on
their campaign. A central location in the evangelical institution actually contributes to
OneWheaton’s success, too; Wheaton’s evangelical reputation, discussed above,
contributes to the visibility of OneWheaton’s campaign, something like the way the
defection of high ranking Syrian officers is currently gaining more media attention than
the far more regular defection of its common soldiers.
Again, OneWheaton finds itself responding to official evangelicalism: forced to
frame its agenda, first and foremost, oppositionally; but again this proves not merely a
constraint, but in fact enables evangelicalism’s strategic redeployment. The first open
letter begins, “Dear Wheaton Students, The recent chapel message on Sexuality and
Wholeness and surrounding conversations may have left some of you feeling alienated,
ashamed, and afraid . . . as a group of LGBTQ Wheaton alumni and allies, we’ve seen the
devastating effects these words have had on ourselves and our loved ones” (“Dear
Wheaton Students”). Here OneWheaton frames its agenda in the context of the
devastating effects of official evangelicalism, represented here by Wheaton’s chapel
message. Going further, the writers assert their own evangelical credibility by referencing
their personal histories at Wheaton College. But they are leveraging, or redeploying, that
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credibility as they assert their simultaneous LGBTQ identities or at least their
commitment to supporting LGBTQ students. Citing their own negotiated position as an
example of its possibility for other students, they write, “In our post-Wheaton lives, we
have traversed the contradictions we once thought irreconcilable. Our sexuality has
become an integral part of our broader pursuit of justice, compassion and love.” From
this authoritative, negotiated position, OneWheaton affirms in part, “You are not tragic.
Your desire for companionship, intimacy and love is not shameful. It is to be affirmed
and celebrated just as you are to be affirmed and celebrated” (emphasis original).
Seen over and over again, such framing indicates the extent to which the
conservative evangelical account and the conservative evangelical institution are truly
hegemonic, but also the ways in which official evangelicalism is being redeployed by
those who want to transform religion. Official evangelicalism exerts normative pressure
on all Christians within its range, but clearly alternative accounts can exert counterpressures and work to lend legitimacy to individuals who wish to practice their
Christianity differently. Religious norms and accounts must be treated by writing scholars
not as given, but as sites of struggle and potential tools for transformational action within
the broader American religious community (and perhaps for those outside of it, who
nevertheless are defined in relation to its norms).

Emergent Evangelicalisms
In addition to alternative formations, which compete with the hegemonic official
evangelicalism for control over evangelical institutions and the evangelical public image
(the hegemonic account), we can identify emergent evangelical formations that do not
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necessarily display the coherence, articulacy, and organization of the Manifesto. These
emergent formations, Raymond Williams explains, tend to appear at the level of the
practical, and may or may not in the future rise to the level of alternative or official
formations (125-7). This seems to have been the level that writers were pointing at when
they wished to talk of religious students’ individual experience. But emergent formations,
even if they are not entirely articulable, are nevertheless social. Practical consciousness
must not be reduced to the individual, Williams writes: “It is this seizure that has
especially to be resisted. For there is always, though in varying degrees, practical
consciousness in specific relationships, specific skills, specific perceptions, that is
unquestionably social and that a specifically dominant social order neglects, excludes,
represses, or simply fails to recognize” (125). Not only are those practical relationships,
skills, and perceptions social, but as such they are likely shared. While practical
consciousness does refer to the ways that people’s individual relations to the official are
inflected by their lived realities and complex relations to multiple formations, looking at
emergent formations can help us highlight the shared components of that process.
Williams points to the arts as a means of highlighting such emergent formations. I focus
here on sociological studies describing an emergent evangelical formation, constituted in
part by generational discursive differences, that seems evident among those under 30
(and in our rhetoric and composition students, as indicated throughout Thomson’s study).
It is certainly lacking the cohesiveness of an alternative formation, but nevertheless
indicates a new source of growing practical resistance to the hegemonic account of
evangelicalism and to official evangelicalism. It is, definitionally, emergent.
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While their official affiliations are not all that different from older generations, by
almost all practical measures—belief, attitude, behavior—research finds that young
Americans are consistently different from (and usually more liberal than) their elders.
The Pew Forum’s U.S. Religious Landscape Survey finds, for example, that compared to
35% of people over 65, 63% of young Americans feel that “Homosexuality should be
accepted by society.” They also report that 55% of young Americans think “Evolution is
the best explanation for human life” compared to 48% of the rest of the population and
67% “prefer bigger government, more services” compared to 46% of the population at
large. On religious issues, 74% of young Americans believe there is “more than one true
way to interpret the teachings of my religion”—a number that fairly steadily decreases
across age groups, falling to 59% in those over 65.
Evangelicalism, despite all its ostensible conservatism, is no exception to these
trends, either. Again according to the Pew Forum, 64% of young evangelicals believe
there is “more than one true way to interpret the teachings of my own religion,”
compared to 51% of those over 30; 39% of young evangelicals feel “Homosexuality
should be accepted in society” compared to 24% of evangelicals over 30; and 65% of
young evangelicals “prefer bigger government, more services,” compared to 36% of
evangelicals over 30. Young Americans of all religious traditions are not only in conflict
with insider/outsider representations of religion, but most are also in conflict with
religion’s entrenched representatives and norms—represented here by elders who are
more likely than the young to be politically, socially, and theologically conservative, to
possess institutional authority, and to be construed as religious spokespersons. Together,
they suggest an emergent formation.
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In You Lost Me, Kinnaman describes this emergent formation by focusing on
those of Christian background. Kinnaman finds, as I noted earlier, that “more than four
out of five Americans under the age of eighteen will spend at least a part of their
childhood, tween, or teenage years attending a [Protestant or Catholic] Christian
congregation or parish” (22). But by the time that population is between 18-29, 59% will
have “dropped out of attending church, after going regularly” (23), for an average of
three years. Even if they do not leave religion for good, most young religious adherents
seem to find themselves at the edges of organized religion. A full 50% of all Americans
aged 18-29 with a Christian background agree that they have “been significantly
frustrated about [their] faith,” and 32% “went through a period when [they] felt like
rejecting [their] parents’ faith” (24). Kinnaman says that almost half of all young
Americans from a Christian background (again, four fifths of the total 18-29 population,
and a group not limited to evangelicals) exemplify at least some characteristics of what
he calls an “exilic posture” towards Christianity. Exiles “are skeptical of [Christian]
institutions but are not wholly disengaged from them” (77). They “want to participate in
ministry outside of conventional forms of Christian community” (78), and are “Rejecting
‘cultural Christianity’ to seek deeper faith in Christ” (83). Exiles feel “stuck between the
security of the Christian subculture and the realities of life in today’s society” (83). Exiles
are “Struggling to see how their faith connects to their calling or professional interests”
(83). They are “Seeing the best in culture and desiring to redeem and renew it—
sometimes experiencing the worst in the church” (83). Exiles feel “fellow Christians—
particularly older believers—frequently have a hard time relating to their choices and
concerns. . . . In fact, many times these young exiles end up staying under the radar, as
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both fellow Christians and nonbelievers often misunderstand their faith and their calling”
(78). Exiles “feel tremendous tension between their work, usually in mainstream arenas
of society (the arts, media, science, fashion, law, and so on), and their faith” (80). Given
all of this, it is unsurprising Kinnaman finds 33% of young Christians agree that “God is
more at work outside the church than inside, and I want to be a part of that” (79), and
29% agree that “I want to help the church change its priorities to be what Jesus intended
it to be.” (79). The exilic subject position, at least as Kinnaman discursively constructs it,
offers evidence of incredible tensions between: young religious practitioners experience
significant conflict between various aspects of their lives and official manifestations of
Christianity. This between-ness, really this performativity, marks both an “individual”
subject position and a shared emergent formation that stands in a liminal relation to
official evangelicalism. It is oppositional but participatory, simultaneously engaged and
disengaged.
We can see some references to Christian ideology in Kinnaman’s phrasing—some
“doubt God,” some feel tension between their work and their “faith”—but seemingly
more references to Christian culture—the church’s priorities, the Christian subculture,
cultural Christianity—and to institutional Christianity—distinctions between inside and
outside the church, difficulties with older church members, and references to institutional
Christianity. Kinnaman explains that exilic Christians are, in fact, more concerned with
the latter two: they are “deeply at odds with expressions of modern-day Christianity,
which many would categorize as distortions or abuses of Christ’s teachings. In other
words, some young adults doubt God—but for others, ‘doubt’ might best be described as
a deep, visceral sense that the church today is not what it could or ought to be” (190).
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As a result of these tensions, these exiles from church “feel isolated and alienated from
the Christian community—caught between the church as it is and what they believe it is
called to be” (77). Such constructions of “church” make room for exceptions—even the
most disaffected young Americans tend to cite a different Christianity evidenced by
someone like their parents. But the negative behaviors, experiences, and representations
can be gathered discursively and organized as expressions of that nebulous Christianity
(official evangelicalism) that cannot be said to exist coherently, but nevertheless must be
acknowledged to fluidly and authoritatively exist in the imaginations and experiences of
Americans in the form of Christian institutions and culture.
This struggle to articulate a position against official evangelicalism, which we
also saw in Thomson’s informants in the first chapter, seems to be echoed in part by
James Bielo’s ethnographic work on the Emergent evangelical movement. Official
evangelicalism operates as a forceful presence in Emergent evangelicalism in several
forms. First, Bielo notes the Emergent movement explicitly rejects institutionalization:
“there is no interest in establishing a denominational heritage, or extinguishing all ties to
existing denominational structures. There is an active resistance to official statements of
faith. There is an explicit resistance to viewing Emerging as a ‘movement’” (“The
Emerging Church” 220). Second, Emergent evangelicals actually tend to construct their
religious identities negatively: whereas conservative evangelicals are often characterized
as purveyors of conversion narratives,12 Emergent evangelicals characteristically offer
“deconversion” narratives, according to Bielo. As Bielo explains,
Emerging Christians have an abiding dissatisfaction with how Christianity
is imagined, lived, and discussed in 21st-century America. The result is an
12

As simultaneously described and enacted by Rand (354-6).
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abundance of talk about what and who they are turning away from, what
forms of thought and practice they reject, and what they would just as
soon see disappear from American Christian culture. The what and who of
this deconversionist bent is primarily the conservative Evangelical
establishment. Emerging Christians seem intent on not being mistaken as
the latest incarnation of Bill Hybels or Rick Warren, not to mention more
militant figures like Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, or James Dobson. (227)
As I have been arguing, Bielo points out these deconversion narratives indicate that even
this most powerful form of Emergent evangelicalism “relies heavily on the existing
discourses of Evangelicalism” for its self-definition (228).
Even beyond the Emergent church’s internal reliance on hegemonic discourse for
self-definition, outside pressures on Emergents to conform to official evangelicalism are
everywhere. This pressure becomes visible at several points. Some ideologically and
culturally conservative evangelical churches take on the outward forms of the emergent
church while retaining their conservative evangelicalisms; other evangelical churches and
leaders have excluded the emergent church by questioning the Christian bona fides of its
leaders and their doctrines (229-30). And of course, the official evangelical dispositions,
ideologies, and social networks inculcated from childhood incline even those within
alternative and emergent evangelicalisms back towards the hegemonic formation. These
hegemonic pressures might partially account for the liminality and inarticulacy of the
emergent formation I described above, and even for their fear of taking on a truly
institutional character—they don’t trust themselves to institutionalize without losing the
exilic posture to official evangelicalism that drives them. This suggests that it is perhaps
too difficult for Emergents to disentangle “church” and “religion” from official
evangelicalism. But Bielo also rightly notes that official evangelicalism’s antagonistic
response indicates a destabilizing power structure: the dialogue surrounding it “indexes
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the fact that Evangelical and Christian identity, and the terms that religious dialogue
function on, are up for grabs in America and any analysis must grapple with this” (230).
Most young Americans are not associated with this Emergent movement. But the
Emergent church Bielo describes nevertheless seems to resonate with the swelling exilic
formation described by Kinnaman and other researchers, and suggested at times by
Thomson’s student informants. We certainly must not assume that religious students
align perfectly with official evangelicalism or any other authorized position (including
the Emergent church) with which they might be identified. But we should assume that
religious students, like the writers of the Manifesto and Bielo’s Emergent Christians, are
always acting in practical relation with the official evangelicalism disseminated by the
popular media, other religious adherents, and academics. Official evangelicalism infuses
their lives and their religious practice, even if only negatively. We would do well to
remember how Thomson’s evangelical informants shape their behavior towards it and
against it, they anticipate interactions on its basis, they feel fear and shame because of it.
We must anticipate that their practices will never perfectly align with the official any
more than anyone else’s will, and that in fact alternative and emergent formations will
continue to constantly arise to resist the official institutions and the hegemonic account of
any religion. Between these students’ lived experience of religion—beliefs, sensibilities,
assumptions, behaviors—and popular representations of those forms of religion, there is a
crucial and variable gap, a felt tension. This is the representational gap in which
instructors must begin to work with their religious students—not only with Christians,
but with all religious students who may feel unrepresented by the representations and
representatives of religion generally available to them.
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Conclusion
The above should demonstrate that, contrary to our representational tendencies,
religious formations like evangelicalism are heterogeneous and instable; continually beset
by power struggles. Evangelicalism is not monolithic, but consists of numerous
dominant, alternative, and emergent formations that fracture it into various partial
evangelicalisms. As Bielo writes, even the privileged discourses and identities of
“Evangelicalism” and “Christianity” are “up for grabs” (230), and we and students
participate in the various ongoing power grabs, even if we don’t always recognize that or
know how to articulate our positions. There are several factors confounding our ability to
see this fluidity and these power struggles (and so, confounding our ability to develop the
truly politically transformative pedagogies for which Stenberg has called). First, the
groups—dominant or otherwise—that successfully articulate their positions tend to do so
by positing homogeneous, stable, and essential accounts of Christianity or evangelicalism
that of necessity attempt to elide the contingency and situatedness of their accounts.
Second, the sedimentation of official evangelicalism within secular and religious
ideological apparatuses, and within the bodies of religious insiders and outsiders, causes
the powerful accounts to seem natural and given. Third, alternative and emergent
evangelicals perpetuate the authority of homogenizing and stable official accounts by
citing them to articulate their own positions—in a sense, the success of alternative
articulations ironically depends on the continued stability, recognizability, and
“citability” of that which they oppose. In sum, official evangelicalism successfully
operates within a number of unstable ideological apparatuses to sediment a “stable”
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position for itself in American society. But none of that makes it immune to change—in
fact, hegemony’s dependence upon continued social participation makes religious
formations like evangelicalism wildly susceptible to change.
Given the critical role of power relations and material conditions in constituting
evangelicalism and other religions, anthropologists studying religion in recent years have
worked to develop theoretical frameworks that can highlight the actual mechanisms of
transmission and transformation at work in ideological apparatuses. So in chapter five, I
forward several terms offered by anthropologists who study religion. Each describes a
particular structuring force that simultaneously maintains and disrupts the hegemony of
official religions, thus helping to produce the alternative and emergent religious
formations I’ve described. The terms I’ve selected are definition, mediation, and
sensation. These frames promise not only to be academically, but also politically useful:
if we can identify the contingent processes by which religions are continually formed and
transformed, then we can also see how such normative pressures and hegemonic accounts
might be de-stabilized, and how actions might be taken to deliberately challenge both the
account and those relations. I will discuss how students and instructors can effectively
activate these terms to create new autoethnographic accounts that do just that.
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CHAPTER V
MATERIAL TERMS FOR WRITING ON RELIGION

I established in chapters three and four that the vast majority of American
religious students experience—and recognize—significant dissonance between their lived
religious practices and the hegemonic account of religion that is connected with
evangelicalism. That hegemonic account constructs religious practitioners as religious
reactionaries and contemporary foundationalists. In contrast, studies suggest that in terms
of belief, attitude, and behavior, religious practitioners are vastly more tolerant and more
moderate—socially, religiously, and politically—than official evangelicalism and the
hegemonic account would suggest. These pervasive disaffections and struggles over
representation offer writing instructors our major opportunity for political intervention in
today’s religious climate. They indicate that many Christians are motivated to practice
and represent Christianity differently—in fact, to practice Christianity in myriad ways
that often partially align with our critical ideals—and are struggling to find ways to do so.
If we desire to efficiently promote and practice tolerance among religious adherents, we
must focus on helping this massive population that is struggling for the same goals (in
addition to challenging the thirteen percent of our students who probably are fully
opposed to them). A few things have held us back from accomplishing this.
One obstacle holding us back has been the issue of respect—I discuss in chapter
two how writing scholars have often worried about balancing change with respect
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through our pedagogies for religious students (Carter; Perkins; DePalma; Vander Lei;
Downs). But Soliday has rightly argued that we presume too much by assuming
responsibility for students’ decisions over “hybridizing and assimilating” (518). An
instructor’s responsibility is not to decide how students should relate to any of the
dominant discourses in their lives—it is to give students the opportunity to examine these
choices for themselves. Soliday recommends an approach that allows “those ‘others’ of
the academic landscape hitherto largely represented by teachers speaking on their
behalf—themselves to enter into and influence the contemporary debates surrounding
multicultural education” (513). Students have a right to offer an account of, belong to,
become transformed by, and in turn transform those other discourses to which they are
engaged in conflicted and committed relations (522). So rather than making decisions for
students, writing classes should help students “wrestle with the kind of relationship to
dominant discourses a writer wants to imagine for herself” (520) as they themselves
“[contend] with complicated affective and social issues of translation” (519). To my
mind, finding ways of reading and responding to students’ acts of religious discourse that
will help them to do this sort of wrestling offers one compelling answer to Howard
Tinberg’s questions in the 2013 CCCC Call for Program Proposals: “In what sense is
writing public work?” and “How might our research be put to public use?”
Our tendency to treat religious and academic discourses “as discrete, stable,
internally uniform and linked indelibly to what is held to be each writer’s likewise stable
and uniform location and social identity” (Lu and Horner, “Translingual Literacy”
forthcoming) has proven a second obstacle to effective pedagogy. We must better
acknowledge that no one discourse holds monolithic sway over public spaces like the
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writing classroom—or the church sanctuary. As Soliday explains, speaking of the
classroom, “outsider” discourses always push back against “insider” academic ones.
“[T]he outsider’s own language overlaps, conflicts with, shapes, and is shaped by
insider’s language; movements between worlds take on a liminal rather than dichotomous
character . . . students and teachers begin to see their languages as mutually shaping”
(522). Recognizing these intersections between students and discourses in the classroom
space, Soliday hopes students come to see themselves as “rooted in other cultures yet also
belonging to, becoming transformed by, and in turn transforming school cultures” (522).
Religious discourse is already in the classroom and shaping academic discourse—we
don’t have to bring them together, and we can’t keep them separate.
Correspondingly, no one discourse can be assumed to hold monolithic sway over
students; Soliday points out that students are “writers with multiple and sometimes
conflicting commitments, aspirations, and choices” (522). Allowing students to contend
and wrestle for themselves with their relationships to dominant discourses becomes not
only desirable, but necessary, when we acknowledge this complexity of relations between
and within students, religious discourses, and academic discourses; it becomes even more
necessary when we acknowledge the complexity introduced into the classroom space by
the “outside” formations we, our students, and our texts carry into the classroom. We are
always operating within the mutually interfering webs of Asad’s “complex space”
(Formations 178-79). So a third obstacle, as I suggest throughout the dissertation, has
been our failure to fully attend to the potential internal conflicts between students and
religious discourses—many of which are created by student’s conflicted and multiple
discursive identities.
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Most Americans, I argue in the above chapters, today must operate in relation to
official evangelicalism and its norms, lending it credence and perpetuating its authority
by re-activating it in their perceptions, their conversations, and even in their own
alternative or excluded social, political or ir/religious practices. Because of this
hegemonic situation, even the majority of students and instructors who do or would
practice religion differently tend to share many of the same negative conceptions and
experiences of American religion described by those who do not practice religion. They
are always, if not self-consciously, responding to their sense of the positions of the
authoritative spokespersons as those positions have been circulated through mass media
and other ideological institutions such as family, the local church, college classrooms,
and the entertainment industry. Such representational difficulties are only compounded
for students by our blindness to the pressures our own academic discourses bring to bear.
If we are going to encourage students to bring their religiously inflected
perspectives and experiences into the classroom, we need to recognize these constraints
on students’ abilities to write about them. Neither preservationist nor assimilative logics
of inclusion can fully address the complexities of actual relations within and between
students, religious discourses, and academic discourses. A key challenge for instructors,
as I see it, is locating new ways of reading and responding to acts of religious discourse,
particularly ways of reading and responding that are neither 1) immediately and
necessarily counter to students’ current positions nor 2) caught up in the hegemonic
accounts and logics of religion forwarded by official evangelicalism (and at times by our
own scholarship). I cite Soliday throughout the dissertation because in her discussions of
autoethnography and translation, she seems to be forwarding a critical strategy for
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accomplishing the approach for which I’m looking: creating strangeness. By reading and
responding to even the most seemingly conventional religious discourses in the relatively
strange or estranging terms I will suggest below, both students and instructors may have
the opportunity to move into new and potentially transformative relations with religion,
and to deliberate on how they want to proceed with these new possibilities. Rather than
re-entering familiar scenes from familiar angles where the battle lines are already drawn,
this gives students and instructors the opportunity to approach sites of religious and
academic conflict, and religious texts and discourses more generally, from new
productive angles. This strategy for working with religious students is not new: it has
already been forwarded, to some degree, by Perkins, Carter, and Stenberg. But I see two
ways in which my project differs from earlier attempts.
First, I understand this chapter as an extension of their work that more fully
addresses official evangelicalism’s hegemonic force in structuring students’ and
instructors’ relations to religion. So I draw on contemporary scholarship in anthropology
and sociology to offer several new strange terms—definition, mediation, and sensation—
that can help us read and respond to students’ religious discourse in ways that address,
deflect, and transform official evangelicalism’s force. I take significant time throughout
the chapter to demonstrate how this might work: after introducing each term, I outline the
official evangelical ideological account of each term, discussing the misreadings these
official accounts encourage and the power relations such misreadings maintain. I then
spend the bulk of each section re-reading previously published texts from religious
students in our composition classrooms to demonstrate how reading and responding to
students’ texts with these new religious terms might open up spaces for deliberation and

170

transformation in those students’ texts and in their relations to official evangelicalism
(whatever those relations might be).
The second difference I see between my transformational approach and those
forwarded by previous scholars is my application of translingualism to the topic.
Translingual scholars pay close attention to the negotiations that occur between various
competing and conflicting discourses and languages—what I would describe as transformational events—and call student and instructor attention to both the risks and
affordances of such transformational action—many of which inform my critique of
extant disciplinary approaches to religion in chapter two. As Horner and Lu explain in
“Translingual Literacy,” translingual approaches aim to use writing to not only respect
and include students’ multiple personal discursive resources traditionally undervalued in
the classroom, but to develop students’ capacities for actively shaping and reshaping the
very languages, identities, and social relations playing a key role in their writing and
learning. So instead of merely asking students to bring religiously-inflected resources into
the writing classroom, translingual approaches to religion will challenge students to
explore how and why they are interested in employing such resources, and to consider
how they might best go about re-creating and transforming their religious experiences,
identities, and communities in the process of writing about them. By bringing
anthropological lenses together with translingual lenses as a way to re-examine our
students’ texts and propose transformational strategies for responding to their acts of
religious discourse, I hope to demonstrate how we might respond in ways that can prove
truly “politically transformative” for our students.
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One pragmatic note should be offered about these strategies and how I imagine
their actual employment in the classroom. Without ever explicitly asking students to
write a significant essay on religion, over the past decade I have received numerous
essays from students that nevertheless either referenced religious discourse or offered a
full-blown account of a particular religion. I have been explicitly witnessed to by students
analyzing sources of major transformation in their lives; I have received traditional
“argumentative” essays challenging and supporting abortion, birth control, and even
homosexuality (just homosexuality, not gay marriage) largely on the basis of religious
evidence; I have received research essays attempting to make a case for atheism or
counter Islamophobia; and as mentioned in chapters one and two, I have received an
autoethnographic piece exploring the role of religion in the lives of African-American
women, while another recounted a student’s personal experience of religious violence in
Pakistan.
My working assumption, then, is that while my strategies could be useful to those
who wish to design a religiously-themed course or assignment sequence—I provide a
number of texts and substantive themes that could facilitate those projects—a greater
number of instructors are likely to come across religious discourse in irregular and
unpredictable ways, for which they are less likely to be prepared. Those instructors who
encounter religion in their classroom unexpectedly need a variety of strategies for reading
and responding to religious students and texts, and my discussions below are largely
geared towards such situations. The previous two chapters should illustrate how and why
many of our conventional ways of reading and responding to religion (described in
chapter two) are actually disciplined by official evangelicalism, as are many of our
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students’ conventional ways of representing religion. We need new ways of reading and
responding because otherwise such encounters with religious discourse will draw out our
habitual responses and habitual readings, reinforcing the polarizing situation described in
my first chapter. So in each section of this chapter I present a new way of reading and
responding to students’ acts of religious discourse, hoping such re-readings might in turn
help students discover new ways of representing and enacting religious discourse.

I. Translingualism and Transformationalism
Translingualism, as it has been recently defined in writing scholarship, represents
a re-conceptualization of language similar to Asad’s formational re-conceptualization of
religion. Asad points out that recognizing religion’s inessentiality causes us to ask how
historical conditions make religion, thus exposing the power relations structuring religion
that would otherwise remain hidden beneath a veneer of a-historical permanence. The
same principle is at work in translingualism: languages are viewed as “always emergent,
in process (a state of becoming), and their relations as mutually constitutive” (Lu and
Horner, “Translingual”). This recognition of the inherent instability of social things like
languages or cultures depends, as we’ve already seen in the cases of religion and gender,
upon performative definitions of those things.13 As Lu and Horner explain, a

13

This correspondence between Asad’s treatment of religion and translingualism is not
merely analogous: in fact, discursive differences such as those between academic and
religious discourses can represent the sorts of differences within a “single language” that
Pennycook and other proponents of translingualism have marked for attention under the
term “semiodiversity” (as opposed to “glossodiversity,” which refers to differences
between languages) (Pennycook 97). Thus, we might imagine that the principles of
translingual writing pedagogy are not only relevant, but in fact directly applicable, to
issues of religious difference (although that is not to say that they won’t require some
degree of translation).
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“translingual approach shifts attention to matters of agency—the ways in which
individual language users fashion and re-fashion standardized conventions, subjectivity,
the world, and their relations to others and the world” (“Translingual”).
Pennycook explains these central aspects of translingualism cogently in Language
as Local Practice, drawing a parallel between Butler’s notion of performative identity
and gender and his own conception of language (46-8). Butler articulates this
performative logic, also discussed in chapters one and four, most clearly in the following
quotation.
Because there is neither an “essence” that gender expresses or externalizes
nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a
fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those
acts, there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that
regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform,
produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions is
obscured by the credibility of those productions—and the punishments
that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the construction that
“compels” our belief in its necessity and naturalness. (Gender Trouble
140)
Like Butler’s conception of gender and Asad’s conception of religion, translingualism
sees languages and discourses as only existing through their repeated performance—that
is, they depend upon new iterations, or uses, for their continuing existence. Language is
practiced and social: performed over and over and passed from individual to individual
in a process of “sedimentation” (Gender Trouble 163). From this perspective, to briefly
rehearse an argument I’ve already made, ideal and stable constructions of a language or
discourse—“English,” “evangelicalism”—paradoxically depend upon human action for
their stability. This is the active, social process Pennycook calls “practice” by which
actions become habituated, repeated in a variety of settings by a variety of users, and can
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come to be both recognized (and therefore socially valuable) but also misrecognized as
natural, stable, essential (46-8).
On this view of language, there is no ideal or essential core—the real English—
existing somewhere, but only ever a set of practical realizations that “real-ize” English.
Pennycook argues that even more progressive notions of overlapping languages or
changing languages, by maintaining somewhere the concept of discrete languages,
participate in hegemonic logics by falsely positing cores and peripheries as well as norms
and variations that do not in fact exist (49-50, 132; see also Lu and Horner,
“Translingual”). Languages themselves must be understood as linguistic constructs
dependent upon their own repetition for credibility and authority. That words have fixed
meanings is a naturalizing perception produced by the constant connection of a word with
a meaning; that languages have discrete boundaries is a naturalizing perception produced
by ATMs that offer discrete language choices and academic courses of work in
“Mandarin” and “Spanish.”
Attempts to remedy this through ever-greater specificity, like isolating Standard
Edited American English or Engrish, will not find a fixed or homogeneous language there
either, because these varieties are not any more stable than their broader counterparts.
More accurately, researchers may find a fixed language variety, but only because they
themselves have produced it in their research by highlighting the partial homogeneities
and partial fixities that they found. Thus, there are not “languages,” which would suggest
a count-noun and thus a countable, finite set of individual languages—instead, there is
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only “language,” something more like “water”, which is not a count-noun,14 or better we
could say there is only “languaging,” the act of using language that is constitutive of the
language process and its sedimentation. There are always and only the ways that people
practice language—writing it down, exchanging it vocally, thinking with it. This renders
language entirely dependent upon users for its continued stability and thus subject to
change through errors, copies, break-downs, alienation, lying, fiction, invention for new
purposes, etc.
Such performative conceptions of language assign users two forms of agency.
First, there is a practical, if not conscious, agency in that language users here are active
agents who create, change, and perpetuate the languages they use with every use. This is
best expressed in the concept of iteration—the perpetual rupturing of language
introduced by its repeated performance over time in an always-new context. Every
performance of language (across space and time) necessarily introduces its forms into a
new set of relations: perhaps into conflicting discourses which use that language form
differently; into alternative “genres” which may authorize, revise, or reject a particular
use; into social categories involving race, gender, class, or even religion where its
meaning may become split or diffuse for different users; into new activities where it may
take on an entirely new relevance or use. Even if I say the same words to the same
interlocutor in the same location twice, still, time has introduced change—neither I, nor
my interlocutor, nor our location, is exactly the same (not to mention that the previous
iteration, remembered, will also impact the words’ meanings in subsequent iterations).
All of these mean that the everyday practice of language inherently re-contextualizes and
14

That analogy could be taken further, but doing so brings added and unnecessary
complications.
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transforms language as new meanings and uses accrete and old meanings and uses
change or drop out, quite outside of any specific intention to create such change.
Languages change, in other words, because they are practical and always in process—
lived out within the flow of everyday practices that are never ideal. As Pennycook notes
and Lu and Horner re-iterate, one cannot step into the same river twice, and you can’t say
the same thing twice (50; “Translingual”). Within such flows of time and space,
constancy and stability are impossible.
Second, performative representations of discourse raise the possibility that
language users can strategically participate in changing their languages. This possibility
that individuals could want to change the discourse arises through the conflicts and
instabilities described above—from the differences between discourses, the dissonance
created by our multiple commitments and multiply-constituted identities, the differences
between lived experiences using a discourse and the official norms of a discourse
endorsed by those in power, between experiences, between experiences and desires,
desires and discourses. Such conflicts present the impetus for language’s negotiation and
re-negotiation in each interaction, and language’s dependence on practice makes those renegotiations possible. We can see this chain of logic in “Language Difference in Writing:
Toward a Translingual Approach” where Horner, Lu, Royster and Trimbur write,
learning language is necessarily continuous precisely because language is
subject to variation and change. Further, we recognize that language
learners are also language users and creators. Thus, mastery must be
redefined to include the ability of users to revise the language that they
must also continuously be learning—to work with and on, not just within,
what seems its conventions and confines. (307)
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Representing social entities as unstable because dependent upon practice for existence,
then, doubly makes room for agency and change in our understanding of language.15
But this recognition of change and agency does not negate the operations of
power detailed at length in chapters three and four: while instability is central to
translingual approaches because it enables a re-conceptualization of possibilities for
agency, power still flows through this practical sedimentation process, constraining those
possibilities. First, this occurs through the situated repetitions by which some forms and
uses come to be repeated, valued, and normalized. Norms and conventions are
continually and actively produced, disseminated, and reproduced by those who act in
relation to that language or discourse, whether from the inside or outside. The privileged
forms and practices move through the ideological apparatuses I describe in chapter
three—through popular media, education, and politics, but also through quotidian social
relations in ways that transform individuals into agents of the hegemonic (regardless of
intention).16
And again, there’s the probability of misrecognition: as the ubiquity of those
particular practices increases, their specific historical and authoritative roots come to be
obscured by generalized practice and the new rationales assigned to them by those who
take up the practice. I illustrate in chapter three that this misrecognition is often effected
through hegemonic accounts that explicitly naturalize, homogenize, and idealize certain
15

The same is true when a practical account of religion or culture is used, as we learned
through Sherif’s account at the beginning of chapter four. The Muslim women Sherif
studies creatively respond to economic- and class-related pressures by re-negotiating
gender roles—even finding ways to do so within the bounds of their religious
formation—and thus work with, on, and within the confines and conventions of their
specific context to achieve their desires.
16
Sometimes, even as individuals or communities explicitly look to work against the
hegemonic.
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privileged practices—this is how Pennycook views the notion of “languages,” as I
explain above. Together, hegemonic practices and accounts lead to misrecognizing a
temporary social structure as permanent and transcendent—and thus slow down actual
change. So translingual pedagogies attempt to recognize again what the hegemonic
account covers up—the heterogeneity, conflict, and change necessitated by practical
processes of cultural reproduction; those processes of reproduction; and the accounts that
naturalize those processes.

Translingual Strategies
To be clear, the translingual approach to writing not only looks to acknowledge
linguistic instability, but also focuses on making political use of that instability. For
translingual scholars, “the ideal user of English is . . . attentive to the capacities, rights
and necessity of change in all living things: people, their life, society, culture, the world,
and the language itself” (Lu and Horner, “Resisting” 151). But the ideal user is not only
attentive to instability, but active in creating and using it: the ideal translingual writer will
“map and order, remap and reorder conditions and relations surrounding their practices,
as they address the potential discrepancies between the official and practical” (Lu and
Horner, “Translingual”). We can see two examples of this de-stabilizing approach in
familiar critical works from outside of translingualism.
Raymond Williams speaks of de-stabilizing “tradition,” which he calls “the most
evident expression of the dominant and hegemonic pressures and limits” (115). To
Williams, tradition is always “selective tradition: an intentionally selective version of a
shaping past and a pre-shaped present, which is then powerfully operative in the process
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of social and cultural definition and identification” (115). Getting a particular form of
language, gender construction, or religious tradition passed off as the “ideal,” or “’the
tradition’, ‘the significant past’” is one of hegemony’s “decisive processes,” Williams
says, by which a contemporary order gains “historical and cultural ratification” (115-16).
So Williams suggests historical research on alternative traditions—“the recovery of
discarded areas, or the redress of selective and reductive interpretations” (116). This
strategy will come up again below.
Butler, alternatively, suggests tactically subversive performance and the strategic
highlighting of such de-stabilizing performances:
The abiding gendered self will then be shown to be structured by repeated
acts that seek to approximate the ideal of a substantial ground of identity,
but which, in their occasional discontinuity, reveal the temporal and
contingent groundlessness of this “ground.” The possibilities of gender
transformation are to be found precisely in the arbitrary relation between
such acts, in the possibility of a failure to repeat, a de-formity, or a parodic
repetition that exposes the phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a
politically tenuous construction. (Gender Trouble 164)
In both cases the key to effecting strategic change is believed to lie in de-stabilizing and
de-naturalizing official representations of social givens that must be shown to be
“historical, variable, and negotiable” (Horner, Lu, Royster, and Trimbur 311).
As I note above, to accomplish this destabilization in matters of language
difference translingual scholars like Lu and Horner suggest helping students learn to map
existing conditions, recognize their practical instability, and take advantage of the
instability to re-order those conditions—often by focusing on processes of translation.
For instance, as I explain in chapter two, when students are asked to translate from one
language or discourse into another, they are confronted with the opacity of words and the
constraints of any one discourse’s representation of “reality” and “experience.” As
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students translate, they are forced to select new words from among a set of partially
adequate choices, leaving some meanings and subtle nuances out of the new translation
while drawing in new ones. Further, these translations are made in the context of the
unequal power relations between discourses that are particular to that setting: these
selections are made because someone has asked for the translation; because some
privilege or reward or punishment will be attached to its performance or failure; because
peers will respond (or are expected to respond) in particular ways to certain discourses,
languages, or experiences. And while a pragmatist or accommodationist approach might
emphasize the utility and benefits of producing the finished translation, a truly
translingual approach will ask students to contemplate the remainders, we might say—the
losses, inefficiencies, and injustices also produced by the process. Ideally, by focusing
student attention on the process and its by-products (and not only the document that
results) students see how each of these discourses or languages bring limitations and new
meaning potentials not available in the other, but also how power works through such
processes. They will see, we might say, the tensions between the official account of
academic writing as a clear, rational, beneficial, and appropriate choice; and the practical,
lived realities of academic writing as a forced, contradictory, obscuring behavior.
In “The Place of World Englishes in Composition,” Canagarajah describes a
second sort of translingual strategy, code-meshing, in which students work to incorporate
multiple languages into a single document rather than “translating” one into another
(598). As I see it, the value here lies in the way students negotiate that incorporation with
readers who also must bring some labor to the negotiation (609-10). The way such
incorporations are invested in relations of power, and the responsibilities of readers and
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writers in such negotiations, becomes apparent when writers and readers discuss whether
or not a foreign word must be defined for readers, for instance. Ideally, at least,
responsibility for the labor and success of a translinguistic encounter lies with all the
participants—not just the “foreigner.” Students should be asked to deliberate upon the
process itself, to discuss its challenges and interrogate (that is, map and re-map) their own
socially-specific assumptions about etiquettes, or responsibilities, or what makes a
linguistic transaction successful, for instance. If this happens, then asking students to
perform “translingually” in these ways helps them to not only see, but also to enter into
negotiating, the work and power of language use.
A third type of translation returns us to autoethnographic pedagogies, discussed in
chapter one. These strategically incorporate (translate) personal experience into academic
conversations in order to challenge hegemonic accounts and discourses. Throughout
“Translating Self and Difference,” Soliday argues that writing on experience can help
students act within their lived conditions by highlighting, deliberating on, and intervening
in the contingent and culturally-situated forces that shape those experiences. Similarly,
Lu and Horner set two goals for classroom uses of students’ experience in “The
Problematic of Experience”: first, “to make productive use of, rather than dismiss, the
challenges students’ lived experience poses for the teachers’ discursive understanding of
that experience” but also “to involve the student as well as the teacher in politicizing the
students’ experience” (267). We use experience autoethnographically, in other words, for
the dual purposes of identifying and transforming hegemonic accounts of discourses, and
for identifying and transforming our lived relations to those discourses. This sort of use
of personal experience extends beyond the constructing or expressing of the self to
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participate in cultural definition and cultural representation through the de-naturalization
of experiences and in turn cultural forces.
This, of course, requires reading and writing strategies for de-naturalizing
(making strange) experience. That is, for locating the contingent and culturally specific
aspects of experiences. Soliday explains what this achieves: “By foregrounding their
acquisition and use of language as a strange and not natural process, authors of literacy
narratives have the opportunity to explore the profound cultural force language exerts in
their everyday lives” (511). She uses, for example, a story of an Irish man’s violent
acquisition of literacy to point out how “his story achieves maximum tellability in
rendering strange one of the most seemingly mundane events of our lives” (514). This
happens, first, when “like an ethnographer, the narrator assumes that something as
seemingly natural as learning to write in school is not a neutral event but is itself a
meaningful social drama” (514). Another means of doing so Soliday suggests is through
shifts in time: “If writers construct their interpretation of past events from the vantage
point of a particular present, then the life story becomes a dialogical account of one’s
experience rather than a chronological report of verifiable events” (514). Soliday explains
that deliberation on the discursive shaping of experience is another key to this
politicization of experience: “successful narrators acknowledge that their life stories can
be composed or deliberately constructed renderings of experience” (514)—in other
words, the choices involved in telling about experience create the meaning and offer
opportunities for experience to be politicized in the telling (514)—to reinterpret
ostensibly neutral experience “from the vantage point of a critical present” (515). The
introduction of these deliberations on experience can lead to the de-naturalization of
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supposed cultural givens like experience’s expressive relation to representation and
autonomous relation to culture.
Summarizing the principles of the translingual approach enacted in all of these
particular strategies, Lu and Horner offer three generalizable pedagogical tacks for
accomplishing translingual work:
1) foregrounding the sedimented nature of social and discursive practices;
2) examining the processes of recontextualization involved in iterations of
conventional ways of doing language; 3) considering the possible short
and long term consequences, often unintended and not always
immediately observable, that individual instances of recontextualization
might bring to conventions iterated, the contexts of iteration, and the
subjectivity and the life of the person using them. (“Translingual”)
While I don’t articulate a comprehensive pedagogy below, the reading strategies I
forward attempt to follow these basic principles of translingual pedagogy. I begin from
the acknowledgement that all student uses of religiously inflected values, experiences,
commitments, texts, or genres in the classroom are trans-formational acts whereby
multiple formations and power relations collide, and change and creativity result. I also
assume it is our responsibility to help students deliberate on the forces, processes, and
consequences of those acts of transformation in which we ask them to engage. Put into
the transformational terms of this dissertation, those reading strategies might be rendered
in this way:
1. Map: Ask students to locate and deliberate on cultural forces that shape their
religious experience, and to map out how they participate in those;
2. De-stabilize: Challenge students to locate the conflict, change, and heterogeneity
within religion and religious experience by drawing students’ practical experience
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of enacting their religion into comparison with official accounts of that religion
for the purposes of interrogating both;
3. Re-map: Emphasize sites for student choice, intervention, and creativity in their
religious and academic contexts (specifically, through acts of representation), and
encourage deliberation on the process and consequences of those choices.

Transformational Strategies for Reading and Responding to Religious Discourse
In the rest of this chapter, I propose three new terms instructors can employ in
reading and responding to acts of religious discourse. I believe each term—whether
brought to bear individually or in concert—offers instructors and students alternative
means of mapping, destabilizing, and re-mapping religious formations through writing
and reading. Drawn and conceptualized largely in terms of anthropological and
sociological research, my terms are purposely chosen for their ability to counter specific
aspects of our hegemonic accounts of religion—largely connected to official
evangelicalism—that make religion’s practical instability difficult for scholars,
instructors, and students to see. For example, official evangelicalism and its account of
religion often focus attention on consciousness: beliefs, language, and the behaviors that
properly express these beliefs. So my terms are intended to help students and instructors
attend to how religious discourses work to shape and adhere to individuals on other
levels: informing not just conscious belief but also sensibilities, attitudes, assumptions,
and behaviors. And because official evangelicalism centers its attention on the Bible as
God’s word, the terms I’ve selected help students and instructors identify how religious
formations depend on material forms other than language—including bodies and
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objects—to produce, maintain, and transmit religious practice over time. This avoids a
direct confrontation over a valued belief while shifting attention to aspects of religious
practice that are immanent and more obviously subject to constant change. By focusing
on “inessential” religious practices rather than “essential” ideas, students and instructors
may be able to more comfortably identify and analyze variations and changes in religious
formations—how individuals change, how discourses change—thus countering reifying
tendencies towards static, unchanging depictions.
These potential shifts in instructors’ readings and students’ representations of
religion, however, are not important simply because they might de-stabilize received
Western notions of religion by talking about bodies, objects, and processes. They are
important because they can help instructors highlight specific avenues of student action
and creativity. The responses I imagine here encourage students to create representations
of religious discourses as entirely dependent upon ongoing relationships between
individuals, things, and language that will perpetuate, challenge, conform to, reappropriate, and ultimately alter the religious discourses themselves. Moreover, the
responses I suggest encourage students to contemplate specific, concrete changes they
might introduce into their religious practices and religious communities. Attending to and
highlighting students’ religious agency should be a crucial concern for us, given the
perceived lack of agency expressed by the religious students I described in chapters one,
three, and four; it should be even more of a concern as we read the representations of
religious experience and communities offered by religious students later in this chapter.
Students need multiple new ways into expressing and altering their own religious
discourse; instructors need multiple new ways to respectfully address and even challenge
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aspects of students’ religiously inflected perspectives, experiences, and communities
about which they may be skeptical.

II. The Transformational Work of Definition in Representational Formations
If privileged religious terms like Christianity, Islam and evangelicalism are taken
to refer to historical formations whose stable boundaries and essential cores are actually
constantly contested, then one of the first channels by which power operates in these
formations is boundary work—that is, acts of definition. While boundary work occurs on
all levels—as evidenced by Sherif’s informants donning of the hijab, which is useful for
the women precisely because wearing the hijab is seen as a definitively Muslim
behavior—language must be considered as a formational component of religion because
implicit and explicit definitions do not merely describe religious formations but actually
participate in shaping them. As foregoing chapters should demonstrate, even ostensibly
meta-discursive definitions (like religion as a historical formation) form religious
formations. Often, an “essence” of a religion is declared in order to determine the
exclusionary boundaries of the social group, whether in ideological or coercive senses (as
seen above in Southern Baptist Seminary’s employment requirements).
Such acts of definition take place in legal arenas, too: those definitions can
actually disable certain practices of religion while enabling others. In chapter one I
mentioned one example of this from Greece, where individuals were not allowed to keep
their religious affiliation on “identity” cards despite their protests—thus enforcing a
definition of religion and of identity as individual. In order to declare that keeping
religious affiliation on an identity card would amount to the violation of those desirous
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individuals’ civil rights, but removing it would not, the government declared religion
(and identity) an individual, private matter, that therefore cannot be violated by lack of
access to particular forms of separation, including communal identity. So an official and
“secular” definition of religion, motivated by a question of legal practice, decided
through a structure of legal channels, and made significant through state apparatuses that
enabled its coercive enforcement—all of this recorded and disseminated through the
medium of language—shaped the individual and collective practice of religion in Greece
(Asad, Formations 139-40).
Anthropologist Webb Keane uses the notion of representational economy to
describe these transformational connections between practices, ideas, and language. It is
not only the definition of religion that causes changes in religious practice: accepted
definitions of any aspect of the religious formation can change related practices. He
writes, “ideas and the practices they involve have not only logical but also causal effects
on one another across a potentially wide range of apparently distinct social fields. They
are parts of what we would call a representational economy” (Christian Moderns 18).
In “God is Nothing but Talk,” Joel Robbins depicts one such representational
economy by exploring the prayer practices of the Urapmin (905-7). Prior to mass
conversions to Christianity, the Urapmin generally believed others’ thoughts were
entirely undiscoverable. Language by definition could not represent thought (906). But
the introduction of a form of Christianity reminiscent of evangelicalism that puts a
premium on sincerity in language provoked the Urapmin to alter their practices to
accommodate this new value (905). They negotiated a solution in which God was an
invisible auditor to Christian prayer, and could assure the sincerity of the person praying.
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Thus, in a situation where two Urapmin men were feuding, a public prayer of apology,
performed in church, was accepted as sincere and ended the feud: an apology offered in
any other discursive mode would have been considered suspect (907-8). New attitudes
towards sincerity introduced by representatives of a different formation shifted the
representational economy of the Urapmin’s religious formation and necessitated new
practices of reconciliation; new assumptions about and practical relations with God
enabled this new conciliatory strategy to be successful, even as the Urapmin’s conception
of the relationship between language and thought transformed the Western religious
practices they took up.
To offer just one more example, Saba Mahmood’s argument in “Religious Reason
and Secular Affect” uses the Danish cartoon controversy of a few years ago to point out
how definitional assumptions about signs can enter trans-formational interactions in ways
that can limit agency and delegitimize religious experience. Mahmood convincingly
argues that Westerners’ bafflement at Muslim pain and anger over cartoon
representations of Muhammed “presuppose a semiotic ideology in which signifiers are
arbitrarily linked to concepts, their meaning open to people’s reading in accord with a
particular code they share between them” (841). It is only because they detach material
causality from semiotic forms, Mahmood argues, that modern Western semiotic
ideologies can suggest “Muslims agitated by the cartoons exhibit an improper reading
practice” (844). That Western response and its assumptions are most obviously at
evidence in the arguments “it’s just a damn cartoon,” and its more recent instantiation
“it’s just a movie,” spoken in response to the fatal backlash against the “Innocence of
Muslims” video. Mahmood points out that this “impoverished understanding of images,
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icons, and signs . . . fails to attend to the affective and embodied practices through which
a subject comes to relate to a particular sign—a relation founded not only on
representation but also on what I will call attachment and cohabitation” (841-42).
She describes the relationship of attachment or cohabitation between devout
Muslims and Muhammed as “predicated not so much upon a communicative or
representational model as an assimilative one” (847) in which practitioners attempt to
embody Muhammed’s dispositions and practices. The sense of violation in the cartoon,
then, “emanates not from the judgment that the law has been transgressed but that one’s
being, grounded as it is in a relationship of dependency with the Prophet, has been
shaken” (848-849). Western semiotic ideologies, with their assumed definitions of signs,
religion, existences, and possible relationships, are incapable of recognizing that sense of
violation and thus dismiss the experience as “irrational.” Obviously, we can see the
power of definition here—if semiotic forms are limited to words and interpretation, then
religion becomes a matter of language, and religious agency becomes choice—a social
and cognitive phenomenon subject to the rules of rationality. Muslims’ agitated response
to the cartoon is prohibited, out-of-bounds, irrational, because their semiotic ideology
does not fit within the Western representational economy.

Definition Misrecognized: The Hegemonic Work of Official Religious Definitions
One chief goal of all hegemonic ideological accounts is to essentialize their own
definitions and ideas: this allows them to stabilize religious boundaries while covering
over the situated source of those definitions and the particular relations of power those
definitions promote. Mohler demonstrates well how official definitions can actively work
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to promote this misrecognition of religious formations. In a blog entry arguing that
Christians should not practice yoga, Mohler writes,
Yoga begins and ends with an understanding of the body that is, to say
the very least, at odds with the Christian understanding. Christians are not
called to empty the mind or to see the human body as a means of
connecting to and coming to know the divine. Believers are called to
meditate upon the Word of God — an external Word that comes to us by
divine revelation — not to meditate by means of incomprehensible
syllables. . . .
When Christians practice yoga, they must either deny the reality of
what yoga represents or fail to see the contradictions between their
Christian commitments and their embrace of yoga. The contradictions are
not few, nor are they peripheral. The bare fact is that yoga is a spiritual
discipline by which the adherent is trained to use the body as a vehicle for
achieving consciousness of the divine. Christians are called to look to
Christ for all that we need and to obey Christ through obeying his Word.
We are not called to escape the consciousness of this world by achieving
an elevated state of consciousness, but to follow Christ in the way of
faithfulness. (“The Subtle Body”)
This short text illustrates two key components of hegemonic definitions.
First, a-historical, essential definitions of religion play a critical role in drawing
boundaries and establishing relations of power. Mohler’s whole argument depends for its
effect upon a number of definitional arguments that erase the fluidity of religious
practice—Christianity is by definition a conscious and pure practice of knowing the
divine; yoga is by definition an embodied and sexualized practice for knowing the divine;
therefore, Christians should not practice yoga. In fact, Mohler actually defines yoga in
universal and essential ways that deny the importance of lived practices. He does so by
ascribing assumptions and understandings of yoga to contemporary practitioners that
Mohler actually acknowledges they may not hold—and yet the “bare fact” is, what “Yoga
begins and ends with,” “the reality of what yoga represents,” is that it is “heathen”
(Mohler’s word). It is heathen because of its supposed point of origination: “yoga cannot
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be fully extricated from its spiritual roots in Hinduism and Buddhism.” In the same way,
Mohler confidently asserts essential definitions of Christianity that do not depend upon
the recognition of practitioners: he writes that “Christians are called,” “believers are
called,” and “Christians are called,” whether they know it or not, to practice religion in
the ways Mohler asserts.
Second, hegemonic acts of self-definition often depend upon constructing an
excluded other (which must also be defined on essential terms). Ironically, Mohler makes
these ahistorical, essentializing assertions about yoga despite drawing his information
from a source, Stefanie Syman, who appears to place careful emphasis upon historicity
and cultural construction. She writes of contemporary yoga,
We had turned a technique for God realization that had, at various points
in time, enjoined its adherents to reduce their diet to rice, milk, and a few
vegetables, fix their minds on a set of, to us, incomprehensible syllables,
and self-administer daily enemas (without the benefit of equipment), to
name just a few of its prerequisites, into an activity suitable for children.
Though yoga has no coherent tradition in India, being preserved instead by
thousands of gurus and hundreds of lineages, each of which makes a
unique claim to authenticity, we had managed to turn it into a singular
thing: a way to stay healthy and relaxed. (Syman, qtd. in Mohler)
In this quotation at least, Syman represents yoga as precisely the sort of constructed,
inessential formation that I’ve attempted to argue official evangelicalism also represents.
Moreover, she ironically notes the American cultural construction of yoga by which an
incoherent set of practices and “traditions” becomes “a singular thing: a way to stay
healthy and relaxed.” And yet, using Syman’s very quotation as evidence, Mohler
brazenly does what Syman mocks: he establishes that there is something “authentic” and
“coherent” about yoga’s tradition that can be identified and used to define and exclude
yoga from Christianity’s boundaries.
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We can see two more components of hegemonic definitions in prominent
evangelicals’ response to the “Evangelical Manifesto” discussed in chapter two. We see
that hegemonic definitions are selective. Many prominent conservative Evangelicals like
(again) Mohler, Dobson, and Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council predictably
and publicly refused to sign the Evangelical Manifesto, often on the explicit grounds that
the document’s definitional criteria were too inclusive or too exclusive. Their rebuttals to
the Manifesto represent the dominant norms of evangelicalism they wish to defend, and
clarify how well they understand the power of definitions to shape entire formations.
Mohler actually admits that the document’s description of evangelicalism might be
accurate, but argues that the account nevertheless remains inadequately selective:
Another complication on this score comes from the fact that Evangelicals
are identified as “one of the great traditions that have developed within the
Christian Church over the centuries.” There is a sense in which this is
true, of course, but relegating the Evangelical understanding of the Gospel
to just one among many Christian traditions undercuts our witness and
sows seeds of confusion. (“An Evangelical Response”)
In that complaint, we see that Mohler finds the Manifesto’s construction of the Christian
tradition not sufficiently selective. Even as he admits that the Manifesto’s rendering of
tradition might be historically accurate, he worries that it will not be satisfactorily
persuasive. Accuracy, Mohler is saying, is not as important as effect.
Finally, hegemonic definitions are exclusive. Mohler complains, for instance, that
the Evangelical Manifesto’s definition of salvation “leaves out the question of the
exclusivity of salvation to those who have come to Christ by faith. The use of the phrase
‘for us’ in strategic sentences,” Mohler writes, “makes one wonder if room is left for
some manner of inclusivism or universalism? The door is certainly not sufficiently
closed.” In a fitting last complaint, Mohler then worries that he himself has been
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excluded from the Manifesto’s definition of evangelicalism. The document, as we saw in
chapter four, criticizes official evangelicals for its anti-intellectualism and its low view of
science. He asks regarding these criticisms, “Who are these believers who represent
‘caricatures of the false hostility between science and faith’? The context would seem to
implicate those who believe in a young earth cosmology. This represents millions of
Evangelicals — perhaps by many surveys the vast majority. Are they (we) to be written
out of Evangelicalism?” (“An Evangelical Response”). “Written out of Evangelicalism”
is the right phrase—Mohler is rightly underlining the most important hegemonic function
of definition: a linguistic exclusion can effect a social exclusion. And if that linguistic
construct can be rendered neutral and natural (the function of ideology), then that social
exclusion will also seem neutral and natural.

Recognizing Definition in Student Accounts of Religion
To provide the simplest of illustrations of how employing a transformational
perspective in student writing might combat such hegemonic definitions—and accounts
of those definitions—we can consider the best definition of evangelicalism heretofore
offered by a student in our scholarship. Here’s how a graduate student named Mona
explains evangelicalism in Carter’s article:
A myriad of beliefs and, subsequently, subgroups abound within the
vaguely defined borders of Evangelical Christianity, however the expected
beliefs are those espoused by the largest protestant denomination in
America. These views are touted by Christian programs, held as mainstays
by the political activist Christian groups, and echoed by grassroots
Christians in the workplace. It is these views to which you must hold or at
least not contradict if you are to be considered a “literate” member of the
mainstream Evangelical movement.” (586)
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As I discussed above, the chief idea in translingual approaches is to help students
recognize that language is always practical—working—rather than transcendent,
transparent, or stable. Mona’s definition suggests that she is very cognizant of some of
this work. First, we note her references to practical heterogeneity: “a myriad of beliefs,”
“subgroups,” and “vaguely defined borders.” Further, she is successfully identifying
several formational forces at work in the “mainstream Evangelical movement”—“touted
by Christian programs,” “held…by political activist Christian groups,” “echoed by
grassroots Christians.” Finally, she recognizes the definitional and exclusionary power
exercised by particular institutions by using phrases like “borders,” “expected beliefs,”
and “must hold or at least not contradict if you are to be considered a literate member.”
Mona apparently offered this information directly to Carter, rather than for an
assignment: but Carter’s response, as she applies it to her undergraduate writing
classrooms, is a concern to help students recognize their various communities’
orthodoxies “so that they don’t commit heretical acts” within them (586). As noted in
chapter one, Carter wants to help students see the differences between academic and
religious communities of practice so they can more effectively and safely shift back and
forth between them, rather than having to abandon a valued community. She calls this
giving students “some control over [their] environment” (586), but it sounds to me more
like helping students fit into environments they cannot control. Our challenge, however,
is to respond in a way that might also help Mona locate and activate the sources of
transformation in evangelicalism.
I say this because even though Mona’s account seems to acknowledge the social
power defining evangelicalism and sources of variation, there is no sign here that Mona
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recognizes how and why evangelicalism has changed, is changing, and will change. Her
definition right now presents us with a stable account of official evangelicalism and its
definitions that does not fully acknowledge the processes of formation behind it. As such,
in the end she offers up a static picture of evangelicalism that can be immediately
appropriated and reified by Carter for politically accommodationist purposes. Mona’s
definition acknowledges heterogeneity, but not transformation—which, given the
generalized dissatisfaction and sense of impotence felt by young Americans towards
contemporary religion, is unsurprising. As I argue in chapters one and four, this apparent
misrecognition indicates a pedagogical opportunity for writing instructors to help
students like Mona wrestle with the dominant religious discourses in their lives.
A first option for de-stabilizing a hegemonic account of religion like this is to
encourage students to compare multiple official definitions of a religion and highlight
both the content and the social purposes of such accounts—focusing, then, on the
intraformational conflict produced by definitions. A student like Mona might be
encouraged, for example, to examine official definitions of evangelicalism like those
offered by Mohler and compare those with the Evangelical Manifesto and definitions
offered by Bielo’s emergent evangelical informants. Or she might be encouraged to
reflect on how various alternative definitions are offered by insider groups that form
around competing discourses—for example, how evangelical feminist groups have
selectively appropriated parts of evangelicalism’s discourse in constructing their
alternative accounts of evangelicalism, and the reasons for those choices. Students like
Mona would then have the opportunity to note the competing claims on “true” and
“essential” Christianity, deliberate on conflicts within religious formations, contemplate

196

the roles played by multiply-constituted identities and external cultural discourses in
those conflicts, and situate themselves positively in relation to the account that they
preferred.
Instructors can also approach official definitions as Raymond Williams suggests,
by asking students to historicize those definitions and doctrines. Historicizing specific
beliefs should be appealing to many instructors, given our own tendency to privilege
doctrines and beliefs in definitions of conservative religion (discussed in earlier chapters),
and even more so given the conservative religious establishment’s heavily doctrinecentered self-representations. The hegemonic works—through us—by naturalizing and
essentializing these definitions, so historicizing these definitions could acknowledge this
habitual emphasis on doctrine while essentially using its momentum against itself. This
would require noting how religious formations have developed through history as not
only a set of ideas but as shifting sets of beliefs, behaviors, and consequences containing
or attached to those shifting ideas. Moreover, it would require examining why those shifts
occurred—that is, the transformative pressures exerted on religious formations.
How, for example, did the presence of Muslims shift how European Christianity
defined religion, or how did the introduction of the printing press and concurrent shifts in
cultural notions of textuality participate in changing definitions of the Bible? Students
could examine how definitions have been used to include and exclude populations—to
examine who would have counted as a Christian in Reformation England, who would
today, and the sometimes-lethal consequences of being included or excluded. Balmer’s
accounts of American Christianity work to describe such historical shifts: in Thy
Kingdom Come, for example, he describes how dominant religious positions on
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evolution, education, political activism and even abortion underwent major shifts during
the twentieth century in response to events including the Scopes trial and Ronald
Reagan’s presidential campaign. In Balmer’s account, the ideas, beliefs and behaviors of
American Christianities are represented as formational practices: produced to do specific
work for the religious formation, in response to particular contextual forces. Such shifts
were not simply in response to events like the Scopes trial or Ronald Reagan, Balmer
argues throughout the book, but in response to shifts in public discourse—on science and
education in one case, and in response to shifts in public policy regarding the taxing of
religious institutions in the other, and so on. Our accounts should look to activate the
same historical perspective on definitions if instructors and scholars intend to continue to
focus on religious doctrines in published representations and classroom interactions.
Some idea of giving greater attention to students’ personal definitions of religion
has already been suggested by DePalma’s recommendation that Thomas work out his
“key words” through narrating personal experiences (237-8). To be more specific about
what that means, however, from a transformational perspective I would want to do three
things when I encountered students’ key words or definitions. We can take the definition
offered by Alex in Carter’s article as an example: Alex writes, “I understand that
academics look at facts and evidence. However, religion is mostly about feeling. If God
wanted to, He could easily give us evidence that He exists. If He did, though, believing in
him and trusting Him wouldn’t be the same” (577, emphasis in original). I would want to
help Alex connect this definition both to her experience and to a specific cultural
context—to draw out the personal-social contexts connected to this definition.
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So first, I would ask Alex to examine the past transformations that produced that
definition for her. I might ask her, for example, how she arrived at this definition—
Where has she seen that definition before? Was there a time when she believed that
religion was a matter of facts and evidence? What changed her mind? Second, I could ask
her about the work the definition presently does: What benefit does she derive from this
definition? Does she know people who would disagree with her? Are they Christians or
non-Christians? If she agreed with those others that religion was a matter of facts and
evidence, or was not a matter of feeling, would she still be able to be a practicing
Christian? Third, a transformational approach would ask Alex about the potential work
she could do on the definition. Moving from a retrospective account of definitional
transformations to a forward-looking transformational account, I might also ask Alex to
pursue one alternative definition of religion and imagine its short-term or long-term
consequences on her life (past, present or future), then to reflect afterwards upon her
reasons for accepting or rejecting that new definition in light of its transformative
potential.
Another transformational response would be to encourage a student like Alex to
examine how academic and religious formations define shared cultural terms, exploring
how the formations work on one another through these definitions. Mahmood’s
discussion of the Mohammed cartoon controversy (above) might help us to initiate this
sort of investigation. If she were encouraged to read Mahmood’s explanation of the
religious conflicts created by differing definitions of seemingly non-religious terms like
representation, instructors could then ask Alex, to deliberate on the definitions of other
key terms in her above description: facts, evidence, feeling, believing, trusting. These
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words clearly do not have stable, singular meanings, and the words are continually
transported from context to context. Alex’s definition indicates some of those crossformational movements between religion and academia that we could deliberate on. For
example, some might argue that the evidence for God is the feeling that Alex describes.
Pointing this out highlights the way Alex’s definition of evidence and facts depends upon
modernist scientific epistemologies, and highlights the way that modernist epistemology
causes her to place religious knowledge in a different category from academic knowledge
(for good or for ill). Instructors might also discuss how Alex’s definitions of Christian
believing and trusting as actions taken in the absence of facts and evidence—definitions
glossed by Carter as “faith” (578)—contribute to precisely the dismissal of faith as “antiintellectual” that Carter complains about (578). If Alex were to re-define facts and
evidence in less Cartesian ways, or if she and Carter were to re-define faith as an action
taken in the presence of evidence (emphasizing faith as the relational concept of “trust”
over the more cognitive concept of “belief”), how would this change the relationship
between the academy and religion Alex has conceptualized? What risk would this present
to Alex or her religious commitments, or what challenges might this present to the
intellectual divide that ghetto-izes religion, in Carter’s mind? Carter herself sets about
doing this work, attempting to re-present the relationship between academic and religious
knowing to instructors. She does not assist Alex in re-considering her definition. But
doesn’t Alex, a Christian graduate student, need this opportunity to re-present the
relations between academic and religious definitions just as much as secular instructors
do?
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III. The Transformational Work of Mediation in Religious Formations
Another key term for thinking through the forces producing religious
transformation is mediation. Keane points out that even if religion is just language and
ideas as some Western conceptions might suggest, those ideas still must take material
form in order to be shared between people: “like everything else, [they only] circulate
insofar as they have some medium” (Christian Moderns 42). In the “Evidence of the
Senses,” Keane argues that even religious beliefs rely on material practices for their
transmission—as he writes, “With the possible exception of divine revelation unmediated
by any prior practices, institutions, or discourses (but even then, it must take a semiotic
form if it is to go further), belief ontogenically follows on practice” (S116-17). Mediation
actually enables religion’s transmission and reproduction across space and time, entailing
both the potential conservation and transformation of the religious discourse—“even the
most spiritualized of scriptural religions teach doctrines through concrete activities, such
as catechisms, sermons, scripture-reading, exegesis” (S117). New assumptions do not
simply appear in the consciousness of the Urapmin Robbins studies—they arrive in
material form and are taken up, practiced, and circulated in and by other material forms.
In keeping with this assertion, Birgit Meyer and the other sociologists in her
edited collection Aesthetic Formations have demonstrated across a wide range of
religious groups—including groups practicing Bahian Candomble, Brazilian
Pentecostalism, Islam in Bangladesh, Tamil mythology (mixtures of Hinduism), Canção
Nova (Catholicism), Ghanaian Pentecostalism, the Raelian movement (UFO religion),
and Venezuelan Pentecostalism—the ways that religious formations depend upon, reappropriate, and are shaped by material objects. Meyer and her contributors emphasize,
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for example, the role of traditionally understood “media” as sensational forms that
mediate religious experience—they describe how sermon cassettes, videos, cards,
worship music, and the like are all used by religious adherents to relate to the
supernatural as well as to strengthen the bonds within their religious community. In his
book-length ethnography, Emerging Evangelicals, Bielo has made similar observations
about American evangelicals (74-75).
Taking the term media more broadly, I propose here that a mediated lens for
understanding a religious discourse such as evangelicalism could help us focus on the
literally material aspects of religion: 1) bodies and bodily practices 2) other material
objects, such as buildings, clothing, relics, and photographs 3) traditional “media”
including podcasts, books, songs, YouTube videos, and blogs. Focusing on these
circulating material forms (bodies, objects, media) as mediators can help writers
represent the transmission, provocation, regularization, and disruption of shared religious
sensibilities and practices that shape historical formations. In order to successfully
recognize and represent religious mediators in this way, there are a few transformational
keys: first, recognizing their necessity for the religious formation; second, recognizing
how their very materiality renders mediators instable, unpredictable transmitters of
religion (introducing change and variation into the religious formation); third,
recognizing how various religious formations relate to mediators in different ways
through their practices, which introduces a further source of instability and difference;
fourth, recognizing how various religious formations manage mediators’ instability in
different ways, again introducing a further source of instability and difference into
religious formations; and fifth, recognizing how all of these unstable aspects of religious
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mediators render religious practitioners and formations always susceptible to creativity
and change. We can see these five keys by analyzing a pair of anecdotes from
anthropologists studying religion.
Matthew Engelke’s A Problem of Presence is an anthropological study of
religious mediation in an African Christian movement, the Friday Church Masowe, in
Zimbabwe. The Friday Church Masowe explicitly reject the use of the Bible in their
religious practice because they strive for a direct and unmediated relationship with God
(2-3). The Masowe, as radical immaterialists, try to shun material objects that they
perceive to inflect their relationship to God: those which cannot be trusted, which may
produce unpredictable results and by doing so produce evidence that their channel is not
entirely clear for the pure transmission of God’s presence, are rejected for use in religious
practice (3). In this way, the Masowe actually take to its logical conclusion Western
definitions of signs and religion I discussed above. But the Masowe cannot eschew the
use of all material vehicles, no matter how hard they try. As Engelke rightly demonstrates
throughout the text, “The repudiation of the material is a selective process” (224). So
throughout his text Engelke investigates the material vehicles that the Masowe will
incorporate into their services—the spoken word, songs, healings, rituals, holy water,
pebbles, holy honey, white robes, and prophets, along with their mumiriri wemweya—
and the ways that these material vehicles exert their own force on the religious
practitioners, in spite of all attempts at relegating them to neutral intermediaries.
The Masowe are in a difficult position because within their struggles to locate
objects that simply transmit (without bending, integrating, or inflecting) religion, they
keep running against the materiality and sociality of those objects. For example, the
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Masowe perform healings using jars of holy honey, supposed to draw all of their
medically healing properties from the church’s ritualistic infusion of the Holy Spirit’s
power in prayer (226-8). The honey, in and of itself, is a neutral vessel, an intermediary
through which the Holy Spirit does all the healing. But then one day a church member
asks Engelke to loan him some holy honey blessed specifically to treat Engelke’s illness.
But the church member is only looking to get through a long day at work (227). Even
church members know the honey really is not an intermediary, despite all the official
discourse—members know practically that the honey can have effects apart from the
Spirit’s power, and no amount of official discourse to the contrary can regulate the
practical use of honey. The Spirit may act upon honey eaters, but so does the honey. It is
a mediator, which by its variable action and variable relations with practitioners
constantly troubles the official account that would obscure the practical work that the
honey does in declaring it a transparent intermediary.
Bielo provides an excellent discussion highlighting how American evangelicals
deal variably with the problem of mediation. In Emerging Evangelicals, he describes how
particular groups of American evangelicals use bodies, objects, and texts differently—
detailing, for instance, how and why emergent evangelicals make heavy and deliberate
use of quotidian found objects and multi-sensory experiences in their worship (see
especially pp. 70-97). He describes uses of “lint brushes, globes, sand, bricks, bags,
sugar, stones, and sponges . . . Lint brushes roll off sin, prayers are placed onto their
destinations, bricks are lifted and removed, and sponges soak while stones sink” (95).
Despite their positive and deliberate incorporation of mediators into their worship, Bielo
finds his evangelical informants are aware—and wary—of this risky relationship. So they
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attempt to change out the found objects they utilize in worship regularly so as to not
sediment too much power in those objects or risk changing the relationship people have
with them (96). The informants know—though Bielo seems to pass over this—that they
are not simply using the objects to relate to God (the primary goal [96]) but entering into
relationship with the objects themselves in ways that are not entirely predictable. So as a
protection against losing control of that relationship—in order to maintain the items in a
place where “they are not dismissed, they are not special”—“none are retained for very
long or treated with any reverence” (96). Given that religious informants (from the
Masowe who distrust media to the emerging evangelicals who privilege them) are clearly
concerned with what objects will do to people and their faith, we must not fail to take
objects equally seriously in our studies of how religion changes.

Mediation Misrecognized: Obscuring Mediation in Official Accounts of Religion
Naturally, another effect of hegemonic ideology is rendering a formation’s
transmission processes—that is, its mediators—transparent. In Western religions like
Christianity and particularly in official evangelical strains, this often occurs through the
de-emphasis of religion’s materiality. In his thoughtful account of Christianity’s arrival in
Papua-New Guinea, Keane traces the historical development of a broadly Western view
of religion “which identified it ‘as a set of propositions to which believers gave assent’ . .
. a matter not of material disciplines or of ritual practices, for example, but of subjective
beliefs” (Christian Moderns 67). Keane argues that this construction of religion also
defines language in certain ways: in such religious formations, he writes, “language
functions primarily (and properly) to refer to or denote objects in a world that lies apart
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from it, in order to communicate ideas that lie within one person to another listener or
reader” (67). And from within this hegemonic account of religion, religious beliefs too
are understood primarily in referential terms—they affirm something about the world
(“Reflections” 245). Explaining what this account of religion achieves, Keane writes that
Christian leaders since John Calvin have been trying to “play down the materiality of
semiotic form in order to arrive at a disembodied spirit, a pure idea, or an unsullied faith”
(79).
This attempted purification, as Asad constructs it, is an attempt at obscuring the
social contingencies that threaten hegemonic religious authority. Such accounts erase the
historicity and transformativity of religion in order to arrive at something essential,
universal, and unchanging. To be clear, focusing on belief is not all bad—the problem is
failing to recognize that beliefs (and orthodox beliefs) are dependent upon social
conditions for their constitution and thus intrinsically changing. The reality, Asad argues,
is that social conditions continually transform religion, religious beliefs, and even the
definitions of belief that religions operate with:
Changes in the object of belief change that belief, and as the world
changes so do the objects of belief, and the specific forms of bafflement
and moral paradox, which are a part of the world. What the Christian
believes today about God, life after death, the universe, is not what he
believed 800 years ago—nor is the way he responds to ignorance, pain,
and injustice the same now as it was then. (“Reflections” 247)
He explains, then, that the proper focus for a religious scholar is on material conditions
and social processes, because social “disciplines are preconditions for specific forms of
thought and action, but they must be taught and learnt, and are therefore themselves
dependent on a range of social institutions and material conditions” (251, emphasis
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mine). Power relations and social conditions cannot be separated from beliefs—and thus
any definition that asserts otherwise serves hegemonic ends by concealing those relations.
On hegemonic belief-centered accounts, religion transcends human action and
historical change; the religion has an enduring essence referenced by ideas that can
correspond perfectly to an eternal reality; humans’ perceived ability to change the
religion is constrained (only the humans can change, because God and his perfect earthly
representation needn’t); the possibility of a true and accurate knowledge arises as an
ideal, and is echoed in the possibility of a single, common-sense meaning for all Biblical
language; arguments over definition, belief, and correctness become possible and then
central to the religious formation. This account of religion and language lends force to
whatever is the official doctrine at a given moment, which can claim to transcend its
historical formation and instead declare itself true in reference to an eternal ideal. Those
in power can then demand belief from adherents. This belief can only be signified by
verbal assent, so that words must now do two things faithfully in order for those in
authority to feel assured of their control: words must faithfully express interiority, and
words must faithfully refer to reality.
We can see how this conjunction between pure beliefs and pure language
produces hegemonic effects by returning to official evangelicalism and Mohler’s
argument against yoga. Mohler’s privileged form of religion, “Christianity,” is defined as
conscious and linguistically centered while in contrast yoga is embodied and privileges
other forms of knowing. As he writes, setting up the boundary between Christianity and
yoga, “Christians are not called to empty the mind or to see the human body as a means
of connecting to and coming to know the divine. Believers are called to meditate upon the
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Word of God — an external Word that comes to us by divine revelation” (“The Subtle
Body”). Mohler explains this transparent process elsewhere in the short pamphlet entitled
“The Pastor as Theologian,” which I reference in chapter three. For Mohler, the
transparent transportation of meaning through language is guaranteed by the work of the
Holy Spirit. He writes,
Through the preaching of the Word of God, the congregation is fed
substantial theological doctrine directly from the biblical text. . . . The
divine agent of this transfer is the Holy Spirit, who opens hearts, eyes and
ears to hear, understand and receive the Word of God. The preacher’s
responsibility is to be clear, specific, systematic and comprehensive in
setting out the biblical convictions that are drawn from God’s Word . . .
(“The Pastor as Theologian” 9-10, emphasis mine)
In his book on emergent evangelicals, Bielo cites another prominent conservative
evangelical theologian, pastor, seminary president, and popularizing author—John
MacArthur—who also articulates this view of biblical language. In a radio interview,
MacArthur says,
. . . we’re talking about how do you interpret the meaning of the Bible?
It’s really not that hard. It’s not brain surgery. You use the normal sense of
the language. You just see what the language says like you do, how do you
interpret a conversation? Or, how do you interpret an old document?
We’re talking simply about how we discern what it means by what it says.
(Emerging Evangelicals 58)
To the extent that religious language transparently refers to a religion that is
perceived to exist separately from the language but can be represented accurately in “that
normal sense of the language,” this account enables several of the hegemonic practices
evident in official evangelical discourse. The direct (pure) transfer of religious
knowledge by way of clear (pure) language, enabled by the Holy Spirit, allows for the
progressive purification of religion as beliefs are corrected and as heretics are excluded.
And it does so while making human religious authority transparent (pure): if Mohler and
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MacArthur are successful in arguing that their interpretation is natural and commonsense, then in declaring Biblical truth and establishing Biblical mandates they are purely
speaking for God, not from crass material motives or a desire for power. Moreover,
alternative understandings must be corruptions, not of God, and can be rejected out of
hand. Hegemony thus draws power from obscuring mediation and positing stability: both
the physical materiality of communication, the material conditions shaping those
communications, and the agendas of the communicators must be removed from
consideration if official evangelical leaders like MacArthur and Mohler are to continue
speaking for God and authoritatively excluding and including beliefs, people and
practices from religion.
While arguments directly challenging this privileged status of language (and in
turn, destabilizing particular beliefs) can be appealing and by 2012 have become
increasingly easy for writing instructors to make,17 I’m not convinced they represent our
best option when we encounter religious discourse that enacts this logic. Pointing out
interpretive variability without first combating the idealist removal of religion from
materiality mostly seems to produce a logic of corruption or variation (as seen in Rand’s
argument in chapter one), not genuine instability. It leaves the hegemonic logic of
religion as an immaterial idea largely intact—and it’s that logic, not just an approach to
language per se, that maintains power relations by masking religion’s transformational
capacities. Appeals to divine revelation, further, produce a loophole for those in power
that arguments over hermeneutics simply can’t overcome. Making matters worse, given
the direct accounts of language-as-common-sense offered by official evangelical leaders
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and formative documents, adopting a strategy that emphasizes language’s instability is
likely to be seen as a direct attack on religion. This is why in the rest of this chapter I
want to focus instead on how instructors might attend to the elements of religious literacy
acquisition that dominant representatives like Mohler wish to leave out—the body,
things, and other people, for instance—and on highlighting how they are involved in the
process of acquiring the right religious knowledges, feelings, and experiences (literacy). I
believe these approaches provide students and instructors with alternative, somewhat
indirect means of challenging the hegemonic status of pure religious language and
knowledge within evangelicalism. They also provide students and instructors with new,
positive terms for representing religious practices, getting them outside of largely
oppositional and unending arguments over doctrine and hermeneutics.

Recognizing Mediation in Student Accounts of Religion—Objects
If instructors want to help students challenge or at least de-naturalize hegemonic
accounts that divorce religion from change and power relations by making its social
transmission appear transparent, our responses to them need to highlight the unstable
material (physical and social) processes involved in religious literacy and learning. One
potentially useful strategy for doing this is to ask religious students who incorporate
religious texts to deliberate on their own relations with those texts, as objects, in light of
Latour’s distinction between mediators and intermediaries (Reassembling 39). Making
any sort of strong distinction between the two—stating, for instance, that the Bible is an
intermediary rather than a mediator, as some evangelicals might, requires a significant
amount of definitional work—establishing criteria, compiling evidence, etcetera. Instead
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of asking students to make a fast distinction, or arguing with students about which their
sacred text is, I think it might be more useful to ask students to define both terms and
then attempt to find ways in which it might enact both roles. For example, Alex tells
Carter how she and her cousins carried their Bibles to school every day in high school in
hopes that “when the time came, we could use it to help others become saved” (576).
Alex also tells of quoting the Bible throughout an academic paper and failing, then
removing those quotes and succeeding—“I did nothing but remove the quotes and my
paper received an A” (577). While not everything falls neatly into the category of
intermediary and mediator or remains within either category—in fact, Latour argues that
things move back and forth in accordance with the relationship actors have with them—
using those theoretical categories might help Alex to deliberate on her experience so as to
highlight how the Bible’s effects change as it relates to individuals in various contexts.
In the high school anecdote, Alex constructs the Bible as simply a tool for use
“when the time came.” In that sense, Alex constructs the Bible as an intermediary she
could deploy for specific purposes at moments she chose. But we could ask if the Bible
doing other work during the school day, apart from Alex’s intentions? Was it acting as a
mediator? Were other students, for example, attributing a religious identity to Alex
because of that Bible? Was it creating a community for her? Or was the Bible actually
acting as a mediator that helped irreligious high school students know to avoid being
evangelized by Alex, who kept waiting for a time to come that the Bible itself kept from
occurring? She might be encouraged to consider alternative actions and effects the Bible
was having while she carried it as a tool—as if the shovel she was carrying to dig a hole
might have knocked over a few passers-by on the way. And did she carry the same Bible
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all those years? What relationship did she have to that particular Bible? I remember
when a pocket Gideon Bible I owned in high school (I carried mine everywhere too) went
through the wash. I was so distraught over the destruction of a free book that I cooked it
in the oven to try and dry it out. The Bible in this case took on properties beyond an
intermediary for delivering informational content—my relationship was also with the
object itself.
In responding to Alex’s experience of removing biblical quotations from her
college paper, we could also examine the transformational relations between academic
and religious discourses the account indicates. Alex’s purported attempt to use the Bible
as an intermediary (simply useful as evidence for her arguments) was foiled because the
instructor’s relationship with the Bible was beyond her control. The Bible again worked
differently than Alex had hoped—making it a mediator—or perhaps not. Perhaps, as
Goodburn and others are suggesting, Alex was aware of the likely effect of the Bible on
her professor and was challenging or even testing her professor. So instructors could
challenge Alex to consider how the Bible, as a cultural object with variable meaning,
mediated the relations between Alex and her professor. But then, Alex might also be
encouraged to consider what it means that she was able to make her argument
successfully for an academic audience without doing anything, she said, but removing the
Bible quotations. For the professor, removing the Bible positively transformed Alex’s
argument. And given that Alex changed nothing else in the essay, it would appear that the
essay was ostensibly coherent and persuasive without her Biblical quotations. Alex’s
argument after the citations were removed became simultaneously biblical (no arguments
were scrubbed out when the quotations were erased) and academic (it’s academic logic
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received an A). This forces a reconsideration of the relationship between academic and
religious discourses—perhaps in this one case at least it was the Bible, not the logic, that
created conflict. But it also allows Alex to go back and look at the document—what,
specifically, was lost to the document, or to Alex, when the Bible was erased from the
text. Why is she still angry about it?
Instructors might also ask Alex about the transformational agency (specifically,
salvific agency) she attributed to the Bible. Alex says she and her cousins carried the
Bible “so we could use it to help others become saved.” This is a fascinating syntactical
construction that establishes four sets of unstable relations Alex could probe by thinking
through a specific witnessing experience she might have had. In that experience, what
were the relations she imagined between herself and the Bible—how specifically did she
use it, and why in those ways? What were the relations between Alex and the other
person—how specifically did she help that person become saved? What were the
relations between the Bible and the other person—how specifically did it help? And
finally, what were the salvific relations between Alex, the Bible, God, and the other
person?—after all, she does not say they save themselves, nor does she say that they get
saved, but she uses the Bible to help them become saved, a curious distribution of agency.
Having thought through these assignations of agency, instructors might ask Alex
to examine the transformational properties of this encounter in the past, present, future
mode I described earlier. First, what was the cultural or experiential source of these
understandings and the evangelistic practices that stemmed from them? Who taught those
attitudes to her, and if no one did, where did she acquire them? Second, instructors could
ask her to consider the consequences of those attitudes and practices towards the Bible in
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concrete encounters. Third, since Alex is reporting on a past behavior towards the Bible
as object, instructors could ask her to construct a narrative of her relationship with the
Bible, or to simply compare that high school relationship to other relationships from other
points in her life (including using it as a source of evidence in a college paper). She could
borrow from a variety of genres and sources to craft these representations, but the
question would remain generally the same: in what ways, and for what reasons, have her
relations with the Bible changed—and how have those related to other changes in her
life?

Recognizing Mediation in Student Accounts of Religion—Sponsors
In attempting to highlight the mediated nature of religious literacy acquisition,
instructors’ responses can also focus students’ attentions on the social disciplinary
relationships their writings describe. Though the language is different, the mediators that
Engelke, Keane, Meyer and Bielo depict aren’t too far from Deborah Brandt’s conception
of sponsors—at least not as regards the role that they play in transforming religious
formations and religious individuals. For her project on literacy, Brandt defines sponsors
as “any agents, local or distant, concrete or abstract, who enable, support, teach, and
model, as well as recruit, regulate, suppress, or withhold, literacy—and gain an advantage
by it” (17). As she explains, “Sponsors are delivery systems for the economies of literacy,
the means by which these forces present themselves to—and through—individual
learners” (17). It will prove helpful below to also think of mediation in terms of
sponsorship to help us draw out the power relations imbricated in the transmission and
distribution of religious practices from sponsors to individual practitioners.
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Here’s James, another student from Carter’s class, explaining the discipline he
underwent at church:
Before I was [just] a child that went to church. I believed the Bible was
something you read if you weren’t sure that you were going to heaven [. .
.] so I never read it. But one day I started to mature from a child that went
to church to a churchly child. I started to understand the older Christians
and the purpose of being a Christian and the role that the Bible played in a
Christian’s life. All because one day . . . I felt it was my job to be the
clown. . . . When my mother . . . saw me acting like a fool she came
slapped me in the back of the head in front of all my friends and maid me
go to the front of the church to sit with the senior saints. . . . I couldn’t
even fall asleep because the old ladies wouldn’t let me because they would
either pinch to wake me or be making to much noise praising the Lord so I
had to listen to the message. . . . I mean don’t get me wrong I always heard
the Message but I actually listened that time. . . . That’s how the front pue
saved my life. (575, all ellipses original)
James explains further in an interview in Carter’s office: “It’s like this. A child who just
goes to church is an illiterate Christian because he can’t feel it. He may feel something
somewhere else, like in school with his friends or at work, but that feeling ain’t the Lord
because he’s not in his House. A churchly child, though, he [is] literate because he can
feel it. Like I felt it” (576).
James’s literacy narrative, ostensibly an essay describing the Bible, was written
for an assignment “to describe an object that best represented literacy for [him]” (575).
But instead of talking about his relation to the Bible as a representation or even a sponsor
of literacy, James’s story is really consumed with other mediators, and with tactile,
affective, and aural discipline. He describes being hit on the back of the head, being
embarrassed, being placed in the front pew, being pinched by old women, and being kept
awake by their noise. All of these acts of discipline—physical, emotional, spatial, aural—
are acts of sponsorship (really, authoritative discipline) that enable James to acquire
religious knowing and religious ways of being. The experience, knowledge, and
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relationship with God that James acquires—together, his personal transformation into a
religious literate—are not directly transported into his mind through the intermediary
Bible, the mediational Holy Spirit, or even the clear instruction of the pastor: instead, a
broad set of indirect mediators enables James’ religious literacy. Recognizing this
directly challenges the exclusionary power claimed by those who would render religious
literacy immediate and self-evident.
What’s more, these mediations are performed mostly by the women of James’s
community, and thus women’s leadership is strongly indicated as a cause for James’s
achievement of religious “feeling” and religious literacy. As he says, those sponsors
caused him to “really listen,” rather than goofing off or falling asleep (which he calls
merely hearing the Message), and thereby “the front pue saved my life” (575). Further,
James spends a lot of time elaborating on the importance of place—the feeling must
occur in the Lord’s House, or it’s not the feeling. In this way, even the church building
(and even specifically the front pew) becomes a mediator necessary for James’s
acquisition of religious discourse. Emphasizing all these mediators might encourage
James to challenge official accounts of Christianity through his representation of
religious transformations. In a revision he might, for example, be encouraged to represent
his experience in a way that highlights the practical role of women and material forms in
the church; deliberate on how these sponsorships do or don’t align with official religious
discourse on gender relations, say, or the practical importance of a Christian’s material
surroundings through locating primary documents distributed by religious institutions;
and even potentially draw in traditional academic research on the changing historical
relationships between African-Americans, women, and Christian churches. Tracing
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mediators, then, might help students represent a different set of practical relationships and
hierarchies within a church than the official discourse offers.
Another revision suggestion might focus on alternative routes to religious literacy,
which could help James develop the contingency and choice that are implicated in
acquiring religious discourse in these mediated ways. For instance, he could be
encouraged to construct alternative narratives exploring what would have happened if the
pews had been more comfortable, or if there had been children’s services at church, or if
he had been at a church where demonstrative forms of worship were not acceptable. We
could challenge him to do either first or second-hand ethnographic research on how other
sorts of Christians acquire religious literacy absent those factors, and deliberate by
comparing his experience to theirs on the differences between not only the processes, but
the products. In what ways are the properly religious dispositions of a member of a
largely white, Midwestern Reformed congregation different from those in James’
community? To what mediating factors does James assign responsibility for these
differences? Do they matter?
A third avenue of response could challenge James to think about the power
relationships and advantages gained through his religious sponsorship. What motivation
does he think the senior section had for pinching him and helping him to acquire religious
discourse? What does the church gain from his membership? What does he gain through
membership—perhaps, I would specify, what besides salvation? Finally, any writer
hoping to represent James’s acquisition of religious discourse as transformative must
identify not only his wide variety of sponsors, but also the specific work that he did in
these interactions with sponsors to help him acquire the religious discourse. One could
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ask James, for instance, how he altered his practices from that day forward in order to
maintain the feeling he describes and the ways of seeing that determine his relation to the
Bible. This might entail asking him to construct a new narrative that focuses not on a
single transformative event, but on religious transformation as a continual process—
describing how his attitudes, practices, feelings and beliefs have changed over the years
since that day that he became a churchly child. To be properly transformational, James
would need to identify not only how they’ve changed, but why—what new discourses,
events, and sponsors does he think caused those changes? Who’s done the work? And
finally, looking forward to the work he can do on his religious experience and discourse,
one could ask James to consider how this new understanding of religious sponsorship
does or should affect the way he sponsors other people—in what ways might he use this
knowledge to become a better religious sponsor for others, or in what ways has this new
knowledge changed or damaged his relations with his religious community? And in what
ways does this new, academic construction of religious literacy acquisition fail to hold up
when interrogated in light of his religious experience?

IV. Recognizing the Transformational Work of Sensation in Religious Formations
A third type of media that I mention above, but do not discuss in detail, is the
body: so here in this final section I focus on the role of the body and bodily practices in
religious formations. I believe instructors must focus on how religious formations help
adherents to acquire the “right” feelings, or sensations (that is, making strange the
processes by which religious practitioners themselves must be transformed). Looking
back at James’s account, we can see how his experience challenges writing scholars and
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instructors to focus more closely on this issue. Carter notes that James’s representation of
Christian literacy hinges on a “feeling that only other literate Christians can experience or
understand” (576), which points to the crucial articulation of feeling with information in
religious literacy. Again, we can begin from the work of Meyer. In her work on
mediation, she explicitly focuses on the sensational level of formation, and usefully
focuses on Evangelical Christians, a group that we might not normally associate with a
religion of the senses (regarding sensation, see also Mauss; Bourdieu; Jackson;
Luhrmann). In fact, as Mohler demonstrates, official evangelical discourse works to
dissociate Christianity from sensational practices: “Christians are not called to empty the
mind or to see the human body as a means of connecting to and coming to know the
divine” (“The Subtle Body”). Meyer demonstrates convincingly, however, that sensation
is not only included, but is actually at the center of many evangelicals’ religious practice.
Moreover, she notes that for many evangelical Christians, the ability to experience certain
sensations arises through “authorized and socially shared practices and techniques” rather
than immediately. In “Aesthetics of Persuasion” Meyer describes these practices,
through which born again Christians are enabled to sense the presence of
the Holy Spirit with and in their bodies wherever they are and to act upon
this sensation . . . sensations of the divine do not happen out of the blue
but require the existence of a particular shared religious aesthetic through
which the Holy Spirit becomes accessible and ‘sense-able’.
(“Indispensability”)
These acquired sensibilities enable participants to physically experience—that is, sense—
new aspects of reality with their bodies.
One of the closest studies of these Evangelical sensibilities and their acquisition
comes from Luhrmann, who studied an Evangelical Christian congregation in California.
Luhrmann argues that while we in the academy have largely focused our attention on the
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beliefs of Christians (particularly about the truth status of the Bible), “it is at least as
important that the new U.S. religious practices put intense spiritual experience—above
all, trance—at the heart of the relationship with God” (“Metakinesis” 518). She also
notes, “The most interesting anthropological phenomenon in U.S. evangelical
Christianity is precisely that it is not words alone that convert: Instead, congregants—
even in ordinary middle-class suburbs—learn to have out-of-the-ordinary experiences
and to use them to develop a remarkably, intimate, personal God” (518).
So in contrast to official evangelicalism’s heavy emphasis upon doctrine, for
many Evangelical adherents “relationship,” not doctrine, seems to be the focus of their
practical religious discourse. And it’s this relational construction of religious practice that
explains for Luhrmann why sensational practices are so important to the Evangelical
Christians she studies: “the goal of worship is to develop a relationship with God.
Developing that relationship is explicitly presented as the process of getting to know a
person who is distinct, external, and opaque, and whom you need to get to know in the
ordinary way” (525). Luhrmann compares falling in love with Jesus to “the intense love
of early adolescence” (523). Religious adherents in Luhrmann’s study consistently
described the process as “falling in love with Jesus,” and achieving “peace,” both of
which Luhrmann specifically identifies as bodily dispositions (523, 524). This emphasis
on learning to have experiences, crucially, denaturalizes religious experiences and the
relationships with God that depend upon them—creating space for the inherent change
and participatory agency we want to inject into representations.
These dispositions emerge through and perpetuate practitioners’ ongoing love
relationship with God, but don’t emerge spontaneously. Writing with Nusbaum and
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Thisted, Luhrmann argues they actually depend upon a set of social disciplines and
individual labor within those disciplines.
it takes effort to accept that a particular interpretation of the supernatural is
correct, and it takes effort to live in accordance with that interpretation—
to live as if they really do believe that their understanding is accurate. It
requires learning, and the learning can be a slow process, like learning to
speak a foreign language in an unfamiliar country, with new and different
social cues. That learning is often stumbling and gradual for those who
convert, take on new roles, or go through an initiation process. People
must come to see differently, to think differently, and above all to feel
differently, because to believe in a particular form of the supernatural as if
the supernatural is truly present is, for most believers, to experience the
world differently than if that form of the supernatural were not real.
(Luhrmann, Nusbaum, Thisted 67)
Maintaining this relationship through seeing, thinking, and feeling differently is difficult,
and must be acquired and worked at by religious practitioners. The relationship and the
sensations are thus the products of a continual learning process. Luhrmann’s findings
suggest there are three different types of learning involved in contemporary U.S.
evangelical Christian practice: cognitive/linguistic, metakinetic, and relational.
“Together, they enable new believers to do something quite remarkable—to construct,
out of everyday psychological experience, the profound sense that they have a really real
relationship with a being that cannot be seen, heard, or touched” (“Metakinesis” 519).
In terms of language, Luhrmann discusses lexical, syntactic, and narrative
knowledges that religious adherents utilize to represent, construct, and disseminate their
personal relationship with God. She notes two lexical elements particularly: one, “walk
with God,” describes the ongoing relationship Christians have with God; the other,
“Word of God,” “refers overtly to the written Bible, but it connotes the loving, personal,
and unique relationship congregants believe God has with each individual Christian.”
One man, for instance, describes the Bible as “a love story [. . .] written to me” (521).
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The man turns a generally available text into a personal communication of sorts—and
importantly, does so through particular interpretive texts. Luhrmann also notes that
evangelical Christian congregants train to acquire and maintain these relational practices
in part through official forms of discourse. Luhrmann’s “syntax” is closer to logic, or
themes. These broad themes include, for instance, the assumption that being a Christian,
praying, and the like are difficult: “These Christians expect that prayer does not come
easily and naturally. It is a skill that must be learned, as a relationship to God must also
be learned” (522). Finally, there are the narratives, and again Luhrmann cites one chief
narrative: “I was lost, so deeply lost, so lost that no one could love me—and then God
did, and I was found” (522).
Language also participates in transmitting metakinetic, or sensational, practices.
Descriptions are used, she finds, to transmit and codify sensational practices and
experiences, which are often “identified, labeled, and discussed” in books, seminars,
small groups, and sermons. At least within this congregation, the practical is articulated
(identified, labeled, discussed) so that it can be shared—whether it ever reaches the level
of official discourse or not. Although Luhrmann notes that individuals seem to develop
their own heterogeneous versions of the authorized practices, codifying articulation can
inform and disseminate these sensational experiences that “mark God’s spiritual reality in
their lives” (525). Luhrmann calls the bodily awareness that results from these practices
“metakinetic.” Reversing direction, metakinetic skills are also dynamically involved in
making linguistic practices relationally significant. For example, Luhrmann’s research
into sensation points out the ways the Bible is also a love story written by that man
referenced above—that is, she attributes his and other practitioners’ ability to have this
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experience and understanding of the Bible to their embodied skills. If the Bible is to be a
personal love story, practitioners must first acquire the “ability to identify their own
bodily reactions as indicating God’s responsiveness as they read the Bible, and as they
pray” (525). This use of sensation to develop a relationship with God, through language,
was widespread in the large congregation that Luhrmann studied: she notes, “all
congregants spontaneously associated the process of ‘getting to know Jesus’—which one
does through prayer and reading the Bible—with occasional experiences that involved
heightened emotions and unusual sensory and perceptual experiences and that they
identified, labeled, and discussed” (523).
In learning metakinetic skills, adherents “seem to be engaging in a variety of
bodily processes that are integrated in new ways and synthesized into a new
understanding of their bodies and the world”—processes that can alter attentional focus,
sensory perceptions, and changes in mood (522). The most prevalent metakinetic skill,
according to Luhrmann, is learning to “build a personal relationship to God through
prayer” (522). This prayer is “the conduit of anomalous psychological experiences” (523)
achieved through attendance and trance. Luhrmann writes that adherents “attend to the
stream of their own consciousness like eager fishermen, scanning for the bubbles and
whorls that suggest a lurking catch” (523). Adherents “become intensely absorbed in
inner sensory stimuli and lose some peripheral awareness” (523). In addition, Luhrmann
discusses the experience of sensory hallucinations—hearing voices, feeling pushes, and
the like. Nearly half of Luhrmann’s interviewees cited such experiences (524). In
whatever form, metakinetic learning allows congregants “to learn to pay attention to the
fragmentary chaos of conscious awareness in a new way” and “learn to identify and
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highlight these moments of discontinuity and . . . come to understand these moments as
signs of God’s presence in their lives” (524). As Luhrmann notes, these emotional and
bodily experiences “mark God’s spiritual reality in their lives” (525). She explains,
Metakinetic states—when God gives you peace, speaks to you outside
your head, when you feel that He carries you down to the altar—give a
kind of real reality to God because they create the experience of social
exchange between opaque individuals, between individuals who cannot
read each other’s minds and must exchange goods or words in order to
become real to each other, in order to know each other’s intentions. (525)
In this way, through the media of their own socially-disciplined bodies, even run-of-themill American evangelical Christians achieve new religious sensations, modes of
consciousness, and dispositions that help them “create a personal relationship that feels to
them authentic, intimate, and mutually reciprocal with an intentional being who does not
exhibit any of the normal signs of existence” (520).

Sensation Misrecognized: Mysticizing Sensation in Official Accounts of Religion
But, as I discussed with regards to DePalma in chapter one, hegemonic accounts
of religion and experience in America tend to misrecognize these embodied experiences
and feelings as natural and spontaneous. While the connection may not at first be
obvious, I’d like to connect this misrecognition to Alex’s distinction, discussed earlier,
between “my faith-based religious views” and “my fact-based academic view of the
world” (Carter 576). Although Alex understands herself as practicing both stances, she
nevertheless posits a divide between the two formations, in that “academics look at facts
and evidence” while “religion is mostly about feeling”—it literally can’t be a matter of
knowledge because God’s material presence would change the nature of belief and trust
(576). Writing studies has focused much attention on this division, and to the concept of
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religious feeling in general, but I don’t think we’ve yet adequately theorized religious
feeling, or figured out how to deploy it fruitfully. In fact, I use our own writings as an
example of the hegemonic account, because we remain wrapped up in a logic of religious
experience and feeling that renders it spontaneous, or individual, or in-articulable, and
almost always non-agential.
The logic first appeared in Anderson’s “Description of an Embarrassment.” Citing
negative theologian Karl Barth, Anderson argues, “Faith is a matter of intuiting the
inexplicable and of making a leap that cannot be justified to anyone who hasn’t made that
leap” (22). Since Anderson, this negative theological definition of religion has developed
into a common trope in our writings: Bronwyn Williams, citing Anderson, defines
religion as “belief in what cannot be proved or seen or explained in words” and a
“relationship to the unspeakable, undefinable, and unprovable” (107), while Smart
approvingly cites Anderson, affirming that “Faith embarrasses our attempts to articulate it
because it is otherworldly and thus other-word-ly: Faith asks us to explain the
unexplainable” (14). Carter’s gloss on Alex’s statement is interesting for the way it draws
in Anderson, Williams and Smart: “as so many of my students have said, true faith is a
‘feeling’ that cannot be explained, so articulating the reasoning behind one’s faith in
terms the secular world can understand may seem impossible” (574). I think it’s worth
rehearsing the set of terms attached to faith in these quotations: Faith is feeling (not facts
and evidence); intuiting; inexplicable; a leap; unjustifiable; belief in what cannot be
proved, seen, explained in words; a relationship to the unspeakable, undefinable,
unprovable; inarticulable; otherworldly; other-word-ly; asking us to explain the
unexplainable.
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As I read these terms that instructors attach to “faith,” I find these descriptors
compelling. Really, they would appear to correspond to the position I’m taking here—
they acknowledge the forms of practical knowing and being that are undoubtedly
involved in religious formations and really all formations, as Raymond Williams makes
clear. Experience cannot be exhaustively represented in language. Moreover, they point
out the internalization of behaviors, beliefs, assumptions, and sensibilities within
formations that I describe in chapter three. I want to further this line of inquiry, but I first
want to point out the hegemonic misrecognition process at work here. It might be best
expressed by Asad’s complaint regarding Geertz: He says, quite simply, “Geertz never
examines whether, and if so to what extent and in what ways, religious ‘experience’
relates to something in the social world believers live in” (249).
To understand what’s going on here, I believe the connections between this
construction of religion and negative theology must be elaborated. Put very roughly, a
strong negative theology asserts that by definition, nothing said by humans about God
can be true. This draws a firm and total line between a God of the Outside, and human
language (see Hagglund; Tillich). This epistemic agnosticism is academically and
philosophically useful, because it appears to insulate religious belief from many basic
rational arguments against it while simultaneously posing a challenge to the certain
knowledge claimed by religious adherents. In a very weak form, negative theology is
prevalent among evangelicals. According to the surveys done by Smith, Putnam and
Campbell, and Kinnaman, as well as ethnographies of evangelicals written by Susan
Harding and Bielo (to name only a few), many evangelicals do seem to acknowledge that
there’s much that they cannot know in a cognitive sense about an infinite being beyond
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their comprehension. This is so even in light of claims for the clear and immediate
knowledge of Biblical truths. This would seem to justify activating negative theology
when discussing students’ faiths.
So as the writing scholars above rightly indicate, many evangelicals instead report
conducting lives infused with religious affect, religious ways of thinking, and even
supernatural experiences. In other words, they report on religious ways of being and like
us often pose those religious ways of being (feeling) against knowledge or fact as a
seeming defense against logical critiques of religion. This is where Alex’s quote comes
in: “I understand that academics look at facts and evidence. However, religion is mostly
about feeling. If God wanted to, He could easily give us evidence that He exists. If He
did, though, believing in him and trusting Him wouldn’t be the same” (Carter 577,
emphasis in original). Here, we see that Alex replaces facts and knowledge with feeling,
though she denies that these feelings represent a form of knowing or evidence. Given
academe’s increasing interest in embodiment and alternative forms of knowing, writing
scholars seem naturally drawn to these descriptions of religious faith (on the relations
between embodiment and rhetoric and composition pedagogy, for instance, see Cooper;
Fleckenstein; Hawhee; Hawk; Johnson; Miller; Rickert). Our pedagogical response, as I
demonstrate in chapter one, is to help religious students find ways to express those
aspects of their faith in ways that will be congenial to an academic audience, rather than
attempting to defend what is “rationally” in-defensible. Negative theology, then, seems a
generous and intelligent way of getting around the difficulty of defending religious
beliefs that we may see as logically indefensible (Latour outlines and dismisses this
approach in the final chapter of Factish Gods).
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But I see two problems here. First, we don’t seem to acknowledge that pervasive
evangelical claims about relational knowing mean that a strong negative theology is
decidedly not how most evangelicals seem to understand their relationship to God. Even
beyond claims that the Bible consists of God’s actual words, the evangelical God
participates in the world—was even incarnated and lived a historical life as a man. He is
not fully Outside; in fact, as Luhrmann makes so clear, many evangelicals report
conducting an ongoing, deeply intimate relationship with a very personal God. If
evangelicals can talk about their lover or their friend, they can talk about their God—
strongly evidenced, too, by the enormous market for Christian music. The lyrics of those
songs are, as many have noted, often strangely reminiscent of popular love songs. God
may be mysterious, inarticulable, and somehow Other, but evangelicals’ relationships
with God are decidedly not. They are conducted, talked about, written about, improved
and fall apart, worked on and deliberately managed. Thus, while it needn’t be rejected out
of hand, we might need to reconsider our attempts to use negative theology as an
explanans for our students’ struggles to articulate their religious experiences and as a
rationale for helping students better express their faith. Their experience of a relationship
with God is not as mysterious and inarticulable for them as we would have it. As
DePalma, Rand, and Carter seem to suggest, perhaps the trouble is not knowledge or
general inarticulacy, but a question of genre or a matter of the sorts of knowledge we
count as legitimate.
Second, and even more crucially, we need to recognize that the difficulty of
adequately articulating religious feelings has little impact on whether or not the mediated
acquisition and maintenance of those feelings can be articulated and deliberated upon—
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and that seems to be a more important political project than determining ways to express
them. I can’t always articulate a feeling of love to my own satisfaction in any one form,
but I can nevertheless use any number of lenses or generic forms to explore and articulate
parts of that love, as well as particular sources contributing to that love’s acquisition. I
can manage it, recognize it, represent it, re-conceive it, make plans to get rid of it, help
others act so as to achieve it. Asserting there is a role for dispositions and emotions in
religious formations, then naming them (simply valuing and incorporating sensation in
descriptions of religious practice), is not enough. If instructors and scholars point to
religion’s practical qualities but fail to expose the deliberate processes of construction
underlying them, we allow ourselves and our religious students to treat these intuitions,
feelings, relationships, and beliefs as spontaneous or static rather than acquired and
changing. We again fall victim to “misrecognition”—forgetting the processes by which a
feeling or belief was acquired, and acting instead as if it is natural, a given. Doing so
maintains power relations by covering over sponsorships and hiding responsibility behind
spontaneity and “mystery.” This assumption, as Asad would point out, disables certain
options for religious students—they may more readily accept the idea that they can’t
express their religious commitment, but worse, they may also more readily accept the
idea that they can’t change the way that they feel.

Recognizing Sensation in Student Accounts of Religion
Acknowledging the importance of “feeling” and “experience” in religious practice
is the easy part—students claim them, instructors constantly highlight them—drawing out
the multiple mediators and individual acts of participation that form these experiences
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and feelings is seemingly more difficult. But it is worth the trouble: emphasizing
“sensation” simultaneously removes religious feelings, experiences, and faith from the
passive mystical, and moves them a little further into the politically and rhetorically
useful realm of choice, change, and individual agency. It is critical, therefore, that
instructor responses to, and student representations of, religious formations not only
gesture at these components of religious commitment and aid in their expression, but also
help students deliberate on and articulate the social processes by which such intuitions,
feelings, relationships, and beliefs are achieved. If students like Alex and James had
access to a strategy for representing the construction of religion’s internalized and
practical qualities, they might gain some agency in both expressing and intervening in the
supposedly inarticulable or spontaneous (passive) aspects of religious experience. Those
practices and events become explicable, describable, transmissible, and even alterable.
That doesn’t make religious commitment “logical,” and it doesn’t resolve it down to
assumptions, facts, or value statements; but it does make religious commitment
accessible to more forms of expression and more forms of intervention.18

18

The same might be said of our persistent definition of religion as identity. While
emphasizing the relations between religious discourse and students’ sense of self has
done powerful political work in legitimizing religions’ inclusion in the writing classroom,
it also risks reifying particular relations. Within all of our repeated attestations to
religion’s role in identity, very little has been said about the way that identity was
achieved and the way that it is likely to change in the future. The problem with this is
very similar to what Horner and Lu argued in “The Problematic of Experience” about
desire. In that article, Horner and Lu argue that students may want certain things when
they enter our classroom, and those desires should be taken into account. But the desires
students have at nineteen often change: over-privileging the desires of a certain moment
in their life, as some instructors have suggested we do, risks ignoring that these desires
have been shaped into this particular form and will continue to re-form in the future. It
would be irresponsible to reify the desires of the student at one moment and only work to
meet those desires, ignoring all of the other forms that student and her desires may take.
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This, I believe, is an implicit concern in DePalma’s article. He focuses significant
attention on the dynamic relationship between religious beliefs and experience. Religious
belief, DePalma argues, is a “working out of experience,” and so he encourages students
to reflect back on faith-defining events (223-4; 232). I’ve described DePalma’s strategy
in depth in chapter one: working specifically with an apparently evangelical student
named Thomas, DePalma responds to Thomas’s accounts of encounters with the Holy
Spirit by suggesting ways that Thomas might better communicate and construct these
religious experiences. DePalma indicates that Thomas could better describe the sensory
experiences (235-6), wants him to complicate and explicate phrases like “the presence of
the Holy Spirit,” “God’s will” and “surrender to Him” as well as terms like “calling,”
“grace,” and “ministry” (232), and thinks Thomas should more carefully mine some of
his key terms by explaining the personal meaning they’ve acquired through his religious
experiences (terms like identity, will, and surrender) (237). These are certainly promising
avenues of approach that are likely to achieve DePalma’s goals: they should encourage
Thomas to reflect in academic ways on both his religious experience and his religious
discourse, and could realistically improve Thomas’s ability to communicate those
experiences and that discourse to academic outsiders. Additionally focusing on religious
sensation as social, acquired, and relational, however, would provide Thomas and
DePalma with a transformative way to re-construct this spiritual experience; one which
could help Thomas to see further opportunities for actively participating and even
intervening in his religious experiences and relationship with God.

When we reify a momentary identity or quarantine a religious feeling, we risk doing the
same thing. Our options for creating change become extremely limited.
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While at times Thomas reports upon successfully achieving religious sensations
and relationships, oftentimes Thomas is reporting on difficulties he has with his feelings
and the strained relationship with God that those struggles index. He seems to feel very
little agency with regards to those religious sensations and that relationship with God, and
this lack of agency is a source of significant angst in the narrative. Thomas speaks at one
point as if God and his feelings towards God have together deserted him, for instance. He
writes,
Ever since I broke up with Jen, I feel like God is nowhere to be found. Just
when I needed him most, he has up and left. I read my bible every day, but
I just don’t feel drawn the way I used to. What’s happening with me? Why
can’t I get a hold of myself? God, I am trying to fix this, but I just don’t
know how. I just have never felt so alone, and I don’t think anyone gets it.
(230)
Here Thomas is clearly flustered by his inability to master his feelings, but also by a
sense of loneliness stemming from a double social loss—not only is his relationship with
God seemingly gone (“he has up and left”), but Thomas also feels that others can’t
understand his situation. Thomas also admits the difficulty of communicating other
religious feelings, implying a pattern: “For a long time, I felt a calling to ministry. It’s
hard to describe, but I just had a feeling inside of me that it was right for me” (231). As I
noted at the beginning of this section, other students in our literature have similarly
confessed to difficulties articulating religious feelings, a complaint that instructors have
frequently highlighted.
So instead of trying to better express his frustration or the sense of absence he
feels when his relationship with God is on the fritz, Thomas might be better served if
encouraged to deliberate on the mediators and processes involved in producing that
relationship and those sensations at that moment. Clearly, attempting to describe feelings
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is difficult for anyone—and poetic genres for expressing them will not always meet
students’ needs (especially not if they’re trying to gain more control or understanding of
them). Focusing on religious sensation as acquired and social could, however, by helping
them to write about the mediative role they and others have played in both enabling and
disabling their feelings and experiences. In Thomas’s case this type of focus could afford
a position of greater agency to Thomas but also to others like his girlfriend Jen, while
also giving him specific language for representing and interrogating the forces and causes
of his feelings.
Reading his account with the social and sensational aspects of religious
experience in mind, I see Thomas’s relationship with God as heavily shaped by his social
conditions. First, there are the commonalities between Thomas’s account and other
evangelical accounts: like Luhrmann’s informants, Thomas uses the word “peace” twice
in one short entry describing a positive religious interaction with the Holy Spirit (231),
suggesting that his sensation (or at least its representational aspect) circulate. Second, in
keeping with Luhrmann’s informant-accounts Thomas depicts a strong connection
between his cognitive relationship to the Bible and his emotional relationship to the Bible
and to God—perhaps just as interestingly, he depicts how that connection is also affected
by his emotional relationship with Jen, his ex-girlfriend. For example, when Jen quotes
Scripture to him shortly after their break-up—“Wait for the Lord. Be strong and take
heart, and wait for the Lord”—Thomas’s journaled retort is, “You know what, no thank
you. I hate that verse. What does it even mean?” (230). Thomas is “unable” to
comprehend the transparent meaning of the Word because his relationship with Jen, and
God, have become troubled. Here, sensation again points to the social and mediated
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nature of religious literacy. This could be the germ of a revision suggestion in which
Thomas would be asked to highlight the mutually transformative social relations he
experienced between he and Jen, and he and God. If I pushed out our boundaries to
consider the cultural forces at work here, I might ask Thomas to consider what discourses
on love, sex, and relationships (religious or not) were speaking into his relationship with
Jen, and so through that relationship into his relationship with God and the Bible.
Many other mediators, too, played significant roles in helping Thomas recover his
ability to hear God speaking. Here, for example, is Thomas’s report of the moment when
he does finally sense God’s presence again:
August 26, 2008: Dear Diary . . . Morning prayer started off sitting in a
small, slightly crowded room joined together in body and spirit with 20
other people. The profound feeling of the presence of the Holy Spirit is a
weight and a heat that surrounds you and fills your lungs with every
breath, as if the air were somehow thicker. Yet it is comforting, like the
warm embrace of a parent; it removes all distractions, and I am at peace . .
. Then, after worship, we transitioned into the retreat of silence. Two and a
half hours by myself in total silence. At first, I was very intimidated by
this, two hours alone with my thoughts with all the confusion in my life at
this point. But as I picked a comfortable spot under a tree and looked out
over the lake, peace crept back in. During the silence, I spent a long time
reflecting on my life and praying for God to reveal whatever he has been
trying to show me. This time I was willing to wait, willing to take heart,
and eagerly I anticipated an answer. In the quiet, God slowly revealed to
me a lot more than I bargained for. (231, ellipses original)
I think we see here the real advantage of DePalma’s emphasis upon thick description—
thick description draws out the mediators in an account. Moving towards revision or
further assignments, a transformational perspective will ask Thomas to think about the
work being done in this scene by a variety of things, people, and regulated practices.
There are the four hours or so of religious programming—the morning group
prayer, transitioning into group “worship” (likely music), transitioning into contemplative
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silence. There is the programmed experiential progression from individual to corporate
body, then back again into individual isolation. There is the small size of the room,
important, as studies have found that being crowded increases excitement and suasion.
There is the relational orientation of the programming: the direct invocation and address
of God through prayer, and the proclamations of relationship that generally infuse
Christian worship music—which Thomas suggests successfully provoke the presence of
the Holy Spirit—followed by the long period of silence and prayer in which Thomas
specifically supplicated God for his personal communication. This period of silence, of
course, is enhanced by the cultural symbolism that attaches contemplative ambience to
the lake scene. Further, I think there are indications that Thomas may be practicing the
metakinetic forms of attention described by Luhrmann’s informants—he is willing to
wait, willing to take heart, eagerly anticipating an answer—and so, after an hour or so of
preparatory practices that moved Thomas into a heightened emotional and spiritual state
and then two hours of prayer and internal attendance, he gets it. God speaks to him.
That’s a lot of work, a lot of mediation, a lot of agency. These not only offer
opportunities for reporting, but for deliberation; Thomas could be asked to examine the
cultural sources that shape, disseminate, and thus enable these practices as effective
religious practices.
If we encouraged him to look backward in his life, Thomas might examine how
he learned to utilize such sensational practices—and to expect and interpret such
sensational experiences—in the first place. In terms of practical experience, instructors
could ask Thomas, When do you remember first having such sensations of God’s
presence, revealing something to you? What were the circumstances that time, and which
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of those circumstances were also present in this occasion? Are there specific types of
prayers that you pray, or ways that you’ve learned to attain the “quiet” and “waiting” that
you describe? Who taught you to do that, or what other experiences helped you locate
those skills? Are there books on this, or other publicly-disseminated models of religious
behavior that resemble your practice? In terms of recognizing those sensations as
specifically religious, instructors might ask Thomas to elaborate again on its sources:
How have you acquired the ability to recognize the Spirit’s presence? What other
individuals taught you how to recognize this? What did that training entail? Where have
you ever read, viewed, or otherwise heard about these experiences and sensations? How
might these past second-hand experiences have informed your experience?
Then, as I suggested with James, instructors could produce a sense of cultural
specificity by asking Thomas to compare reports of religious experience offered by
practitioners of other religions or other churches to his own report. How do they differ,
and why does he think that is? What might Thomas consider including from those
practices into his own—and if he’s unwilling to include any of these alternative means of
relating to God, he might go back to the definitions of religion he’s operating with.
Instuctors’ comments could, too, turn attention to the future by asking Thomas to
consider what he can do with this new conception of religious sensation as acquired. How
can he intervene in his own religious practices or those of others with this new
knowledge? What work could be accomplished by representing religious experience in
this way? Conversely, Thomas could discuss any losses or contradictions this new, fairly
academic representation creates for him. Does thinking of religious sensation through this
academic lens change Thomas’s relationship with God, or the way he now remembers
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that experience on retreat? Does the excitement of experiencing God’s presence go away
if it seems orchestrated or manufactured? Does it create a sense of contradiction for him
at church, or in any way cause him to feel differently about things he hears or sees in
church?

Conclusion
In a well-known Bible story King Solomon is confronted by two mothers and one
baby. Each woman claims that the infant is her child. Those of Judeo-Christian heritage
know, of course, the punch line—Solomon demonstrates his divine wisdom by drawing
the truth out of the women themselves. He orders the baby cut in half. It was not his
intent, of course, but by today’s light there is something scientific and analytical in
Solomon’s recommendation: let us cut the baby open, releasing the child from its
infantile muteness, and let the body itself tell us the truth. One woman—the ESV calls her
“the woman whose son was alive”— exclaims, basically, “In that case, she can keep the
child. Don’t kill it.” The other, stone-faced, urges the king to get on with it. Solomon
declares the first woman the boy’s mother on the basis of those reactions, saying, “Give
the child to the first woman, and by no means put him to death; she is his mother” (I
Kings 3:16-27). Solomon, you sly devil, we say. Tricking the women into telling you the
truth.
But lately I am more compelled by an alternate reading. As a modern reader it has
always troubled me that the women in the story are not named, and as such the
distinctions between the two women are never better than hazy. They are described as
“two prostitutes,” “the one,” “the other,” “the first woman,” etc. The reader is never told
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whether the plaintiff or the defendant is speaking after the opening explanation of the
circumstances, so that the reader is never granted the “truth” we often demand from such
a story. We don’t know which woman was stone-faced, and which was loving—only that
the loving woman received the child. It’s like ending a detective novel with the
murderer’s execution, but never showing readers the face under the hood. Here, we only
know that the story is adequately resolved in the sense that the mother has her child. That
should be enough, right?
But this raises, for me, a critical implication: if we do not need to know who was
telling the truth—plaintiff or defendant—perhaps it’s because Solomon didn’t need to
know either. The real story for me isn’t about the honesty of the women or the facts of
the child’s birth—the narrative (and by turn Solomon) proves to be concerned with the
baby and with its mother. A relationship. Solomon’s real wisdom may have been in
eschewing information (facts, knowledge of the past) for present effects. So is it possible,
I’d like to ask, that the birth mother did not end up with the baby, but the mother did?
Why not? What if the reason we aren’t given any way to differentiate between the
women’s histories (their characters, their “selves”) is because they don’t matter? Then,
Solomon’s wisdom is not in “knowing the truth,” nor in “revealing the truth,” nor in
otherwise pretending to find what is inaccessible but instead in recognizing, in making, a
mother. Motherhood is “yearning,” being “moved,” effects that the ESV says Solomon’s
word triggered in one woman and not the other (3:26). From there on, motherhood
becomes really a matter of legal positioning—Solomon’s performative utterance declares
“She is his mother” in the same breath as it gives the child to her, so that this particular
type of motherhood is born in discourse.
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Solomon’s story points out, certainly, other approaches to an investigation. We
can proceed assuming that cutting open the baby will reveal a factual mother. We can
proceed assuming that careful questioning may eventually coax or cajole a hidden truth
or partial truth from the women (that’s how the story is generally read). We can give up
on both and declare that whatever we decide it won’t ever get to the truth; we may
believe what we determine, but we can forget about ever being certain of it. In this case,
which sounds (but is not) close to my reading, the true mother may not end up with the
child. But that’s not what I’m saying: I’m saying the mother inevitably ends up with her
child in this story because Solomon is re-defining a mother as something one can become
or cease to be, rather than something one simply is. One woman became a mother
through her responses and through Solomon’s actions—the other woman became the
mother of the other, dead child through her responses and through Solomon’s actions.
This reading of Solomon’s story compels the dissertation I’ve written. My
founding assumption is that religions, like mothers, are being made continually. The
important questions have never been what religion, or Christianity, or evangelicalism,
really are: the important questions have always been what forces have shaped those
formations into their current form, what relationships and practices maintain that current
form, and in what ways can our actions intervene and alter future formations of religion,
and Christianity, and evangelicalism? And, specific to our discipline, what habitual ways
of thinking, seeing, reading, and writing about religion operate in our relations to
religious discourses and religious students? If instead of answering these questions we
wish to continue arguing over what religion is, or what evangelicalism or Islam or
Judaism truly are, the result for ourselves and our auditors will be something like
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Solomon’s response to the two women’s endless debate: “‘The one says, ‘This is my son
that is alive, and your son is dead’; and the other says, ‘No; but your son is dead, and my
son is the living one’.’ And the king said, ‘Bring me a sword’” (3:23-24). There is no end
to such an argument, but there will assuredly always be two polarized sides, a weak
middle, and a scramble for a sword.
The binary logic on religion is pervasive, and politically consequential. Mohler
said weeks before our recent presidential election, speaking from just such a binary
perspective on the difference between Democrats and Republicans, “We are not looking
at minor matters of political difference. We are staring into the abyss of comprehensive
moral conflict. Christian voters,” he continued, cannot escape “the fact that our most
basic convictions will be revealed in the voting booth come November” (“The Great
American Worldview Test”). Barack Obama and the Democratic Party were applauded in
some corners for eventually taking an equally antagonistic rhetorical stance, dramatically
apparent to me as I watched the Democratic National Convention. In the end, such
irresolvable arguments must resolve down to force: who yells loudest, who steals the
baby last, who gets the most votes, who grabs the government’s sword.
Thinking back to Thomson’s student-informants and the ways they struggle to
represent themselves within the hegemonic influence of official evangelical discourses
like Mohler’s, and thinking back to instructors’ and scholars’ corresponding difficulties
with reading and representing religious students and religious texts, it is clear that we all
need strategies for re-mapping the polarized, two party, heaven and hell religio-political
world of Mohler and official evangelicalism. As I have argued in this fifth chapter, this
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re-mapping is a matter of recognizing (that is, not only reading but legitimating and
realizing) both difference, and change.
To better recognize difference, students and instructors need new ways of
recognizing and locating official evangelicalism’s representations, representatives, and
accounts on a different, less polarized, more pluralized map, even if it’s just a map of
evangelicalism itself. If we can produce that map, it will offer us a richer variety of ways
to position ourselves and relate to one another on religious and political questions. This
might allow students to more creatively align their position in relation with their
experience of religion, or their desires for religion, or the political reality that they desire,
or to the various and competing commitments shaping their political and religious lives.
To better recognize change, students need help focusing on religious processes rather
than contents or products, so that they will have a better chance at seeing religion, the
academy, and the contexts in which it plays out as sets of moving parts involving
relations of agency and power. If they do, then they may also understand themselves as
one of those moving parts, part of the answer to how and why; they may see themselves
having the capacity to intentionally and non-intentionally change, as well as be changed
by, their religious experiences and discourses and the contexts in which such experiences
and discourses take place.
Accordingly, the reading strategies I’ve recommended to instructors throughout
this dissertation are intended to help students explore new ways of representing, locating,
and creating religion. At the very least, I hope they help instructors practice forms of
reading and writing that acknowledge, and help students address, the challenges of
representation—the need for and possibility of responding to official discourse using
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one's own practical experience in religions and academic cultures. But in addition, these
reading strategies should help students see how they can exercise their agency in
transforming cultures and identities through reading and writing. If these strategies are
successful, we may be able to simultaneously practice and promote tolerance by helping
religious students “engage the fluidity of [religion] in pursuit of new knowledge, new
ways of knowing, and more peaceful relations” (Lu, Horner, Royster, and Trimbur 307).
And, really, in pursuit of new religions.
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